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This thesis presents a refined treatise of civil-military relations and military 
professionalism which provides civilian and military personnel engaged in the reform 
process in Hungary and Poland with insights into the ongoing struggle to institutionalize 
the ideal of the democratic citizen-soldier and democratic military professionalism. 
Infusing democratic military professionalism and the ideal of the citizen-soldier 
throughout the ranks of the Hungarian Defense Forces (HDF) and the Polish Armed 
Forces (PAF) will help ensure that Hungary and Poland make a complete transition to 
democracy and achieve "human interoperability" with NATO. As Hungary and Poland 
democratize, they must create mechanisms of democratic political (civilian) control of the 
military, introduce society and the military to the concept of the democratic citizen-
soldier; and institutionalize democratic military professionalism within the armed forces. 
Democratization programs such as NATO's Partnership for Peace (PFP), and the 
United States' Joint Contact Team Program (JCTP), International Military Education and 
Training Program (IMET), and the George C. Marshall European Center for Security 
Studies must help the Hungarian and Polish armed forces to institutionalize the ideal of 
the democratic citizen-soldier and democratic military professionalism. Without 
democratic military professionalism, the new armies of democratic citizen-soldiers in 
East Central Europe will not have the leadership, discipline, and morale necessary to be 
effective and reliable NATO partners. 
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This thesis is based on the premise that the transformation of society and politics 
results in changed patterns of civil-military relations. 1 A communist political system is 
characterized by communist civil-military relations, and a democratic political system is 
characterized by democratic civil-military relations. When states change from one 
political system to another, they must also reorder their civil-military relations to ensure 
the military plays a role that is congruous with the principles, norms and values of the 
new political system? In addition, a change in the political system transforms the nature 
of the military's relationship with society. To ensure that the military's role is congruous 
with changes in the political system and society, the state must change the mechanisms of 
political control, develop a new concept of the "citizen-soldier," and create a new form of 
military professionalism. 
1 Marybeth Peterson Ulrich, "Democratization and the Post-Communist Militaries: U.S. Support for 
Democratization in the Czech and Russian Militaries," Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Illinois at Urbana-
Champaign, 1996, p. 131; Otto Hintze, "Military Organization and Organization of the State," The 
Historical Essays of Otto Hintze (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975), pp. 180-183, Hintze notes 
that "All state organization was originally military organization, organization for war ... But then there came 
a period, as agriculture expanded, as men took root in the soil they cultivated, as the population increased, 
as communications and technology advanced, as trade developed--in short, as the conditions of economic 
life changed when a separation of military and commercial activity set in, a division between the class that 
fought and the class that fed The armed forces became a special part of the whole, and its organization a 
special aspect of the organization of the state. The questions that now arise are these: What place is 
occupied by the organization of the army in the general organization of the state? To what extent does it 
influence political institutions as a whole? How far do the economic requirements of the whole community 
or even of individual classes impose limitations on the demands ofthe warrior class to dominate public 
life? How in general do class contradictions interweave with the contradiction between military life and 
commercial life? What balance between the two does the state organization provide?"; Felix Gilbert, 
"Machiavelli: The Renaissance of the Art of War," Makers of Modern Strategy, Peter Paret, ed. (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1986) pp. 11-31. 
2 Ibid., and Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military 
Relations (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957), p. 2; and 
Colonel Mark E. Victorson, U.S. Army, Mission in the East: The Building of an Army in a Democracy in 
the New German States (Newport, Rhode Island: Naval War College, Newport Paper No. 7, June 1994), 
pp. 3-4. 
As Hungary and Poland convert from a communist to a democratic political 
system, they must also change from a communist to democratic form of civil-military 
relations and military professionalism. Thus, Hungary and Poland are struggling to create 
mechanisms of democratic political (civilian) control; introduce society and the military 
to the concept of the democratic citizen-soldier; and institutionalize democratic military 
professionalism within the armed forces--all within the framework of the North Atlantic 
Cooperation Council (NACC), the Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe 
(OSCE), and possible NATO and Western European Union (WEU) membership. 
This thesis goes beyond most studies of civil-military relations by providing a 
more detailed examination of military professionalism. The authors present a refined 
treatise of military professionalism which provides civilian and military personnel 
engaged in the reform process with insights into the ongoing struggle to institutionalize 
the ideal of the democratic citizen-soldier and democratic military professionalism in 
Hungary and Poland. Infusing democratic military professionalism and the ideal of the 
democratic citizen-soldier throughout the ranks of the Hungarian Defense Forces (HDF) 
and the Polish Armed Forces (PAF) will help ensure that Hungary and Poland make a 
complete transition to democracy and achieve "human interoperability" with NATO. This 
study defines democratic military professionalism as the image and practice of the soldier 
in the state that allows the professional armed forces of a democracy to be effective, 
while at the same time, reflecting certain democratic values. Military professionals in a 
democracy are experts in their field who respect civilian control of the military, embody 
2 
the ideal of the democratic citizen-soldier, are accountable to society, and maintain the 
unique "military ethic." 
Moreover, this study refines the concept of military professionalism by 
identifying three primary and two secondary foundations which form the basis of military 
professionalism in any military organization. The three primary foundations of military 
professionalism are (1) authority, (2) leadership, and (3) discipline, morale, and 
obedience, and the two secondary foundations are (1) recruitment and retention, and (2) 
career development. Defining military professionalism in this way provides a greater 
level of specificity to compare democratic military professionalism in the Atlantic-Style 
Democratic (ASD) states with communist military professionalism in non-Soviet Warsaw 
Pact (NSWP) states.3 Comprehending the differences in military professionalism will 
help the members of East Central European (ECE) militaries to develop a new form of 
military professionalism to coincide with the reform of their formal civil-military 
relations. 
Since the end of the Cold War, the former NSWP states of Hungary and Poland 
have attempted to transform their economies, political systems and military institutions 
from the Soviet model to that of the Atlantic democracies. As they shift to a free-market 
economy, develop closer ties with the European Union, and join Western security 
institutions, the Poles and Hungarians face the challenge of overcoming the legacy of 
3 The ASD states include: U.S., Great Britain, France, Canada, Germany, The Netherlands, Denmark, 
Iceland, Belgium, and Norway. NSWP states included: Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Romania, 
Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Albania. 
3 
fifty years of communism and authoritarian rule before inculcating the principles of 
democracy and capitalism. 
In addition to economic and political transformation, an outstanding challenge 
confronting the post-communist states is the reform of external and national security 
policy and military institutions. Prior to 1989, all aspects of national defense policy and 
strategy were subordinated to the Warsaw Pact. By 1992-93, the Polish and Hungarian 
desire to satisfy Western requirements for possible NATO membership led post-
communist policy makers to reformulate their security policy and restructure and 
modernize the armed forces. Eager to join NATO, leaders in Budapest and Warsaw stated 
that they were committed to achieving the main objectives set forth in NATO's 
Partnership For Peace (PFP) Framework Document: ensuring democratic control of 
defense forces and developing interoperability with NAT0.4 Since then, the Polish and 
Hungarian defense establishments have worked toward achieving democratic control of 
the military and NATO interoperability with the help of such US and NATO 
democratization programs as PFP, the U.S. military's Joint Contact Team Program 
(JCTP), the U.S. State Department's International Military Education and Training 
Program (IMET), and the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies (for a 
description of the programs, refer to the Appendix).5 This thesis recommends that U.S. 
4 NATO Handbook (Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 1995), pp. 265-268; Partnership for 
Peace Guide, March, 1996, U.S. DOD Publication, p. 3. 
5 Ibid., PFP is aNA TO program; the other three listed are US programs. Other US and NATO programs 
address specific functional and technical needs of the Partnership for Peace member state defense 
establishments. For example, the Defense Resource Management Study Program (DRMS) of the US 
Office of the Secretary of Defense, helps civilian Ministries in Partner nations develop effective defense 
resource and budget systems. In addition, other NATO countries conduct their own bilateral and 
multilateral programs. 
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and NATO programs help the Hungarian Defense Force (HDF) and the Polish Armed 
Forces (PAF) institutionalize the ideal of the democratic citizen-soldier and democratic 
military professionalism to ensure the military's proper role in society and enhance 
"human interoperability" with NATO. 
B. METHODOLOGY 
Chapter II of this study treats the dynamics of civil-military relations in the ASD 
and NSWP states, including thereby the concept of the democratic and communist 
citizen-soldier. Chapter III examines the foundations of military professionalism with 
respect to ASD and NSWP states. In chapter IV, the authors use the dialectical 
discussions in the first chapters as a framework to analyze the current status of civil-
military relations and military professionalism in Hungary and Poland. Finally, chapter V 
summarizes the current status of civil-military relations and military professionalism in 
Hungary and Poland and makes recommendations concerning reform efforts. 
Authors' note: A "dialectic" is the method of logic used by Hegel and adapted by 
Clausewitz and Marx to explain social, political, military and economic processes: it is 
based on the principle that an idea or event (thesis) is followed by its opposite 
(antithesis); the characteristics of one phenomenon are clarified by analyzing its 
opposite.6 For example, in On War, Clausewitz's thesis oftotal war as the ideal war is 
followed by the antithesis that war, even in theory, is always influenced by forces 
external to it.7 Similarly, this study uses a dialectical approach to clearly identify the 
6 Webster's New World Dictionary, Victoria Neufeldt, ed. (New York: Macmillan, 1994); Peter Paret, 
"Clausewitz," Makers of Modern Strategy, p. 198. 
7 Ibid., p. 199. 
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differences between democratic civil-military relations/military professionalism (thesis), 
and communist civil-military relations/military professionalism (antithesis), to provide a 
useful framework for analyzing military reform in Hungary and Poland. As part of the 
dialectical approach, the authors describe the "ideal" models of democratic civil-military 
relations/military professionalism, and the "ideal" models of Soviet-communist civil-
military relations/military professionalism. The use of"ideal," or "absolute," models in a 
dialectic format allows the authors to clearly organize ideas and identify the distinctive 
features of civil-military relations and military professionalism in each political system. 
However, the use of a dialectical approach and "ideal" models glosses over some of the 
exceptional events and aberrant characteristics of civil-military relations which, together 
with the ideal models form an aggregate picture of the reality of civil-military relations 
and military professionalism in each political system. The authors footnote many of these 
exceptions in an effort to present a balanced and realistic analysis throughout the study. 
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II. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN ASD AND NSWP STATES 
A. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN NSWP STATES 
1. Introduction 
The relationship between the Soviet Union, the East European Communist Parties 
and the armed forces formed a unique pattern of civil-military relations in the NSWP. 
The Soviet Union exercised control over the NSWP through political, economic, cultural, 
and military mechanisms at the domestic level, the bilateral level, and the multinational 
level. 8 Each state's domestic communist party apparatus had to submit to Soviet authority 
through bilateral political and economic agreements. In addition, the mechanisms of the 
multinational WTO controlled the armed forces of the Eastern European states. 
9 Strong 
Soviet mechanisms of control guaranteed Soviet hegemony and the existence of the 
illegitimate communist regimes of Eastern Europe. However, to understand the dynamics 
of civil-military relations in the NSWP states, one must examine the characteristics of 
civil-military relations in Soviet-communist political systems in general. The structure 
and functions of the Party and the organs of government in the NSWP were identical to 
those in the Soviet Union. 
2. Characteristics of Civil-Military Relations in Soviet-Communist 
States 
Civil military relations in communist political systems, to include those of NSWP 
states, can best be understood by examining the nexus between the military, the 
8 Theresa Rakowska-Harmstone, Warsaw Pact: Question of Cohesion Phase II, Vol. I The Greater 
Socialist Army: Integration and Reliability (Ottawa: Department of Defense, Canada, 1984), p.iii; and 
Bradley R. Gitz, Armed Forces and Political Power in Eastern Europe (New York: Greenwood Press, 
1992), p. 51. 
9 Bradley R. Gitz, p. 51. 
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government, and the hegemonic Communist Party--the institution that controlled all 
government institutions and every facet of life in society. The Communist Party's 
vanguard role created a political system in which the Party reigned supreme, and its 
hegemony depended on its ability to control the non-party institutions of the state. 10 
The Communist Party ensured its supremacy through the use of a dual party-
government structure which consisted of two parallel hierarchies: the party apparatus, run 
by officials of the Communist Party, and a larger state structure of government 
bureaucrats, military officers and members of the security forces. 11 The party and the 
government structures were interconnected in two ways: First, all important government 
officials, generals, and most of the officer corps were party members, subject to party 
discipline and directives; and second, joint party-government committees developed 
national policies and served as institutional links between the two structures. 12 In 
addition, the party leadership had the authority to make policy and to oversee its 
execution, while government institutions, to include the Defense Council and the 
Ministry of Defense (MOD) ratified (rubber stamped) and implemented all party 
policies. 13 Thus, the relationship between the Party and the government can best be 
described as a partnership, in which the Party was the undisputed senior partner. 14 
The government institutions concerned with the formulation and implementation 
of defense policy in the Soviet system were the Defense Council and the Ministry of 
10 Ibid., p. 8. 
11 Ellen Jones, Red Army and Society, (Boston: Allen and Unwin Publishers, 1985), p. 2. 
12 Ibid., p. 2. 
13 Ibid., p. 2. 
14 Ibid., p. 2. 
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Defense. 15 As a joint party-military committee, the Defense Council provided top-level 
coordination for the defense-related activities of government bodies to ensure that non-
military agencies were responsive to military needs.
16 Its membership consisted of the 
Minister of Defense, Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Chief of the General Staff, 
the Foreign Minister, and other Central Committee functionaries with military duties.
17 
Party leaders entrusted the Defense Council to review all major national security issues, 
direct military development programs, and coordinate the work of the entire state 
apparatus in support of military requirements. 18 
The MOD in the Soviet system had the responsibility for the direct management 
of the armed forces. 19 The officers in the MOD held a monopoly of expertise on defense 
issues and military matters which enabled them to directly influence the policymaking 
process, although they were not autonomous actors in that process. 
20 Despite the 
Communist Party's predominance in policy making, over which the armed forces had no 
control, civilian party and government leaders did not have an extensive network of non-
military sources of military information. There were no Soviet equivalents for the Central 
Intelligence Agency or private consulting firms like the RAND corporation?
1 Rather, 
civilian leaders and bureaucrats relied on the monopoly of expertise held by the officers 
in the MOD. Officers alone possessed military expertise because the few civilians that 
15 Ulrich, p. 141. 
16 Ellen Jones, p. 7. 
17 Ulrich, p. 141. 
18 Ellen Jones, p. 7. 
19 Ulrich, p. 141. 
20 Ellen Jones, p. 23. 
21 Timothy J. Colton, Commissars, Commanders, and Civilian Authority: The Structure of Soviet Military 
Politics (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979), p. 244. 
9 
were employed in the Ministry of Defense held low level, less-skilled, non-professional 
positions?2 By contrast to ASD defense establishments, the Soviet-style MODs did not 
integrate civilians into high-level, professional posts. And those few civilians who were 
assigned to top positions within Soviet-style MODs, such as former Soviet Defense 
Minister Dmitry Ustinov, were given military rank commensurate with their position and 
'1' 'fi 23 wore a m1 Itary um orm. 
The Party charged the MOD with the responsibility for defense planning, military 
research and development, and the management of personnel issues.24 To implement the 
vast amount of responsibility assigned to it, the MOD relied on the General Staffto 
consolidate and coordinate its activities. The General Staff acted as an extended personal 
staff of the Defense Minister, charged with strategic planning and with coordinating the 
activities of the service staffs?5 Together, the MOD and the General Staff served as the 
executive agency for basic policies forged at the higher levels of the civilian 
bureaucracy. 26 
As the "senior partner" in a one-party system, the Communist Party exercised a 
form of civilian control over the Defense Council, the MOD, and the General Staff which 
differed sharply from the democratic civilian control exercised in ASD states. The ASD 
states have transparent, accountable political processes, in which it is relatively easy to 
delineate the goals and interests of the various actors who attempt to influence defense 
22 Ellen Jones, p. 104. 
23 Ibid., p. 105. 
24 Ellen Jones, p. 14. 
25 Harriet Fast Scott and William F. Scott, The Armed Forces of the USSR (London: Anns and Annour 
Press, 1984), p. 117. 
26 Ibid., p. 244. 
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policy: the legislature; the executive; the military leadership; political parties and the 
numerous pressure groups, ranging from military industrial lobbies to associations of 
retired veterans.27 The Soviet and NSWP states lacked such transparency in their 
political processes. In the Soviet system, the omnipresence of the Communist Party in the 
organs of government made it difficult to separate the aims and interests of the 
institutions vying to influence defense policy from the agenda of the Party ?8 This lack of 
transparency often created obscure, informal, and "hidden" policy-making processes in 
which the Party ensured its hegemony through centralized institutional mechanisms of 
29 
control. 
The Party ensured that it would remain the senior partner in the dual party-
government structure, retain its hegemony over the people, and protect the state from 
external threats by forging a close relationship with the armed forces. Communist rulers 
throughout the Soviet Imperium, but in particular, those in the NSWP states, relied on the 
Soviet military to keep them in power because their communist regimes lacked 
legitimacy.30 Without the mandate of the people to legitimize their rule, the communist 
parties needed the support of the only institution that possessed the instrument of coercive 
power: the military. Although the Party maintained a monopoly of power within the 
political system, they did not have a monopoly of force to preserve that power, thus, the 
27 Rudolf Joo, "The Democratic Control of the Armed Forces," Challiot Paper 23, Feb 1996 (Paris: 
Institute for Security Studies Western European Union), p. 13. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid., p. 13; and Ellen Jones, p. 23. 
30 A complete discussion of why the communist parties lacked legitimacy is presented in the authority 
section of Chapter III in this thesis. 
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Party depended on the indigenous military and the Soviets as instruments to protect the 
Communist regime from its internal as well as its external enemies.31 
3. Mechanisms of Soviet Control 
One must view the above discussion on the nature of communist civil-military 
relations in the NSWP states in the context of Soviet hegemony in the region. Determined 
to maintain the dominant role as leader of the "socialist community of nations," the 
Communist Party ofthe Soviet Union (CPSU) relied on a variety of mechanisms to 
ensure the loyalty of the Communist Parties and the armed forces ofNSWP states. To 
maintain its hegemony over Eastern Europe, the CPSU sought the functional and 
attitudinal integration of the NSWP states 32 According to Soviet scholar Theresa 
Rakowska-Harmstone, functional integration is "conformity to the official norms and 
obedience to the policy directives of the ruling parties and Warsaw Pact command 
structures; and attitudinal integration is the internalization of the official value system and 
political loyalty to the Soviet or East European communist parties and the Warsaw Pact 
alliance system."33 The CPSU successfully obtained the functional integration of the 
NSWP through the use of the following institutional mechanisms of control: the Main 
Political Administration (MPA) and its political officers; the Committee for State 
Security (KGB) and the military counterintelligence service; the para-military units of the 
Communist party, and economic and military mechanisms of the WP alliance. However, 
31 Ulrich, p.133. 
32 Rakowska-Harmstone, Phase II, Vol. 1, pp. iv-v. 
33 Ibid. 
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the CPSU s political socialization programs failed to gain the attitudinal integration of 
servicemembers--except for the senior cadre--in NSWP armies.
34 
a. Main Political Administration (MPA) 
The Communist Parties ofthe Soviet Union and NSWP states guided 
party-political work in the armed forces through the Main Political Administration.
35 
Accountable to the Central Committee and the Defense Council, the MP A provided a 
channel through which the Party influenced all aspects of military activity, enhanced 
combat readiness, strengthened military discipline, boosted morale, increased political 
awareness, and indoctrinated Eastern European youth. 36 In addition, the MP A attempted 
to ensure the "ideological purity" of the NSWP armies through a process of political 
socialization--instilling military personnel with approved values and attitudes.
37 The 
MPA accomplished these tasks through the military's political organs, party 
organizations, and Komsomol organizations. 
The MPA organized its administrative bodies to parallel the military's 
command hierarchy.38 From the Ministry of Defense, the chief of the MPA directed 
political operations for the entire armed forces. At each of the service headquarters, the 
political administrations ofthe Navy, Air Forces, and Ground Forces conducted MPA 
operations.39 The MPA employed political administrative apparatuses in the military 
districts, fleets, and groups of forces, and used smaller political "departments" to carry 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Scott and Scott, p. 288. 
37 Ellen Jones, p. 114. 
38 Ibid., p. 118. 
39 Ibid. 
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out its mission within Army divisions, military schools, and other MOD institutions.40 
Finally, HQ MPA assigned political officers with a small, full-time staff to carry out 
political duties at the regiment, battalion, and company levels of command.41 
h. The Political Officers 
The Party leadership relied on political officers to discharge the duties 
assigned to the MPA and its subordinate organs within the military hierarchy. Political 
officers were responsible for political socialization, ideological standardization, and 
management of the military's party and Komsomol organizations.42 They also filled the 
role of personnel officer, educational or orientations officer, and chaplain at the lower 
levels of the chain of command.43 In addition, the political officers were charged with 
promoting the military effectiveness of individual units. As a deputy to the unit 
commander, the political officer kept soldiers motivated and focused by reinforcing the 
importance of their mission through the use of formal political classes, evening lectures, 
and informal group discussions.44 The political officer also maintained unit discipline by 
enforcing regulations, prosecuting criminals, and rewarding exemplary behavior.45 
Moreover, the political officer maintained morale among the troops. He ensured that 
living conditions conformed to regulations and monitored the quality of the food, housing 
facilities, medical and laundry services, and clothing supplies.46 If he discovered a 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid. p. 114. 
43 Ibid. 




shortfall in any of these or other areas he would notify the unit commander of the need 
for immediate action to remedy the situation.47 
The political officer and the commander worked together to ensure their 
unit maintained full combat readiness. Both men were held accountable if their unit failed 
to meet training standards or mission requirements. In short, the commander and the 
political officer functioned more as partners than as adversaries.48 According to 
Sovietologist Ellen Jones, the military commander and the political officer were so 
thoroughly interconnected that the MPA's role as an "autonomous source of information 
and control gradually atrophied." 49 Jones goes on to comment on the nature of the 
commander/political officer relationship, and its relevance to civil-military relations in 
the Soviet system: 
MP A activities within the armed forces were basically irrelevant to the 
issue of civil-military conflict. The relationship between the commander 
and the political officer could not be used as a measure of party-military 
relations. Political control in the sense of ensuring political reliability of 
military professionals, is one of only a broad array of MP A 
responsibilities; and by the 1980s, it was one of the least significant of the 
MPA' . . 50 S miSSIOnS. 
Despite the importance of the political officer's role in the eyes of the 
Party, many officers regarded the entire MPA infrastructure as an "alien body" invading 
the ranks of the professional military, and viewed the activities of the political officers 
with great suspicion. 51 For many, the existence of political officers at every level in the 
chain of command created a system of "dual command," in which ultimate authority 
47 Ibid., p. 130. 
48 Ibid., p. 140. 
49 Ibid., p. 141. 
50 Ibid., p. 142. 
51 Joo, p. 17. 
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belonged to the Party's political officers, rather than the military's commanders. 52 To 
further strengthen its authority, the Party relied on two other organizations: the KGB and 
the military counterintelligence service. These agencies helped the party to control the 
military by ensuring the reliability of personnel in the armed forces. 
c. The Committee for State Security (KGB) and The Military 
Counter-intelligence Service 
As the role of the military's political organs shifted from political control 
to military-oriented functions, the Party energized another mechanism for exerting 
control over the military, the "special departments" of the KGB and indigenous secret 
police agencies linked to the KGB.53 KGB officers gathered personal information on 
individual soldiers through a network of informers at every level in the hierarchy of 
military command. 54 Thus, the Party used the KGB as a primary means of conducting 
political surveillance of the military. At the same time, the military counter-intelligence 
service, part of the Ministry of the Interior, ensured party loyalty in the officer corps, 
eliminated internal enemies, and combated anti-socialist forces. 55 In addition, the KGB 
assigned permanent representatives in the NSWP states to ensure that the indigenous 
52 Ibid. In contrast to views held by Jones, Colton, and other Western scholars, that the political officers 
made a positive contribution to military efficiency; Professor Joo, a former Deputy Defense Minister in 
Hungary, states that Eastern Europeans regarded the role of the political officer as counterproductive. He 
states that" very often the professional military considered the activity of political officers as a useless 
exercise, diverting time and energy form the real duty, or simply violating the privacy of servicemen. 
Commanders worried about the unity of command, because political officers were quite often outside their 
control." A few Polish and Hungarian officers interviewed by the authors' viewed political officers as 
assets, rather than liabilities. They said political officers were particularly helpful in enforcing discipline. 
However, most of the officers interviewed agreed with Dr. Joo's assertion that political officers were 
counterproductive. 
53 Ellen Jones, p. 123. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Joo, p. 19. 
16 
security and intelligence services remained loyal to Moscow. 56 Moreover, key personnel 
from the satellite states were trained in the Soviet Union. 57 Apart from the surveillance 
activities of the KGB, its indigenous counterparts, and the military intelligence service, 
the Party relied on other organizations such as militia forces, paramilitary forces, and 
special security elements within the armed forces to help control the military. 
d. Militia Forces; Paramilitary Units of the Communist Party; and 
Special Security Elements of the Armed Forces 
The Communist Parties of the NSWP employed militia forces, such as 
Poland's "People's Militia," and Hungary's "Worker's Militia," to provide their citizens 
with the basic military skills necessary to augment the regular armed forces in times of 
crisis. 58 According to Dr. Joo, "The militia units contributed to the militarization of 
society, as part of the general oppressive structure, and exerted a kind of counterbalance 
to the regular armed forces by separating those bearing arms into competing units. "59 
Regime leaders also used them as "bodyguards," or instruments to guarantee the 
supremacy of the Communist Party. 60 In sum, militia units augmented the wider political 
socialization efforts of the Communist regimes by promoting militarism and fostering 
respect for the military institution in society.61 
In addition, the NSWP regimes depended on the security elements within the 
armed forces and paramilitary special security units to offset the inferior reliability of 
56 Amy Knight, Spies Without Cloaks: The KGB 's Successors (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University 
Press, 1996), p. 135. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Ibid., and Barany, Soldiers and Politics in Eastern Europe, 1945-90, p. 9. 
59 Joo,p.19. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Ulrich, p. 147. 
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conscript forces and ensure that internal suppression would be carried out in times of 
crisis.62 In fact, security forces were upgraded and enlarged as the regimes' level of 
distrust in conscripts increased.63 For example, after the Polish army's bungled 
suppression of rioting workers along the Baltic Coast in 1970, the regime rapidly 
expanded its number of special security troops. 64 In addition to these indigenous military 
and paramilitary mechanisms of control, the NSWP states were controlled by political, 
economic, and military ties to the Soviet Union. 
e. Economic and Military Mechanisms of Control in the WP 
The Soviets exercised political and economic control through the 
Cominform, bilateral economic and cultural treaties, and mechanisms of the WP. Stalin 
created the Cominform in 1947 to emphasize the USSR's role as leader of the socialist 
bloc, ensure that the patterns of development in Eastern European states were consistent 
with orthodox Leninist ideology, and promote class unity, the greater struggle against 
capitalism, and socialist internationalism. 65 In addition, the Soviets established bilateral 
economic treaties that initially forced the Eastern European states to become 
economically dependent on the Soviet Union by prohibiting them from trading with the 
West.66 The Soviets also instituted a series of informal mechanisms to ensure the loyalty 
of the Eastern Europeans. For example, the KGB penetrated East European government 
62 ak Teresa R owska-Harmstone, Phase II- Vol. 1, Dr. Harmstone and her colleagues refer to the 
phenomenon as the "ratio of distrust," defined as the combined total of professional cadre and special 
security troops to conscripts. Rakowska-Harmstone noted that the ratio was highest in East Germany and 
Poland. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Roman Laba, The Roots ofSo/idarity, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1991), p. 91. 
65 Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1979), pp. 58-59 and pp. 83-85. 
66 Ibid., pp. 112-129. 
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institutions, ensured that Moscow-loyalists were placed in key positions, and purged 
unreliable elements from society. 67 
In addition, the Soviets created the Warsaw Pact to integrate the military 
institutions of East European states with the Soviet armed forces. In 1954, Kruschev 
formed the Warsaw Treaty Organization, in part as a response to the formation ofNATO, 
but also to offset the danger of non-unity among the increasingly domestic-oriented East 
European regimes.68 However, the anti-Soviet revolts in East Germany, Poland and 
Hungary, and the successful assertion of national sovereignty by Rumania and Albania 
exposed weaknesses in Soviet-East Europe relations. The events of the "Prague Spring" 
in 1968 finally convinced the Soviets to strengthen their grip, not only on the recalcitrant 
Czechs, but the entire Eastern Bloc. Introduced during the Soviet invasion of 
Czechoslovakia, the Brezhnev Doctrine stressed the "common internationalist duty of all 
countries to support, strengthen, and defend socialist gains."
69 Moreover, the doctrine 
prohibited secession from the socialist community and precluded "any divergence from 
an orthodox communist government and society of the communist type."
70 Thus, 
throughout the Soviet era, Moscow attempted to prevent Eastern European regimes from 
developing truly national armed forces in Eastern Europe. 
71 
Throughout the Soviet period, the CPSU and Red Army attempted to 
ensure the political reliability of the members of the NSWP by detaching components of 
67 Ibid. 
68 Ibid., p. 174. 
69 Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, Phase II, Vol. I, p. 51. 
70 Ibid., p. 52. 
71 Barany, Soldiers and Politics in Eastern Europe, 1945-90, p. 19. 
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national military forces from the control of national MODs and attaching them to a 
"Greater Socialist Army" built around the Soviet army and under the operational control 
of the Soviet General Staff. 72 The Soviets were determined to create a reliable 
multinational force capable of satisfying the Soviet requirements for defense from 
external and internal enemies of socialism. According to Rakowska-Harmstone there 
were three requirements for the internal role: First, maintaining a visible Soviet military 
presence within each NSWP state to crush anti-communist movements or national 
regimes seeking independence from the Soviet Union; Second, deterring a NATO 
offensive in response to Soviet intervention in Eastern Europe; and Third, denying NSWP 
MODs the capability to defend either national communist regimes or anti-communist 
successor regimes.73 National-level Communist Party leaders supported the Soviet policy 
of fragmentation of national control over the NSWP militaries because the illegitimate 
regimes' survival depended on the ability of the Soviets to intervene on their behalf. 74 
Like other NSWP armies, the Polish military fulfilled its role as a Soviet 
tool to maintain internal security during times of crisis. Throughout the communist era, 
the Polish armed forces successfully performed their duty to defend against internal 
enemies of socialism: From the civil war of 1945-4 7, the Poznan worker's riots in 1956, 
and the Baltic shipyard strikes of 1970, to the military takeover in 1981, the Polish 
military displayed the extent of its functional integration. 75 
72 Rakowska-Harmstone, Phase II Vol. I, p. vi, 165. 
73 lb'd .. I ., p. VII. 
74 Ibid. 
75 Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, Christopher D. Jones, and Ivan Sylvain, Warsaw Pact: The Question of 
Cohesion Phase II, Vol. 2--Po/and, German Democratic Republic and Romania (Ottawa: ORAE, 1984), p. 
234. 
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In sum, through various political, economic, cultural, and military 
mechanisms, the Soviet Communist Party and the Red army ensured the functional 
integration of the NSWP armed forces. The above mentioned integration mechanisms 
fragmented potentially autonomous structures and reintegrated their components into a 
force that would be reliable in a conflict with NAT0.76 However, the attitudinal 
reliability of citizen-soldiers in the NSWP is an altogether different matter. 
f. Political Socialization Programs 
Like their counterparts in the West, political and military leaders in the 
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe shared the belief that the experience of military service 
had a measurable impact on the social and political attitudes of citizen-soldiers. 
77 
Supporting this view, former General Secretary of the USSR, Konstantin Chemenko 
referred to the Soviet military as a "school of patriotic growth" --an excellent training 
ground to instill discipline and patriotism, and mold young men with little "life 
experience," into responsible, upright citizens.78 Accordingly, the Soviet and NSWP 
militaries directed much of their resources toward controlling and socializing the citizen-
soldiers who comprised the majority of their personnel. 79 
Communist leaders throughout the Soviet Imperium relied on the 
military's formalized, intensive, and centralized political socialization effort, historically 
known as the "school of the nation," to generate support for the Communist Party, its 
76 Rakowska-Harmstone, Phase II- Vol. 1, p. v. 
77 Jones, Red Army and Society, p.149. Jones points to the socialization programs of the German 
Bundeswehr and the Israeli Defense Forces as examples of Western efforts to inculcate soldiers with a set 
of certain values and beliefs. 
78 Ibid., p. 148. Also see footnote 4 on page 171 of Jones, chapter 6. 
79 Ibid., p. 105. 
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leadership, goals and policies. 80 During the process of political indoctrination, 
commanders, political officers and unit activists attempted to transform young conscripts 
into an ideal "New Socialist Man"--a hard-working, patriotic, morally upright defender of 
the nation.81 This New Socialist Man was expected to fulfill his role as the ideal soldier 
as well as the ideal communist citizen--one who believed in the Marxist-Leninist world 
view and socialist internationalism, and who took an active interest in civic affairs, hated 
his enemies, obeyed the party, and scorned bourgeois ideology. 82 
Upon entering the military, draft age youths had already received a large 
dose of political socialization at home, in school, and in communist youth organizations 
such as the Young Pioneers and the Komsomol. 83 The Party continued the socialization 
process after compulsory military training through adult socialization programs. By 
providing political socialization programs throughout one's lifetime, the Communist 
Party continuously reinforced the ideal of the New Socialist Man in an attempt to ensure 
the loyalty of its citizens. 
80 Ibid., pp. 148-179, and Donald Abenheim, Reforging the Iron Cross: The Search for Tradition in the 
West German Armed Forces (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1988), p.15, 243. 
Prussian King William II introduced the concept of the "school of the nation," in the late 1800's. 
According to Abenheim, the political education program, Die Schule der Nation empowered the German 
officer corps to "freely impose its will upon the Reich because of universal military service, an institution 
that its proponents lauded as the "people in arms" and the "school of the nation." Millions of men passed 
through the gates ofthe barracks, where, by donning the blue wool tunic of the king and emperor, they 
cast off their few civil rights." 
81 Ellen Jones, pp. 148-179; and Eliot A. Cohen, Citizens and Soldiers: The Dilemmas of Military Service 
(London: Cornell University Press, 1985), p. 33. Cohen notes that conscription is especially useful for 
political socialization programs in totalitarian states. According to Cohen, conscription offers totalitarian 
states "one more tool to organize and regiment the lives of their subjects, and it may help create the sense 
of constant and potent foreign threat against which one must always be on guard." 
82 Ellen Jones, pp. 148-179. 
83 Ibid. 
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The Communist Parties of East Central Europe faced an additional 
challenge in their efforts to develop a patriotic and politically reliable New Socialist Man. 
NSWP states were forced to emphasize loyalty to Moscow as well as loyalty to the state's 
own communist regime. 84 The Soviets expected the NSWP armies to instill the values of 
nationalism and socialist patriotism and, at the same time, promote the value of socialist 
internationalism--obedience to Soviet authority.85 In "The Military and Political 
Socialization: Hungary," Professor Ivan Volgyes explains how this dichotomy of 
loyalties created an enormous conflict of values within the ranks of the armed forces of 
the Warsaw Pact. Writing in the late 1970s, he notes that, in Hungary: 
The dual task [of inculcating soldiers with the spirit of nationalism and 
socialist internationalism] poses several serious problems for the political 
education process. First and foremost, the very composition of the armed 
forces represents a high coalescence of nationalist values--both the officer 
corps and the draftees are largely of worker and peasant origin, where the 
value of nationalism has always been very strong ... Within the mind of the 
Hungarian officer, this nationalism must be contrasted with the tasks of 
socialist internationalism. The conflict of values is obvious. The memories 
of 1956 [the Hungarian uprising] are perhaps not so strong as they were 
even a few years ago. Hungarian participation in the joint exercises of the 
WTO forces was intended to heighten the personal commitment of 
Hungarian troops to the concepts of socialist internationalism and anti-
imperialism. But the use of the Warsaw Treaty forces against one another 
in combat, instead of in joint operations, and Hungary's unwilling 
participation in the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 tend to 
reemphasize the importance of the only permanent value--nationalism--as 
contrasted to the continually changing interpretation of the theory of 
socialist internationalism. 86 
84 Ivan Volgyes, "The Military as an Agent of Political Socialization: The Case of Hungary," in Dale R. 
Herspring and Ivan Volgyes, Civil Military Relations in Communist Systems (Boulder: Westview Press, 
1978), pp. 145-164. 
85 Bradley R. Gitz, Armed Forces and Political Power in Eastern Europe (New York: Greenwood Press, 
1992), pp. 89-94. 
86 Ibid., pp. 160-161. 
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Thus, Hungarian officers and conscripts, like most of their counterparts in 
the WTO, were far more reliable inculcators of national values than they were convinced 
advocates of the fraternal socialist-internationalist order.87 According to Dr. Zoltan 
Barany, the Hungarian political socialization process did not mold a "New Hungarian 
Socialist Man:" "It has clearly failed to indoctrinate the population in general and youth 
in particular with socialist and proletarian internationalist values."88 
Like the Hungarians, the Poles refused to be "attitudinally integrated" into 
the Soviet socialist international system. With the exception of top-level military and 
political leaders, most Poles were firmly committed nationalists. Polish generals 
"presided over a schizophrenic army" composed of soldiers who were openly and 
unequivocally hostile to the Soviet Union. 89 The extent of the lack of attitudinal 
integration is exemplified by the following incident. According to Rakowska-Harmstone, 
conscripts flashed the "V" sign as they were sworn in and refused to repeat the part of the 
pledge concerning the "alliance with the USSR," instead "the conscripts hummed."90 
Thus, despite the use of joint exercises, common doctrine, consolidated 
political administrations, and an integrated system of political socialization, the Soviets 
failed to affect genuine attitudinal integration of East European armed forces. 91 However, 
the successful functional integration ofNSWP states ensured Soviet hegemony because, 
87 Ibid., p. 161. 
88 Zoltan D. Barany and Ivan Sylvain, Hungary, in Rakowska-Harmstone, Warsaw Pact: The Question of 
Cohesion, Phase II- Volume 3: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and 
Hungary, p. 455. 
89 Rakowska-Harmstone, Warsaw Pact: The Question of Cohesion, Phase II- Volume 2: Poland, German 
Democratic Republic and Romania, p. 236. 
90 Ibid., 209. 
91 Barany, Soldiers and Politics in Eastern Europe, p. 18. 
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in the final analysis, most NSWP soldiers and officers followed Soviet orders whether or 
not they believed in the ideal of the communist citizen-soldier. 
In addition, such strong Soviet mechanisms of political, economic, and 
military control guaranteed the existence of the illegitimate communist regimes of 
Eastern Europe. Upon examining the nexus between the hegemonic communist party, the 
military, and the government in the NSWP states, it is clear that the communist parties 
could not have maintained their hegemony without Soviet support. In Soldiers and 
Politics in Eastern Europe, 1945-90, Professor Zoltan Barany aptly describes the effect of 
external Soviet domination on Eastern European civil-military relations: 
East European regimes were not reliant on the benevolence of their 
respective military establishments to the degree we have seen in the Soviet 
example, because in a worst-case scenario the regime's last line of defense 
was not its own army but that of the Soviet Union. As a result, the typical 
East European military's intra-party role was of significantly lower profile 
than in the cases of the Soviet Union of other Communist countries where 
the military was not subordinated to an external force. It is fair to say that 
aside from a few exceptions from the rule, the military was not a 
significant actor in East European politics.92 
The next section of this chapter discusses civil-military relations in ASD states, to include 
the concept of the democratic citizen-soldier. This dialectic then provides the civil-
military relations context for examining postcommunist civil-military relations with 
respect to Hungary and Poland in Chapter IV. 
92 Ibid., p.l9. Barany points to the example of the Polish military's political involvement in the 1980s as 
an important exception. 
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B. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN ATLANTIC-STYLE DEMOCRATIC 
(ASD) STATES 
1. Introduction 
To understand civil-military relations in a democracy, one must analyze in 
overview the concepts of democratic political control and democratic military 
professionalism. 93 According to Samuel Huntington's classic definition, a profession is 
characterized by its particular expertise, responsibility to society, and corporateness.94 
The military profession is unique because its expertise lies in the management of a state's 
instrument of violence and its members are responsible for the protection of society.95 
According to Huntington, the military professional "is not a mercenary who transfers his 
services wherever they are best rewarded, nor is he the temporary citizen-soldier inspired 
by intense momentary patriotism and duty but with no steadying and permanent desire to 
perfect himself in the management ofviolence .... The motivations of the officer are a 
technical love for his craft and the sense of social obligation to utilize this craft for the 
benefit of society."96 By this standard, military professionalism arose out of the 
93 The following theoretical discussion of democratic military professionalism and political (civilian) 
control of the military is based upon the authors' examination of the following sources: Samuel P. 
Huntington, The Soldier and the State (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, 1957); Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier (New York: The Free Press, 1971); 
S.E. Finer, The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics (New York, Praeger, 1962); Amos 
Perlmutter, The Military and Politics in Modern Times (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977); Jacques 
van Doom, The Soldier and Social Change (Beverly Hills: Sage, 197 5); Bengt Abrahamsson, Military 
Professionalization and Political Power (Beverly Hills, Sage, 1972); Gerke Teitler, The Genesis ofthe 
Professional Officers' Corps (Beverly Hills, Sage, 1977); Richard A. Gabriel, To Serve with Honor: A 
Treatise on Military Ethics and the Way of the Soldier (London, Greenwood Press, 1982); Michel Louis 
Martin and Ellen Stem McCrate, eds., The Military, Militarism, and the Polity: Essays in Honor of Morris 
Janowitz (New York: The Free Press, 1984); Morris Janowitz, ed., The New Military: Changing Patterns of 
Organization (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1964); Alexis De Tocqueville, Democracy in America, 
Volume II (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1945), and Claude E. Welch Jr., Civilian Control of the Military 
(Albany: State University ofNew York Press, 1976). 
94 Huntington, The Soldier and the State, p. 8. 
95 Ibid., pp. 11-14. 
96 Ibid., p. 15. 
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emergence of the professional officer corps at the beginning of the 19th century.
97 And, 
the problem of civil-military relations came to light throughout Europe and North 
Am . 98 en ca. 
The primary focus of civil-military relations is the relationship between the officer 
corps and the state.99 For years, scholars have advanced different theories on the 
relationship between professionalism and political control of the military. In his classic 
work on civil-military relations, The Soldier and the State, Samuel Huntington contends 
that "a highly professional officer corps stands ready to carry out the wishes of any 
civilian group which secures legitimate authority within the state." 
100 By contrast, S.E. 
Finer asserts that a high level of military professionalism alone does not guarantee that 
the military will respect civilian control. Finer argues that Huntington's contention does 
not account for cases in which highly professional militaries have violated the principle 
of civilian control. 101 According to Finer, the military must make a firm commitment to 
h " . . 1 f h f . "1 " 102 t e pnnc1p eo t e supremacy o CIVI power. 
Morris Janowitz offers another perspective. He argues that if the military 
profession reflects societal values, democratic political control is enhanced because the 
profession is not brought into conflict with society. 103 However, like Huntington, 
97 Ibid., pp. 19-20. Huntington states that, prior to the 19th century, officers were generally either 
mercenaries or aristocrats, and did not comprise a professional officer corps. 
98 Ibid. 
99 Ibid., p. 3. 
100 Ibid., p. 84. 
101 S. E. Finer, The Man on Horseback, (Boulder: Westview Press, 2nd, enlarged edition, 1988), pp. 21-23. 
Finer mentions the German and Japanese cases prior to the outbreak of World War II, and the case of the 
French army during the Dreyfus period as examples of highly professional militaries that refused to accept 
civilian control. 
102 Ibid., p. 26. 
103 Morris Janowitz, "From Institutional to Occupational: The Need for Conceptual Continuity," Armed 
Forces and Society, No.4, Fall1977, p. 53. 
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Janowitz recognizes that the military profession must retain certain core values to remain 
f~ . 104 e 1ect1ve. 
The balanced, equitable relationship between a free society, the military, and a 
democratically-elected civilian government forms the essence of democratic civil-military 
relations. In ordering these relations, the state must ensure democratic political (civilian) 
control of the armed forces to prevent the military from challenging the state's political 
authority and dominant values. 105 Huntington's emphasis on military professionalism, 
Finer's warning that the military must firmly accept the principle of civilian control, and 
Janowitz's focus on the military's relationship with society all point to important factors 
in maintaining democratic political (civilian) control ofthe military. 
ASD states ensure democratic political control of the armed forces through the 
following political, social, and military arrangements and conditions: First, clear legal 
and constitutional provisions that define the basic relationship between the state and the 
armed forces; 106 Second, a legislature with significant power in defense and security 
matters, including control over the budget/07 Third, a civilian ministry or department of 
104 Ibid. 
105 Rudolf Joo, The democratic control of armed forces: The experience of Hungary, Chaillot Paper 23 
(Paris: Institute for Security Studies- Western European Union, February, 1996), p. 5. In The Man on 
Horseback, pp. 22-23, Finer gives three reasons why the military might be inclined to challenge the state's 
political authority: First, "the military's consciousness of themselves as a profession may lead them to see 
themselves as the servants of the state rather than the government in power." In other words, if the civilian 
government is not performing well, the military might be inclined to take over. Second, "as specialists in 
their field, the military leaders may feel that they alone are competent to judge on [defense] matters." And 
third, the military's reluctance to be used to coerce the government's domestic opponents."105 106 Douglas V. Johnson II and Steven Metz, American Civil-Military Relations: New Issues, Enduring 
Problems (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, April24, 1995), p. 3; Drs. 
Johnson and Metz discuss the US example: "the framers of the US Constitution crafted a compromise 
between military effectiveness and political control. They trusted balance, the diffusion of power, and 
shared responsibility-- all basic elements of the new political system-- to control the military." 107 The armed forces of democratic states have the unique challenge of exercising fiscal responsibility. This 
stems from the fact that the states' political leadership is accountable to the people for government 
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defense that provides civilian supervision and administrative oversight of the military; 
Fourth, an armed forces that, as part of its professionalism, respects the principle of 
civilian control; Fifth, the existence of a civil society with a mature democratic political 
culture that includes institutionalized democratic political behavior and a consensus on 
the role of the military; And Sixth, non-governmental involvement in the defense 
community that generates public debate on defense and security issues. 108 
In addition, democratic political control is enhanced when the military is given a 
stable, legitimate, institutionalized status within the state. 109 To achieve this status, 
democratic states must order their civil-military relations to satisfy three conditions: First, 
the military must realize that it is not the ultimate guardian of the state's social/political 
order, nor is it the exclusive definer of the national interest; Second, the state must assign 
to the military a credible and honorable role in the defense of the state and the 
accomplishment of national goals; and Third, the state must prevent civilian politicians 
and military officers from misusing the military's monopoly of force to attain political 
goals or resolve partisan political disputes. 110 In other words, the military must remain 
neutral and non-partisan so that the military officer can serve several successive 
governments. 111 In support of this notion, Samuel Finer states: 
The armed forces have to serve a succession of m1msters and 
governments, and official neutrality is a precondition of their being able to 
spending. To exercise this accountability, the political leadership imposes fiscal spending limits and 
approves budgets for government institutions, such as the military. The political leadership weighs the 
needs of the military with other national priorities and fiscal constraints, then, through a democratic 
political process which includes open debate, approves an appropriate defense budget. 
108 Joo, pp. 5-7, Professor Joo describes all 6 conditions in some detail. 
109 Constantine P. Danopolous and Daniel Zirker eds., Civil-Military Relations in the Soviet and Yugoslav 
Successor States, (Boulder CO: Westview Press, 1996). p.xiv. 
110 Ibid., p. xii, xiv, and Joo, The Democratic Control of Armed Forces, p. 5 
Ill Joo, p. 21. 
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do so; the party-affiliated members might be dismissed by a hostile party 
in power, with serious effects on discipline and training; party disputes in 
the force could impair its fighting efficiency by breaking up its carefully 
fostered esprit de corps. 112 
In fact, ASD militaries strive to prevent their soldiers from actively participating in 
political parties, as reflected by the U.S. Army Officer's Guide's warning to "avoid the 
political": 
Be somewhat guarded in your political comments, Officers are entitled to 
have as firm opinions on matters of politics and national policy as any 
citizen. They have the same right and duty to vote and record their 
convictions. But it is unwise for officers to become too outspoken in 
approval or disapproval of either political party, or of the leading members 
of either party ... Army officers serve in tum Democrat and Republican 
administrations. Soldiers must be non-political and serve each with equal 
zeal. 113 
Society's participation in the democratic process further enhances democratic 
political control of the armed forces. In representative democracies, politicians answer to 
their electorate within society. 114 Through their political representation in the legislature 
and their individual right to vote, the people influence political decisions that effect the 
military. Thus, there is a tendency for society to impose its liberal values and norms on 
the military through the political process. On the other hand, the military must retain its 
" . " 1 d b f~ . 115 ASD ·1 th. conservative va ues an norms to e e 1ect1ve. states attempt to reconc1 e Is 
112 Finer, p. 29 - footnote number 24. 
113 Lawrence P. Crocker, LTC USA ret., The Army Officers Guide 44th Edition (Harrisburg, Pa: Stackpole 
Books, 1988), p.53. ASD officers are "apolitical" in the sense that they respect democratic civilian control 
of the military, refrain from intervening in partisan political disputes, and do not use the military's 
monopoly of force to attain political goals or conduct a coup d'etat. However, the authors are not 
suggesting that military officers (especially high-ranking ones) are totally indifferent to politics. In 
Johnson and Metz (pp. 9-10), former Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell is 
quoted, "There isn't a general in Washington who isn't political, not if he's going to be successful, 
because that's the nature of our system." 
114 Ibid., p. 3. 
115 Samuel P. Huntington, "The Military Mind: Conservative Realism of the Professional Military Ethic," 
War, Morality, and the Military Profession, Malham M. Wakin, ed., (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 
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"tension" between the military's conservative requirements for effectiveness and 
society's liberal demands by maximizing military security at the least sacrifice of other 
. 1 1 ll6 soc1a va ues. 
The way in which a state orders its civil-military relations determines how 
effectively it manages this "tension."117 First, fully to understand this "tension," it is 
useful to examine the concept of the "citizen-soldier." This section examines the western 
conception of the "citizen-soldier" vis a vis the "professional" through some historical, 
then contemporary perspectives. Throughout the discussion, the following terms and 
definitions apply: 
Citizen-soldier - A soldier who is a citizen of the nation/state he serves, is broadly 
representative of society, and who serves because he feels a sense of civic 
responsibility to defend his country, its laws, and its dominant ideology.ll
8 The 
previous section on NSWP civil-military relations described the ideal communist 
citizen-soldier as the "New Socialist Man." The ideal democratic citizen-soldier 
is a soldier who meets the following criteria: First, he is broadly representative of 
2nd edition, 1986), pp. 35-52. Huntington believes that to function appropriately, the military profession 
should be made up of officers who embrace a "conservative, realistic" ethic, which includes: a commitment 
to military security of the state, a pessimistic view of human nature (war is inevitable), subordination of the 
individual to the group, loyalty, obedience, civilian control, alienation from political activity, and the 
military's instrumental function in the state. 
116 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State, pp. 2-3. 
117 Ibid. 
118 Thus, the ideal of the citizen-soldier does not apply to professional mercenaries. See Jacques Van 
Doom, "Continuity and Discontinuity in Civil-Military Relations," The Military, Militarism, and the Polity, 
Michel Louis Martin and Ellen Stem McCrate, eds., (New York: The Free Press, 1984), p 37, Van Doom 
states: "Whereas the military professional is an expert, serving the nation as a specialist, the citizen- soldier 
is an active member of the political community, who puts his efforts at the service of this community 
because his political rights include the right to bear arms." In other words, for the citizen-soldier ideal to 
work, citizens must be willing to serve the nation out of a feeling of duty and civic responsibility. 
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society; 119 Second, he serves the nation primarily out of a feeling of duty and civic 
responsibility; Third, he respects democratic political (civilian) control of the 
military and remains non-partisan; and Fourth, he retains the rights of a 
democratic citizen, limited only to the extent required to perform his military 
d . 120 utles. 
Military Professional- Narrowly defined, a military professional is a full-time 
military specialist (soldier). This narrow definition applies to the professional 
mercenaries and aristocratic officers who made up professional armies prior to the 
emergence of the professional officer corps between the late 18th and early 19th 
centuries. 121 The modem military professional came to light with the emergence 
of the professional officer corps. Huntington defines the modem military 
professional as a member of the military profession -- a profession characterized 
by: its expertise in the management of the state's instrument of violence; a sense 
of corporateness and responsibility to society among its members; and a 
"conservative, realistic" military ethic. 122 Modem standing armies consist of 
military professionals. In the case of the states that maintain peacetime 
conscription, the standing army consists of a core of professional officers and 
NCOs, and a rank-and-file of conscripts. 
119 For example, the officer corps is not elitist, like the aristocratic officer corps' of the early 19th and pre-
19th century European armies. 
12
° Conscripts and reserve component soldiers have been referred to traditionally as citizen-soldiers, but the 
professional soldiers of ASD armed forces also embody the ideal of the democratic citizen-soldier. 
121 Huntington, The Soldier and the State, pp. 19-39. 
122 Ibid., pp. 8-18 and pp. 59-79. On page 79, Huntington summarizes the military ethic as being both 
"realistic and conservative." 
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Militia - a military unit comprised of non-professional citizen-soldiers, called up 
by their government for military service in a time of emergency.
123 
Conscription (or draft)- the process by which a government levies citizens for 
military service, normally for a given period of time. 
Conscript- a citizen who has been conscripted to serve in the military.
124 
2. The Western Conception of the Citizen-Soldier 
Citizen-soldiers date back to Antiquity, when great citizen-armies were used to 
fight the early wars of the Greek, Persian, and Roman empires. These states conscripted 
male citizens to serve as needed for a single military action. 12
5 As war became more 
frequent, some citizen-soldiers, enticed by the prospect of receiving booty and other 
material incentives, served beyond their commitment and became full-time professional 
soldiers. 126 Eventually, the superior discipline and combat effectiveness of professional 
soldiers, coupled with a perpetual state of war, led to the formation of professional 
armies. 127 For example, during the Second Punic War, the Roman army gradually 
evolved from a citizen-army into the highly disciplined professional army that defeated 
123 Militias include reserve units, such as those of the US Reserves and National Guard. For a discussion, 
see Allan R. Millett, "The Constitution and the Citizen-Soldier," in Kohn, pp. 104-115. 
124 Traditionally, conscripts have been considered citizen-soldiers. However, due to a declining sense of 
civic responsibility in liberal democratic societies, ASD peacetime conscripts have not always embodied 
the ideal of the citizen-soldier. This is due to the fact that many served only because the state compelled 
them to do so, rather than out of a sense of civic responsibility to serve the nation. According to Eliot 
Cohen, in Citizens and Soldiers, p. 136, People of western democracies typically reject the idea of being 
compelled by the state to serve in the military during peacetime. In fact, this contributed to the decision by 
some ASD states to implement the peacetime AU-Volunteer Force. (For this last point, see Cohen, p. 166.) 
125 Hans Delbruck, History of the Art of War: Within the Framework of Political History, Volume 1, 
(Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1975), translated from German by Walter J. Renfroe, Jr., 
original title: Gesichte der Kriegskunst im Rahmen der politischen Geschichte, p. 144. 
126 Ibid., p. 417. 
127 Ibid., pp. 149-150. 
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Hannibal.128 In fact, the experience ofthe Second Punic War and the subsequent 
expansion of perennial military commitments prompted Rome to maintain a standing 
army of professional soldiers, despite the Republic's constitutional dictum of universal 
military service. 129 Operationalized through conscription, the egalitarian principle of 
universal military service required the Republic to distribute the burden of military 
service among all eligible citizens. 130 The expansion of the Roman Empire and 
simultaneous decline in the civic and military virtues of Roman society undermined the 
conscription process. 131 The expanding population and geographical breadth of the 
empire, along with the Roman people's growing prosperity and their apathy toward 
fulfilling civic and military duties, made universal conscription difficult to enforce. 132 
The breakdown of the conscription system forced Rome to rely more heavily on 
mercenaries, thus contributing to the trend toward professionalization of the army .133 In 
addition, as Rome's military commitments broadened, soldiers were needed for extended 
periods to fight in such places as Spain, Asia, Africa, and the Alps. 134 Only professional 
soldiers, who had no other form of livelihood, could meet these commitments on a 
regular basis. 135 Moreover, the existence of professionally-trained warriors to lead 
128 Ibid., p.414. 
129 Ibid., p.412. 
130 R. Ernest Dupuy and Trevor N. Dupuy, The Harper Encyclopedia of Military History, 4th ed. (New 
York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1993), p. 105. 
131 Ibid., p. 106. 
132 Hans Delbrueck, History of the Art of War, p. 417. Roman men found excuses to not perform their 
military service. "Substitution" was also common-- whereby men would compensate someone else (a 
mercenary) to serve in their place. This led to an increase in the proportion of"professionals" in the 
Roman army. 
133 Ibid. Professionalization in this sense means an increase in the proportion of professionals (or 
mercenaries). These were professionals in the narrow sense -- not the true military professional of Samuel 
Huntington, which did not emerge until the 19th century. 
134 Ibid., p. 413. 
135 Ibid. 
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citizen-soldiers in battle enhanced the effectiveness of the Roman army. 
136 Thus, from a 
military perspective, a professional army was desirable, despite the fact that its existence 
contradicted the egalitarian principle of universal military service.
137 The contradiction 
between Rome's egalitarian principles and the existence of its standing army of 
"professionals" provides an early example of the kinds of tensions that continue to exist 
in democratic states with professional militaries. 138 
After the fall of the Roman empire, a trend toward feudalism in Western Europe 
led to a different kind of military system -- a system that prevailed throughout most of the 
Middle Ages. In this medieval system, each land-owning noble maintained a small 
element of cavalry soldiers for the defense of his property. By order of the King, the 
land-owning noble would contribute his personal cavalry to serve in the royal army for a 
given period each year -- usually forty days. The royal army had no common loyalty to 
king and nation, no cohesiveness based upon a common organization and integrated 
training, and no effective unity of command. The one common social force was their 
strong devotion to Christendom, which served as the basis for a moral bond of knightly 
honor. 139 
As the agricultural economy of medieval society yielded to the rapid expansion of 
money-based economies, the morally-grounded qualities of the feudal armies capitulated 
to the self-serving interests of mercenaries. 140 In the Italian city-states, where the spread 
136 Ibid. 
137 Ibid., p. 418. 
138 Ibid. Of course, most of the "professionals" in the ancient Roman empire were mercenaries. 
139 R. Ernest Dupuy and Trevor N. Dupuy, pp. 264-265. 
14
° Felix Gilbert, "Machiavelli: The Renaissance ofthe Art of War," Makers of Modern Strategy: From 
Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, Peter Paret, ed., (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 
1986), p. 13. 
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of Christianity had pacified society, the city-state governments relied entirely on 
mercenaries for military service. 141 It was during this period, in the early 16th century, 
that Machiavelli demanded the development of a militia system in the city-state of 
Florence. He blamed Italy's reliance on mercenaries for it's decline as a world power, 
describing mercenaries as "disunited, ambitious, without discipline, disloyal, overbearing 
among friends, cowardly among enemies .... " 142 Machiavelli insisted that only a conscript 
militia, comprised of inhabitants of the state, would have the necessary foundation to 
develop the confidence and discipline for success in war. 143 In addition, Machiavelli 
argued that the state should create the conditions in society necessary to inspire the will 
of its citizens to fight and die for their government. He observed that "there is a great 
difference between an army that is well content and fights for its own reputation and one 
that is ill disposed and has to fight only for the interests of others."144 Such insights into 
the nature ofthe relationship between the state, society, and the military are equally 
relevant in the democratic civil-military relations of today. 
For the next two centuries, rulers continued to rely on mercenary armies rather 
than conscript militias. 145 Under absolutism, the dominant form of government during 
this period, rulers relied on standing armies of mercenaries to expand their territory by 
forcing smaller neighbors or estates to submit to their control. 146 Standing armies 
continued to predominate until the latter part ofthe 18th century, when conscript militias 
141 Ibid., p. 14. 
142 Ibid., p. 26. 
143 Ibid. 
144 Ibid. 
145 Ibid., p. 28. 
146 Ibid., p. 29. 
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emerged as a viable alternative to the standing army.
147 In fact, the ideological appeal of 
conscript militias led the framers of the US Constitution to adopt the militia system in the 
fledgling American Democracy. 
3. Modern Military Professionalism and Civil-Military Relations in 
Atlantic-style Democratic (ASD) States 
Prior to the American Revolution, the militias of the English North American 
colonies served primarily as a recruiting base for the regular professional forces, which 
conducted most ofthe fighting. 148 During the American Revolution, colonial militias 
actually fought as units and directly contributed to American victory, along with the 
regulars. The strong performance of the colonial militias during the revolution pacified 
opponents of the militia system, including General George Washington, who had favored 
a standing professional army. 149 The war record of the militias helped to convince the 
framers of the Constitution--who were predisposed to the idea of a militia system because 
of its ideological appeal--to adopt the militia system to meet the nation's military 
requirements. 150 One proponent ofthe militia system, Thomas Jefferson, so strongly 
favored the militia concept that he criticized the constitution's omission of "protection 
. d" . ,151 agamst stan mg armtes. 
Writing in the late 18th century, Jefferson was unable to foresee how advances in 
technology and changes in societal values engendered by the Industrial Revolution would 
147 Ibid., p. 31. 
148 Allan R. Millett, "The Constitution and the Citizen-Soldier," The United States Military under the 
Constitution of the United States, 1789-1989, Richard H. Kohn, ed., (New York: New York University 
Press, 1991), pp. 98-99. 
149 Ibid., pp. 100-101. 
150 Ibid. 
151 Richard H. Kohn, "The Constitution and National Security," The United States Military under the 
Constitution of the United States, 1789-1989, p. 86. 
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strain the militia system. Jefferson, like the framers of the constitution, cared about the 
preservation of democratic ideals. Until proven otherwise, the militia system seemed 
appropriate and adequate for meeting the military requirements of the new nation-state. 
The US Army's dismal performance in the War of 1812 proved that the militia 
system could not adequately meet America's military needs. In 1821, a reform bill 
created a permanent professional core in the US Army in an effort to prevent a recurrence 
of the debacle of 1812. 152 By the start of the Civil War, the US militia system had largely 
disintegrated as a result of the societal and technological changes stimulated by the 
Industrial Revolution. The greater specialization of skill required by industry led to the 
formation of professional workingmen's associations, which applied political pressure on 
states to relieve skilled workers from their military obligation. Church-based peace 
societies and local political coalitions also applied political pressure on states to exempt 
their members or constituents from military service. The army, too, had its own reasons 
for opposing the militia system. First, the military required more full-time professionals 
to perform the specialty skills required by advances in military technology. And second, 
numerous professional army officers, like General George B. McClellan, developed a 
feeling of ambivalence toward citizen-soldiers due to the inconsistent performance of 
militia units during the Civil War. 153 
Thus, less than one hundred years after the signing of the constitution, the U.S. 
adopted a standing army. Yet, in spite of the concern of Thomas Jefferson and others that 
152 Edward Hagerman, The American Civil War and the Origins of Modern Warfare: Ideas, Organization, 
and Field Command, (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1988), p. 32. 
153 Ibid., p. 38. 
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a standing army posed a threat to the nation, the professional armed forces of the United 
States have never threatened the constitution and have remained loyal to the principle of 
democratic civilian control. 154 The peaceful demobilization of Union troops after the 
conclusion of the Civil War and the assassination of President Lincoln demonstrated a 
firm commitment to the principle of civilian control.
155 Similarly, President Truman's 
relief of General MacArthur during the Korean War --an action that MacArthur did not 
challenge, demonstrated respect for civilian authority, and also underscored the power of 
the President as commander-in-chief. 156 
In addition to respect for civilian authority, a professional military must maintain 
a good relationship with society in order to exist peaceably in a democracy. The 
importance of the military's relationship with society is expressed in political philosopher 
Ralph Barton Perry's 1921 warning that "the American military system must be 
popular."157 The "tension" between the professional armed forces and democracy arises 
from the military's need to be effective, while, at the same time, maintaining the popular 
support of a liberal democratic society. In order to be effective, the military must retain 
its ethos-- a set of conservative values and norms necessary for discipline, morale, and 
obedience. On the other hand, the military must reflect liberal values and norms of 
society in order to maintain popular support in a liberal democratic society. Thus, ASD 
states must strike a balance between the needs of a conservative military and the demands 
154 Richard H. Kohn, "The Constitution and National Security," p. 87. 
155 Harold M. Hyman, "Ulysses Grant I, Emperor of America?," The United States Military under the 
Constitution of the United States, 1789-1989, p. 180. 
156 Roy K. Flint, "The Truman-MacArthur Conflict: Dilemmas of Civil-Military Relations in the Nuclear 
Age," The United States Military under the Constitution of the United States, 1789-1989, p. 225. 
157 Cohen, p. 188- cited from Ralph Barton Perry's notable work The Free Man and the Soldier, (1916). 
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of a liberal society in order to minimize the "tension" between the armed forces and 
democratic society. Politicians and military leaders must weigh contemporary societal 
norms and values against the requirements for military effectiveness to manage this 
"tension." 
Samuel Huntington states that the goal of democratic civil-military relations is to 
manage this "tension" in the most effective way possible. According to Huntington, "The 
ordering of [a state's] civil-military relations .. .is basic to a nation's military security 
policy. The objective of this policy on the institutional level is to develop a system of 
civil-military relations which will maximize military security at the least sacrifice of 
other social values."158 Most western democracies have developed this system of civil-
military relations, and a military tradition that supports it, through the course of an 
extended and unbroken national history. 159 By contrast, the Federal Republic of 
Germany, successor state of the Third Reich whose army was abolished after World War 
II, developed its current system of civil-military relations through the concerted effort of 
scholars, military officers, and policymakers from West Germany and other western 
states during the 1950s. 160 
The founders of the Bundeswehr wanted to create a military that consisted of 
"citizens in uniform." 161 One ofthe founders, Count Wolf von Baudissin, envisioned the 
new West German soldier as "a free person, a good citizen, and an effective soldier."162 
158 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State, p. 2. 
159 Mark E. Victorson, Colonel, U.S. Army, Mission in the East: The Building of an Army in a Democracy 
in the New German States, p. 4. 
160 Donald Abenheim, Reforging the Iron Cross: The Search for Tradition in the West German Armed 
Forces (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1988), pp. 88-120. 
161 Ibid., p. 98. 
162 Ibid., p. 128. 
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According to Baudissin, the new traditional values for the Bundeswehr should be "a 
desire for peace, humanity, a chivalrous attitude, loyalty, and above all, a sense of moral 
responsibility for one's fellow man."163 He compared the new German soldier to the 
original image of the western soldier: "the knight who also embodied the values of the 
Christian tradition."164 In order to operationalize the "citizen in uniform ideal" in the new 
armed forces, Baudissin and his several colleagues developed Innere Fuehrung, a modem 
leadership style that enables soldiers to carry out the mission while assuring their rights 
as citizens. 165 The fact that this leadership style applies to German officers and NCOs 
alike is clearly revealed in a statement made in 1950 to German citizens by national 
security adviser, Theodor Blank, who said: "Whoever is unable as an officer, NCO, or 
reserve officer to impart his military skills and knowledge to recruits without treating 
them as free citizens will have no place with us."166 As the German conception of 
democratic military professionalism, Innere Fuehrung enables the Bundeswehr to retain 
the popular acceptance of Germany's contemporary liberal democratic society while 
performing its military functions, even after 1990. 
Recently, the East German armed forces (NV A) faced a similar challenge after the 
collapse of the Warsaw Pact. The demise of the communist system created a situation in 
which NVA officers and NCOs, accustomed to relying on the authority of the Party and 
the state, were suddenly challenged with trying to maintain an effective military while 
163 Ibid., p. 154. 
164 Ibid., p. 155. 
165 Ibid., p. 45. 
166 Ibid., p. 82. 
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simultaneously meeting the approval of a democratizing society. 167 As a result, NVA 
officers and NCOs had difficulty in maintaining discipline among their soldiers. 168 The 
NV A leaders were used to Soviet-style discipline, obedience and morale. 169 Moreover, 
like West German society in the 1950s, the East German population had learned to 
distrust the military. 170 Thus, as part of German reunification, the Bundeswehr faced the 
dual challenge of: First, convincing the East Germans that the armed forces are 
legitimate; and Second, teaching a new style of professionalism to the former NV A 
officers and NCOs. 171 The Bundeswehr met these challenges by educating the former 
NV A officers and NCOs on the tenets of Innere Fuehrung. 172 Innere Fuehrung 's role in 
German reunification provides a strong precedent for instituting democratic forms of 
military professionalism in the other post-communist armed forces of the region. 
Democratic states require democratic forms of military professionalism so that the 
military can perform its role while meeting the demands of democratic society. And, as 
noted in the introduction to this thesis, democratic military professionalism is the form of 
military professionalism that allows the professional armed forces of a democracy to be 
effective while, at the same time, reflecting democratic principles, norms, and values. 
Military professionals in a democracy are experts in their field who respect civilian 
control of the military, embody the ideal of the democratic citizen-soldier, who are 
accountable to society and maintain the unique "military ethic." 
167 Mark E. Victorson, Mission in the East, pp. 20-21; also Joerg Schoenbohm, Two Armies and One 
Fatherland: the end of the Nationale Volksarmee (Providence, Rhode Island: Berghahn Books, 1996). 
168 Ibid. 
169 Ibid., pp. 25-26. 




Other ASD militaries have institutionalized similar styles of democratic military 
professionalism to deal with the "tension" between the military and civil society. Like 
the Republic of Germany, these states subscribe to the principle that the soldier should 
retain the rights of a citizen, narrowed only as necessary for military effectiveness.
173 
However, the degree to which soldiers rights are narrowed varies among the ASD armed 
forces. Each state determines the scope of soldiers' rights by balancing the needs of its 
military with the demands of its society. For example, the conservative American society 
of the 1940s and 1950s was far more tolerant of strict disciplinary practices in the armed 
forces than the liberal society of the 1960s and beyond. 
The military requires a certain narrowing of soldiers' rights in order to maintain 
discipline, obedience, and morale-- indicators of effectiveness and reliability, among 
servicemembers. Variations in levels of discipline, morale, and obedience among armed 
forces can be traced often to particulars surrounding the state's civil-military relations. 
The degree to which the military accommodates values and norms of liberal society can 
impact military effectiveness. 174 For example, some question the effectiveness of the 
Bundeswehr, which accommodates more of civil society's norms and values than other 
ASD "1" . 175 m11tanes. 
One must realize that each state faces its own unique political, social, and 
military circumstances which require a different solution to the military's relationship 
with civil society. For example, when West Germany organized the Bundeswehr, 
173 Ibid., p. 5. 
174 In other words, less "narrowing" of the soldiers rights. 
175 Ibid., p. 33. 
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German citizens were filled with anxieties about the military profession, which they 
associated with the political and social abuses ofthe past. 176 Theodor Blank described the 
task of constructing the new West German army: "the young German democracy, though 
still in the Nazi shadow, must create new soldiers without having yet won the full faith of 
the West German people."177 German society which, only after considerable convincing, 
accepted the ideal of the "German citizens in uniform," would have been reluctant to 
accept any further narrowing of a soldier's rights, regardless of its benefit to military 
f~ . 178 e 1ect1veness. 
Through a continuous process of democratic political debate, each ASD state 
determines the degree to which the rights of soldiers will be narrowed from their rights as 
citizens. The two extremes in the debate are well represented by Alexis De Tocqueville 
on the one hand, and political scientist T.R. Fehrenback on the other. De Tocqueville, 
who opposed the idea of standing armies, believed in the citizen-soldier in its purest form 
-- a soldier who served as a citizen, and retained all of the rights of a citizen. 179 In 
contrast, T.R. Fehrenback favored a wholly professional military, reflected in his 
statement that "by the very nature of its mission, the military must maintain a hard and 
illiberal view oflife and the world. Society's purpose is to live; the military's is to stand 
ready, if need be, to die."180 Thus, one side ofthe debate (the liberal side) is focused on 
the preservation of democratic principles and the other side of the debate is focused on 
176 Donald Abenheim, Reforging the Iron Cross, pp. 6-7. 
177 Ibid., p. 81. 
178 Ibid. 
179 Alexis De Tocqueville, Democracy in America (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1945), vol. II, book 
III, p. 272 (original publication: New York: Langley, 1840). 
180 Mark E. Victorson, Mission in the East, p. 6. 
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the requirements for military effectiveness (the conservative side ). 181 This debate forms 
the crux of the problem of civil-military relations in a democracy.
182 
The debate over the need for conscription flows from the larger problem of 
democratic civil-military relations. The rise of nationalism and the spread of democracy 
in Europe during the late 18th and early 19th centuries produced the concept of the 
"nation in arms."183 This concept led to the development of the "national army," with a 
rank and file conscripted in accordance with a system of universal service.
184 The 
development of the "national army" coincided with the professionalization of the officer 
corps. 185 The mass national armies that emerged were much larger than the previous 
professional armies and required far more capable and experienced leadership than had 
been provided by the old aristocratic officer corps. 186 Prussia, the first state to 
professionalize its officer corps, was also the first state to adopt a permanent system of 
universal service. 187 After Prussia's victory over France in 1870, the French 
professionalized their officer corps and introduced a permanent system of conscription as 
181 The liberal and conservative viewpoints expressed here reflect Huntington's societal imperative, in 
which social forces and ideologies are dominant within the society; and thefimctional imperative, in which 
the threat to society's security is dominant. See Huntington, The Soldier and the State, p. 2-3. 
182 Huntington, The Soldier and the State, p. 2. 
183 Ibid., p. 37. 
184 Ibid., Universal service meant that all eligible citizens were conscripted for a brief period of years. 
185 Huntington, The Soldier and the State, pp. 37-39. According to Huntington, the professionalization of 
the officer corps included the following steps: I) the elimination of aristocratic prerequisites for entry; 2) 
the requiring of a basic level of professional training and competence; 3) the requiring of a minimum 
general education and the provision of this education in institutions not operated by the military. 
186 Ibid., p. 38. Prior to the professionalization of the officer corps and the development of"mass" national 
armies, the "amateur" aristocratic officers relied on the experienced regular troops who made up the rank-
and-file of much smaller armies. The mass armies that emerged in the 19th century were made up largely 
of inexperienced conscripts who required the superior leadership that only a professional corps of officers 
could provide. As a result, demonstrated potential replaced the prerequisite of aristocrat status for entry 
into the officer corps. 
187 Ibid. Prussia abolished class restriction on entry into the officer corps in 1808 and introduced 
permanent universal service in 1814. "Permanent" universal service requires peacetime and wartime 
conscription. 
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well. 188 Britain and the US, due in part to their geographical security, did not introduce 
. . . .1 h 20 h 189 peace-time conscnptwn untl t e t century. 
4. Conscription 
Today, Germany and France continue to maintain conscription for their rank and 
file, while Britain and the United States rely on all-volunteer forces (AVF).190 The 
collapse of the British empire and corresponding force reductions led to the decision to 
transition to an AVF in Britain. 191 In the United States, the decision to institute an AVF 
came in response to popular discontent with the Vietnam War and the draft. 192 
Remarkably, according to Morris Janowitz, the citizen-soldier ideal continues to function 
in the American all-volunteer force despite the social upheaval of the 1960s and 70s. 193 
Janowitz states that the citizen-soldier ideal remains viable in the A VF for three reasons. 
First, a steady flow of people from a broad cross-section of society into and out of the 
military continues in the all-volunteer force. Second, despite increased salaries and 
material gratification, there has been no significant trace of "mercenarisation." And third, 
service to the constitution and the nation remain a dominant aspect of career 





° France is currently considering an all-volunteer force. Britain returned to an all-volunteer force 
beginning in 1957 (as a result of the 1957 British Defence White Paper) and the US returned to an all-
volunteer force in 1973 (as a result ofthe Gates Commission report issued in February, 1970) See Eliot 
Cohen, Citizens and Soldiers, pp. 166-171. 
191 Cohen, p. 171. 
192 Cohen, p. 166. 
193 Morris Janowitz, "The Citizen-Soldier and National Service," Air University Review 31 (November-
December 1979), pp. 2-16. 
194 Ibid. 
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Despite the success of the all-volunteer force, the debate over the pros and cons of 
conscription continues. Advocates of conscription have pointed to numerous benefits, to 
include: the inculcation of moral and ethical values, the opportunity for education and 
training, and the development of maturity in young people.
195 In Citizens and Soldiers, 
Eliot Cohen argues that US and British history has proven that "a patriotic and well-
educated citizenry can flourish without military service;" and that "the sole purpose of 
military training or compulsory service must be the strengthening of the armed forces .... 
When the governments of liberal states stray into other purposes they find themselves 
subjected to furious criticism."196 In other words, unless the state's military requirements 
warrant conscription, as in the case of war, Cohen believes that a liberal society will not 
support it. Cohen further states that "The proof of this contention, namely, that 
compulsory military service is fundamentally incompatible with, or at least antagonistic 
to, liberal doctrine is borne out by the history of conscription in the liberal Anglo-
American states, those states most influenced by the views of Hobbes and Locke."
197 
In democracies, the absence of the political will to compel citizens to participate 
in peacetime military service, combined with the state's need to have a capable military 
has induced ASD states to rely on professional forces for the bulk of their military 
commitments. Like Roman society after 50 BC, ASD societies do not widely reflect the 
civic virtues and martial spirit required to support a system of universal service. Cohen 
summarizes the problem: "The free man does not wish to become as soldier; the 
195 Cohen, Citizens and Soldiers, pp. 128-129. 
196 Ibid., p. 132. 
197 Ibid., p. 136. 
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democratic man abhors unequal burdens; the military man would like to ignore their 
claims, but cannot. It is the task of the statesman to reconcile the three .... " 198 The ASD 
system of civil-military relations provides a framework for reconciling the competing 
interests of the state, the military, and society. This system of civil-military relations, 
supported by law and traditions, ensures civilian control of the military and democratic 
accountability of the military to society. 199 
The unique way that ASD states order their civil-military relations enables them 
to maintain the democratic "citizen-soldier ideal" in their professional armed forces. 
Citizens who enter the militaries of liberal democratic states bring the values and norms 
of society into the military with them. The freedoms and rights provided in democratic 
societies foster an environment in which individuals are allowed to display initiative, 
originality, and creativity in the conduct of their daily lives. Upon entering the armed 
forces, the citizen discovers that the military encourages its soldiers to display the same 
kinds of traits in the performance of their duties.200 Initiative, originality, and creativity 
are traits that ASD militaries expect their leaders to demonstrate in order to win on the 
battlefield. 
To promote these traits, ASD militaries foster a command climate that is 
consistent with the environment that Clausewitz observed as conducive to success in 
battle and war. Clausewitz contends that military commanders and their subordinates are 
198 Ibid., p. 188. 
199 Even covert operations are made accountable through a system of congressional oversight mandated by 
law; J. Kenneth McDonald, "Secrecy, Accountability, and the CIA," in The United States Military under 
the Constitution ofthe United States, 1789-1989, Richard H. Kohn, ed. (New York: New York University 
Press, 1991), p. 399. 
200 Even though soldiers are encouraged to exercise these traits, they do it within the context of a military 
environment that narrows the degree to which those traits can be exercised. 
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better able to realize their intellectual and psychological potential, and thus, display the 
"genius" necessary to overcome the inevitable frictions of war, in a command climate 
which encourages initiative, originality, and creativity, and allows leaders at all levels of 
command to freely exercise autonomy in decision making?
01 Through the medium of 
"genius," Clausewitz examined the qualities of the commander, the army, and society that 
help to overcome the potentially devastating effects of friction?
02 Among these qualities 
are the intellectual and psychological strengths of the commander; the morale and esprit 
of the army; and the martial traits of society as reflected in its soldiers?
03 
De T ocqueville recognized the relationship between the traits of society and the 
army, noting that "the spirit that [men of democracies] bring to commerce and 
manufactures; ... [is the same spirit that] carried with them to the field ofbattle, induces 
them willingly to expose their lives in order to secure in a moment the rewards of 
victory."204 The modem professional armed forces of the ASD states aim to foster this 
same spirit and achieve a high level of professionalism in their ranks by illiciting the 
willing obedience of soldiers through styles of leadership and discipline that offer the best 
chance for each soldier to realize his utmost potential and thereby display the "genius" 
necessary to overcome the frictions of war. Thus, by practicing a form of military 
professionalism that reflects certain democratic societal values, the ASD armed forces 
201 Peter Paret, "Clausewitz," in Makers of Modern Strategy, Peter Paret ed. (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1986). p.l86-216. Clausewitz defmes "friction" as the uncertainties, difficulties, and 
unforseen events, and their effect on morale, decision-making, and mission execution 
202 Ibid., p. 203. Clausewitz discusses "Genius" in On War, Book one, Chapter 3. 
203 Ibid. 
204 Alexis De Tocqueville, Democracy in America, Volume II, p. 278. 
49 
strive to achieve a "Clausewitzian" command climate that will help them to be more 
effective in war. 
ASD militaries maintain the Clausewitzian command climate that contributes to 
military effectiveness by relying on a form of military professionalism that is unique to 
democratic societies. Ideally, democratic military professionalism preserves the 
conservative military ethos and ensures that fundamental values and norms of the 
democratic society are reflected in the military, thus, minimizing the "tension" between 
civil society and the armed forces. In order to fully understand how democratic military 
professionalism helps to minimize the "tension" in democratic civil-military relations, 
one must examine each foundation of military professionalism. 
The following chapter discusses each of the primary and secondary foundations of 
military professionalism with respect to ASD and NSWP armed forces. It is important to 
note how the disparate civil-military relations and citizen-soldier concepts of the Soviet-
style communist system and atlantic-style democratic system described in the present 
chapter is reflected in the equally disparate forms of ~ilitary professionalism described in 
the next chapter. 
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III. MILITARY PROFESSIONALISM IN ASD AND NSWP STATES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Chapter II described the nature of communist civil-military relations in the NSWP 
and democratic civil-military relations in the ASD. This chapter describes military 
professionalism in the NSWP and in the ASD by examining three "primary foundations" 
of military professionalism: (1) authority; (2) leadership; (3) discipline, morale, and 
obedience and two "secondary foundations" of military professionalism: (1) recruitment 
and retention; and (2) career development. Defining military professionalism in this way 
provides a greater level of detail that better enables one to compare military 
professionalism in ASD states with military professionalism in the NSWP states. 
Comprehending the differences in military professionalism will help the members of 
Eastern European militaries to develop a new form of military professionalism to 
coincide with the reform of their formal civil-military relations. By developing 
democratic military professionalism, post-communist militaries can be effective 
instruments of national security in a democracy. 
This chapter is divided into two parts, each of which is subdivided into two 
sections. The first part describes the three primary foundations of military 
professionalism with respect to the ASD and the NSWP. The second part describes the 
two secondary foundations of military professionalism with respect to ASD and NSWP 
states. Then, using the foundations discussed in this chapter as a framework for analysis, 
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chapter IV examines the current status of military professionalism in Hungary and 
Poland. 
Authors' note: The description ofthe foundations of military professionalism 
presented in this chapter represent the "ideal" model of democratic military 
professionalism that ASD states strive to achieve today, as well as the "ideal" model of 
communist military professionalism that the NSWP attempted to attain in the years after 
Stalin and before the introduction of Gorbachev' s reforms in the late 1980' s?05 
In the case of ASD militaries, this chapter offers not only an "ideal" but a 
"contemporary" model of military professionalism. The model reflects the contemporary 
ideal of democratic military professionalism so that the model can be used as a guide for 
post-communist military reform. History demonstrates that the ideal model of military 
professionalism evolves as democratic society changes. For example, the ideal model of 
military professionalism in the 1930's differs from the ideal model today. The process of 
evolution continues as contemporary societal values and military requirements shape the 
current form of democratic civil-military relations and democratic military 
professionalism in each ASD state.206 The authors' understand this process and attempt to 
explain the origin and evolution of each aspect of contemporary democratic military 
c . al. d. h. h 207 pro1essmn Ism presente m t IS c apter. 
205 The author's realize that there are exceptions to every "ideal" defmition and example presented in the 
discussions of the foundations of military professionalism. Throughout this chapter, the authors' footnote 
examples that contradict the stated ideals. 
206 For example, in the U.S. the integration of African-Americans and the introduction of women into 
combat roles demonstrates how changes in societal values force changes in the military. See the works of 
Charles Moskos. 
207 It is important to use the contemporary "ideal" model of democratic military professionalism because 
the Eastern European states who desire NATO membership look to current models of civil-military 
relations and military professionalism used by US and NATO countries for guidance. States like Hungary 
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The description of communist military professionalism is based on the "ideal" 
model that the Soviets achieved on a "functional," but not "attitudinal," level in the 
armed forces of Eastern Europe, as discussed in chapter II. Despite the reforms initiated 
during the Gorbachev years and continued in the post-communist period, the legacy of 
the ideal communist model of military professionalism remains in the militaries of 
Eastern Europe?08 
In addition, the authors' use a dialectic approach to describe the ideal models of 
military professionalism. Dialectics help one to clearly identify the major characteristics 
of each form of military professionalism in order to provide a useful framework for 
analyzing the prospects of democratic military reform in Eastern Europe. 
B. PRIMARY FOUNDATIONS OF MILITARY PROFESSIONALISM 
1. The Armed Forces of Atlantic-Style Democratic (ASD) States 
a. Authority 
To understand the differences in military professionalism in the ASD and 
the NSWP states at a fundamental level, one must first review basic organizational 
theory, focusing on how such professional, bureaucratic organizations as the state and the 
military organize systems of authority. According to the political theorist Max Weber, the 
structures of authority "designate the formal and informal patterns in which power is 
distributed and organized with regard to the authoritative making and implementing of 
and Poland are interested in developing a form of military professionalism that is congruent with 
contemporary models of professionalism in NATO countries. 
208 Based on the authors' interviews with officers in the Hungarian and Polish armed forces in August, 
1996. 
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decisions--the roles and relationships through which authority is distributed and 
. d ,209 exercise . 
Weber advocated a "legal-rational form" of authority for bureaucratic 
organizations such as the modem armed forces. Based on the legally established 
impersonal order, the legal-rational form of authority "is superior to any other form in 
precision, in stability, in the stringency of its discipline, and in its reliability."210 In 
contrast, other theorists defined authority in the context of the human-relations movement 
that began in the 1930's.211 Theorist Robert Peabody combined the human-relations 
dimension with Weber's concept oflegal-rational authority to develop a comprehensive 
theory which classified authority into two types: formal authority and functional 
authority.Z12 Formal authority, which Peabody subdivides into authority oflegitimacy 
and authority of position, is the impersonal legal-rational form of authority described by 
Weber. Functional authority, subdivided into authority of competence and authority of 
person, is the additional authority derived from the competence and leadership qualities 
displayed by an individual who possesses formal authority.Z13 This thesis examines 
authority, as an element of military professionalism, in accordance with Peabody's 
categories. 
(1) Formal Authority- Authority ofLegitimacy and Authority of 
Position. Unlike the related concepts of power and influence, the concept of authority has 
209 Amos Perlmutter, The Military and Politics in Modern Times, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1977), p. 22. 
210 Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, A.M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons, 
eds. (NewYork: Oxford University Press, 1947), p. 337. 
211 Robert L. Peabody, Organizational Authority (New York: Atherton Press, 1964), pp. 23-24. 
212 Ibid., pp. 117-119. 
213 Ibid., pp. 121-131. 
54 
implicit in it the notion of legitimacy.214 For example, the authority inherent in an 
employee-employer relationship evolved out of the relationship between master and 
servant, and is predicated on the concept that those in authority (the master) have the right 
to demand obedience, and those subject to authority (the servant) have the duty to 
obey.215 The type of authority that the master holds over the servant is based on the kind 
of claim to legitimacy made by the master.216 
Like the master in the master-servant relationship, the government 
in the government-society relationship acquires its legitimacy through processes that 
facilitate the acceptance of authority and generalized deference to authority by the 
individuals in the social group affected by that authority.217 Civil-military relations 
theorist Amos Perlmutter explains why it is important for governments to acquire 
legitimacy: 
Legitimacy is the foundation of governmental power. It is a source of 
support, exercised universally in modem times by rational and complex 
bureaucratic organizations. The regime that elicits obedience is an 
organization that regulates its authority relationships, that is the system 
which causes the people to accept the regime ... The inculcation of the sense 
of legitimacy, along with the extension of its acceptance, is the most 
. .fi fun . f h . 218 s1gm 1cant ctlon o t e regime. 
The authority exercised by the governments in Atlantic style 
democracies is based on the legal-rational model, where the civilian organs of 
government, the military, and society display obedience to legally established 




218 Perlmutter, The Military and Politics in Modern Times, p. 22. 
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constitutions. ASD governments enjoy social approval and general deference to their 
authority because they function within the framework of a democratic system, where 
leaders are elected by the people, and theoretically, government exists to "serve the 
people."219 In democracies, there exists a political-social "contract" between the people 
and their government, such that the people empower the government with the authority of 
legitimacy?20 This "contract" is codified in constitutional provisions and operationalized 
through the processes of"political pluralism."221 
In a democracy, legal-rational authority is neither legal nor 
legitimate without the willing deference of the people toward their government's 
authority. 222 A democratic government gains the deference of its people by ensuring that 
it is representative ofthe people and it respects human and individual rights. By contrast, 
the communist governments of Eastern Europe gained the deference of their people by 
mechanisms of authoritarian control that sacrificed human and individual rights in order 
to ensure the power of the party, the state, and Soviet hegemony. 223 
In addition, Huntington notes that western democratic systems 
depend much less than authoritarian regimes on the government's "performance" for 
219 The US Constitution provides a good example ofthis. See Kohn, p. 1-94. 
220 Based on the works of Locke, Rousseau, and Kant. See Locke's Second Treatise of Government, 
Rousseau's The Social Contract, and Kant The Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals for a discussion 
on the contract tradition. 
221 Ibid. Political pluralism is "a condition for the government to be representative of the diversity of 
public opinion." It requires: the holding of free elections at regular intervals and in conditions of complete 
openness; the ability of citizens to establish political parties freely; the ability of the parties to campaign 
without fear of intimidation. (This definition was extracted from NATO Draft General Report 




legitimacy?24 In Atlantic-style democratic systems, Huntington explains, "performance 
failure is blamed on the incumbents rather than the system, and the ouster and 
replacement of the incumbents [through the electoral process] leads to a renewal of the 
system."225 The ability to retain legitimacy through this renewal process provides the 
f d . . h " d ll . . "
226 Th th governments o western emocratlc systems Wit proce ura egttlmacy. us, e 
legitimacy of government authority in ASD states does not solely hinge on the 
"performance" of the particular political figure or party in power. Even if those in power 
fail to live up to society's expectations, the government's authority remains legitimate by 
virtue of the "procedural legitimacy" of the democratic system?
27 In other words, the 
processes and procedures of the democratic political system, which includes all of the 
elements of political pluralism, allows the government to enjoy the authority of 
legitimacy, apart from the ability or inability of the persons in power to solve the 
try' bl 228 coun s pro ems. 
Legitimacy is a condition of validity and acceptance enjoyed by 
systems ofauthority?29 In addition, legitimacy is a system of normative domination that 
ensures support for the government.230 The legitimacy of government institutions, such as 
the military, depends on the legitimacy of the government itself. ASD militaries enjoy 
the authority of legitimacy because they serve a legitimate civilian government; and 
224 Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman, 
Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma, 1991), p. 259. Huntington includes communist regimes among the 
authoritarian regimes with respect to this assertion. 
225 Ibid., p. 306. 
226 Ibid., pp. 258-259. 
227 Ibid. Of course, this is assuming that those in power abide by the law and constitution. 
228 Ibid. 
229 Perlmutter, p. 23. 
230 Ibid., p. 23. 
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operate within the legally-established framework of a constitution, defense act, service 
act, and military justice system that embody democratic values and the principle of 
democratic civilian political control.231 
Once a government establishes its legitimate right to rule, it must 
build structures of authority within government institutions to execute its power. Like 
other government institutions, the military is a bureaucracy consisting of an impersonal 
hierarchy of ranks and positions that serve to enforce obedience and ensure compliance 
among its members.232 This hierarchy of"position authority" in government institutions 
facilitates the distribution of state power. 
The authority of position is the power of control inherent in rank or 
office, not in the particular person who holds that rank or office.233 The laws of the state 
assign authority to the ranks or offices of government institutions such as the military. 
ASD militaries, like all military organizations distribute authority through an impersonal 
structure of position and rank to facilitate control at all levels of command. However, 
ASD militaries widen the scope of positional authority by allowing leaders to exercise 
autonomy in decision making. In addition, ASD militaries extend the impersonal 
positional structure of authority by relying on a professional corps of non-commissioned 
officers (NCOs). 
Command and control in the armed forces of the ASD is predicated 
on the concept of trust between leaders and subordinates. Trust removes barriers to 
231 Ulrich, pp. 77-94. 
232 Perlmutter, p. 23. 
233 Peabody, p. 121. The authors use "positional authority" and "the authority of person" interchangeably. 
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innovation, initiative, and independent thought, and allows officers at the lowest level in 
the chain of command to exercise autonomy in decision making. With trust as a guiding 
principle, ASD militaries use a system of command which gives subordinate leaders 
autonomy in accomplishing assigned missions. Autonomy is operationalized through the 
use of "mission-type orders"-- orders which specify what tasks to accomplish, but not 
how to accomplish them?34 For example, a platoon leader is given an order that 
identifies his objective, but does not specify how he is to task organize his platoon, 
conduct movement, and assault the objective. 
The concept of mission-type orders evolved from Auftragstaktik, 
the decentralized command system developed by the German army in the nineteenth 
century to give individual commanders a large degree ofindependence.
235 First 
articulated clearly as a doctrine by Moltke and inspired by Clausewitz, Auftragstaktik 
allowed soldiers to demonstrate flexibility in all aspects of war so they could avoid being 
overwhelmed by unforeseen circumstances--the imponderables that create friction in 
warfare?36 Auftragstaktik constituted a key element the German army's success in the 
Franco-Prussian War and the Second World War. Remarks by Wehrmacht General 
Herman Balck illuminate the importance of Auftragstaktik to the German Army: 
Generally, the German higher commander rarely or never reproached their 
subordinates unless they made a terrible blunder. They were fostering the 
individual's initiative. They left him room for initiative, and did not 
234 John T. Nelsen II, "Auftragstaktik: Case For Decentralized Combat Leadership," The Challenge of 
Military Leadership, Lloyd J. Matthews and Dale E. Brown, eds. (New York: Pergamon-Brassey's 
Publishers, 1989), p. 29. 
235 Martin van Creveld, The Training of Officers, (New York: The Free Press, 1990), p. 31 
236 Based on the teachings of Professor Donald Abenheim; also Peter Paret, "Clausewitz," Makers of 
Modern Strategy, p. 212. 
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reprimand him unless he did something very wrong. This went down to 
the individual soldier, who was praised for developing initiative?37 
Cases from American and British history also demonstrate how the 
use of mission-type orders can lead to success in combat. During the American Civil 
War, General Grant's use of mission-type orders helped widely dispersed and isolated 
Union forces defeat the Confederacy. During the Second World War, Generals Marshall, 
MacArthur, Patton, Montgomery, and Slim also relied on mission-type orders to 
successfully conduct operations in large theaters ofwar.238 
Today, mission-type orders are part of a broader command 
philosophy that emphasizes centralized control and decentralized execution in the 
conduct of military operations?39 The success of centralized control and decentralized 
execution depends on the junior officer's ability to clearly interpret the "commander's 
intent" with regard to the mission-type order he has been given by that commander. ASD 
commanders expect their subordinates to correctly interpret the commander's intent and 
exercise initiative to accomplish the mission in the absence of specific orders?40 The 
ability of officers and NCOs to successfully perform the mission based on the 
commander's intent allows commanders at all levels of the chain of command to cope 
237 Charles G. Sutten, Jr., "Command and Control at the Operational Level," The Challenge of Military 
Leadership, p. 78. The example of the German Army in the Nazi era offered here is obviously not an 
example of how autonomy works in democratic military institutions. Rather, it provides an operational 
example of how autonomy can facilitate success in combat. The success of Aufiragstaktik in the Second 
World War flowed from the acknowledgment and unreserved acceptance of mutual dependence that 
Germans inherited from traditional Prussian society. (See Sutten, p.80). The fact that the Bundeswehr still 
relies on Aufiragstaktik today demonstrates that the concept is especially compatible with the requirements 
of a military in a democracy. 
238 See Nelsen, pp. 26-39; and Sutten, pp. 74-83. 
239 Not all commanders in ASD militaries issue broad mission-type orders; some commanders prefer to 
give detailed instructions that they want their subordinates to follow meticulously. However, the military 
officially encourages the use of mission-type orders whenever possible. 
240 Nelsen, p. 36. 
60 
with uncertainty and ambiguity (Clausewitz's "frictions") that occur during military 
operations.241 Initiative, aggressiveness, risk-taking, and willingness to assume 
responsibility are attributes prevalent in the soldiers from a democratic society, and are 
qualities that empower soldiers to successfully navigate through the "fog of war." 
242 
Recent guidance from the United States Special Operations 
Command (USSOCOM) exemplifies the importance of autonomy and mission-type 
orders. General Downing, former USCINCSOC, challenged his commanders to give their 
subordinates wide latitude to exercise their individual judgment and initiative. He 
provided simple guidance: 
Is it the right thing for the country? Is it legal and ethical? Is it something 
you are willing to be accountable for? Is it consistent with your 
organizational values? If the answer is Yes to all ofthese questions, Don't 
k . . J d . 243 as permission, ust o It. 
A system of command that operates under the philosophy of 
centralized control and decentralized execution relies heavily on the existence of the NCO 
corps as the guarantor of mission success. An incident during a recent PFP peacekeeping 
exercise demonstrates why it is important to have a hierarchy ofNCOs to interpret and 
execute mission-type orders. In that exercise, a platoon leader from an FWP military was 
given the task of ensuring the safe passage of refugees into a command post compound. 
241 John M. Vermillion, "The Pillars of Generalship," The Challenge of Military Leadership, p. 68. This is 
especially important when units suddenly find themselves cut-off and isolated from the chain of command 
during combat. 
242 Sutten, p. 80. In contrast, these attributes are not prevalent in soldiers from communist societies, 
because the tight controls ofthe totalitarian system stifled the development of initiative, risk-taking, and 
the willingness to assume responsibility. 
243 David J. Scott, Lieutenant Colonel, USAF, "The Air Force Special Operations Command Identity 
Crisis: An Assessment and Opinion," Air War College Paper, April, 1996. 
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Without any NCOs in his platoon, he relied on conscripts to interpret and execute the 
mission-type order he received from a NATO commander. The platoon failed to properly 
execute the mission-type order when one conscript-led squad misinterpreted their order 
and mistakenly shot at a group of refugees. If the FWP platoon would have had a trained 
NCO, rather than a conscript to interpret the mission-type orders, the mistake could have 
been avoided. In contrast, an American platoon leader who was given the same mission, 
gave a clear, concise, mission-type order to his NCO squad leaders, who then correctly 
interpreted and successfully executed the order.244 
The NCO corps also provides a vital link in the chain of command 
by extending the lines of positional authority to the lowest levels of command. 245 As part 
of the formal chain of command, NCOs ensure that orders are carried out and discipline is 
maintained within the ranks. Moreover, as experts in a specialty skill, NCOs train soldiers 
and ensure that soldiers properly execute individual and collective tasks. In addition, 
NCOs are responsible for the development of enlisted troops; setting and maintaining 
performance standards; supervision of unit operations within established guidelines; care 
of individual soldiers and their families; proper wearing of the uniform; appearance and 
courtesy of enlisted personnel; care of arms and equipment; care of living quarters; and 
operation of recreational facilities, to name a few. 246 NCOs enhance unit effectiveness by 
spending most of their time among the troops, supervising the details involved in 
244 Thomas A. Wuchte, MAJ, US Army, "NCOs: A model for the world," (Observations from Peace 
Shield 1996, a multinational peacekeeping exercise in L'viv, Ukraine), Army Times, July 22, 1996, p.54. 
245 Lawrence P. Crocker, LTC, US Army (ret), The Army Officers Guide, 44th Edition (Harrisburg, Pa: 
Stackpole Books, 1988), p. 271. 
246 Ibid., p. 272. 
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accomplishing the mission. And as noted above, NCOs perform leadership and 
supervisory roles necessary to ensure the execution of mission-type orders. 
(2) Functional Authority - Authority of Competence and Authority 
of Person. According to Peabody, "formal authority flowing from legitimacy and 
organizational status [rank or position] must almost invariably be supported by authority 
based on professional competence and skill in human relations."
247 ASD militaries 
emphasize competence at each level of the military hierarchy and consider it a leadership 
principle?48 A leader's competence helps to inspire the trust and confidence ofhis 
subordinates. 249 ASD militaries develop competence through education programs and 
career development systems which help to ensure that each leader gains the appropriate 
mix of broad and specialized education and experience.
250 In addition, the degree to 
which an individual possesses military competence is the focus of evaluation reports and 
determines, in part, a servicemember' s prospects for advancement. Along with 
competence, other personal qualities are relied upon by ASD officers and NCOs to 
enhance their formal authority. These qualities confer upon the leader the "authority of 
person," which inspires subordinates to obey not only the impersonal rank or position, but 
also the "person," ofthe leader.251 
247 Peabody, Organizational Authority, p. 122. 
248 The Armed Forces Officer, p. 28., and FM 22-10 Leadership, US Dept. of the Army, p. 10. 
249 Ibid. 
250 Scott and Scott, pp. 352 -353 state that professional military education in the U.S. produces officers who 
are "generalists," whereas the military education program in the WP produced "specialists." 
251 Peabody, pp. 124-125. Max Weber refers to two types of authority-- traditional and charismatic--
which are owed to a person. Weber's "charismatic authority," like Peabody"s "authority of person," flows 
from the leadership qualities ofthe person in authority. Authority of person emphasizes the human 
element--the ability of leaders to use interpersonal skills to inspire their troops. 
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Authority of person (or personal authority) is critical to military 
professionalism in ASD armed forces?52 Janowitz recognizes the importance of "personal 
authority" in his observation that western military establishments emphasize 
"interpersonal relations" as the basis of authority?53 Personal authority flows from the 
leadership qualities of the person in a position of authority. Thus, ASD militaries instruct 
their officers and NCOs to use leadership rather than formal authority to gain the 
followership of their soldiers. Through leadership, ASD officers and NCOs are able to 
enjoy the "authority of person, " which obviates the need to resort to their formal 
authority to attain discipline and obedience. Moreover, "personal authority" gains more 
than simple obedience because leadership, as the basis of"personal authority," inspires 
subordinates to anticipate and enthusiastically carry-out orders?54 In addition, as the 
mechanism by which ASD officers and NCOs gain "personal authority," leadership is 
one of the key foundations of democratic military professionalism. 
b. Leadership 
Leadership in all militaries is characterized by courage, competence, a 
sense of duty, ideas of class, honor, and a commitment to the mission. In a democracy, 
military leadership is also defined by a set of principles that represent the essence of 
democratic ideology: respect for individual rights, civil liberties, and human dignity; 
trust; accountability to societal values; and ethical behavior manifested in the honor code 
of the profession.255 These leadership traits are grounded in theories of social 
252 Ibid. 
253 Ibid., p. 42. 
254 1bid., p.115. 
255 Ulrich, p. 116. 
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organization derived from nineteenth century French and German social thought and are 
especially appropriate in democratic open societies due to the expectations of their 
citizens that human rights will not be unduly sacrificed and the existence of oversight 
procedures capable of monitoring violations of democratic norms and practices. 
256 An 
expert on military leadership, Dr. Sam Sarkesian notes that; "The exercise of leadership 
within a military that is part of a democratic system must reflect democratic values. This 
does not mean, of course, that leadership must consistently operate according to the 
followers' consensus. But it does mean that leadership must be based on some minimum 
acceptance of democratic values."257 
Fundamental democratic principles are emphasized in the discussion of 
leadership in ASD military doctrinal manuals such as the US Army's Field ManuallOO-
5, which states: 
The nation expects its Army to adhere to the highest standards of 
professional conduct and to reflect the ideals of American values. The 
American people demand a high-quality Army that honors the core values 
of the Constitution it is sworn to uphold - a strong respect for the rule of 
law, human dignity, and individual rights .... Leaders have a special 
responsibility to subordinates ... trust is the basic bond of leadership. Good 
leaders occupy a position of special trust and confidence in the eyes of 
their soldiers. They return their soldiers' trust with the greatest care for 
their well-being, while aggressively pursuing the accomplishment of the 
mission. Leaders treat subordinates with respect; never do they seek self-
gain at the expense of their soldiers or their subordinate commanders. 
Leaders imbue soldiers with a sense of honor, share their hardships, and 
acknowledge their accomplishments .. ?58 
256 David R. Segal, "Leadership and Management: Organization Theory," Military Leadership, James H. 
Buck and Lawrence J. Korb, eds. (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1981), p. 42.; and Ulrich, p. 115. 
257 Sam C. Sarkesian, "A Personal Perspective," Military Leadership, pp. 243-244. 
258 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 100-5: Operations, (Washington D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 14 June 1993), Chapter I. 
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The importance of attending to the needs of the individual soldier is a 
basic leadership principle in ASD militaries. For example, retired General Edward C. 
Meyer states that the American leadership style is "founded upon consideration and 
respect for the soldier; each soldier meaningfully assisted toward development as a whole 
man, a whole person, is more likely to respond with his or her full commitment."259 
Similarly, the German leadership style Innere Fuehrung calls for soldiers to be treated as 
thinking individuals who are worthy of respect and who are able to understand the 
purpose behind an order.260 
By respecting the individual rights and human dignity of soldiers, military 
leaders are able to adhere to constitutional guidelines and, at the same time, earn the 
confidence, respect, and cooperation of their soldiers. The ideals espoused in democratic 
constitutions encourage a form of military leadership based on respect for a soldier's 
human rights and individual needs. The Federal Republic of Germany's democratic 
constitution, the "Basic Law," states that "Human dignity shall be inviolable. To respect 
and protect it shall be the duty of all state authority." 261 In Atlantic-style democracies 
human dignity is not lost when one becomes a soldier. For example, in the Bundeswehr, a 
soldier retains the rights of a citizen, narrowed only as required by his mission?62 In 
other words, the soldier is a democratic "citizen in uniform."263 
259 Ulrich, p. 114. 
260 Victorson, p. 5. The Germans believe that in a democratic society, a soldier must understand the 
purpose of an order if he is to carry out his duties. 
261 Article I (1), Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany (Wolfenbuettel: Roco-Druck, GmbH, 
1990), p. 8, cited in Victorson, p. 5. 
262 Victorson, p. 5, and Joo, p. 54. 
263 Victorson, p. 5, The Bundeswehr affords the same rights to conscripts as well as professional officers 
and NCOs. Thus, the German Army maintains the "ideal" of the citizen-soldier throughout the ranks or 
professional soldiers. The authors contend that this is also true in the other ASD militaries, although to 
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To earn the confidence, respect, and cooperation of their soldiers, ASD 
leaders rely on positive motivational techniques rather than fear and intimidation. By 
exercising a style of leadership derived from motivational theory, ASD militaries aim to 
inspire their soldiers to want to do their job?64 In his classic study on military leadership, 
Nineteen Stars, Edgar Puryear noted that, in World War II, "American generals could get 
their subordinates to carry out orders through fear, but never, under such conditions, 
would men give their all to a commander."265 Today, as in 1945, ASD militaries do not 
tolerate motivation through fear or any form of physical abuse, to include hazing, 
beatings, and arbitrary physical punishments. 
In addition, contemporary ASD military leaders rely on trust, which forms 
the basis for positive motivational leadership. Trust creates a command climate which 
promotes innovation, initiative, and motivates subordinates to excel. In addition, the 
ASD officer promotes the willing followership of his subordinates by inspiring trust and 
confidence in his leadership, thereby empowering the officer with "authority of person." 
Moreover, the soldier of a democracy can remain a moral agent ultimately 
responsible for his actions, and can at the same time obey the orders of a person he trusts, 
in the presumption that the orders are legally and morally correct.
266 ASD military 
varying degrees. In ASD states, respect for the dignity of the individual is a value that extends beyond 
international borders and political systems-- and even applies to the nation's enemies in war. As recently 
as the Gulf War, ASD military members compassionately cared for surrendering enemy soldiers. In 
addition, the commitment of ASD states to human dignity has led, in part, to ASD military involvement in 
humanitarian missions around the world. 
264 For a discussion on the relationship between motivational theory and leadership, refer to Laurie A. 
Broedling, "The Psychology ofLeadership," in Military Leadership, Buck and Korb, eds., pp. 71-94. 
265 Edgar F. Puryear, Jr., 19 Stars: A Study in Military Character and Leadership, 2nd Edition (Novato, 
CA: Presidio Press, 1981), p. 397. 
266 Michael 0. Wheeler, "Loyalty, Honor, and the Modem Military," War, Morality, and the Military 
Profession, Malham M. Wakin, ed. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1986), p. 178. 
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doctrine emphasizes trust as a key ingredient ofleadership. For example, the US Marine 
Corps Warfighting manual, FMFM 1, states "trust is an essential trait among leaders-
trust by seniors in the abilities of their subordinates and by juniors in the competence and 
f h . . "267 support o t eu semors. 
Trust is enhanced by a leader's ability to communicate effectively and 
honestly with subordinates. Leadership in ASD militaries requires this type of 
communications both up and down the chain of command. ASD militaries encourage the 
use of counseling to help officers and NCOs meet their prime responsibility of 
developing people and making the most of their talents. In addition, commanders in 
ASD militaries have "open-door" policies which allow soldiers to speak freely to any 
commander. Through candor and honesty, soldiers and leaders can solve problems 
together and enhance morale. At the same time, it is considered the subordinate's duty to 
provide his honest, professional opinion, even if he disagrees with his superior.268 The 
importance of open communications is also reflected in US Marine Corps FMFM 1, 
which states "seniors must encourage candor among subordinates and must not hide 
b h. d h . ank . . . ,269 e m t eu r mstgma. 
In addition to the importance of trust within the military, there exists a 
bond of trust between the military and society?70 According to Huntington, people in 
professions, such as the military, must have a feeling of responsibility to society.271 In a 
267 US Marine Corps FMFM 1, p. 45. 
268 However, once the superior announces that he has made a decision (gives a lawful order), it is the 
subordinate's duty to put personal views aside and support the superior's decision. 269 US Marine Corps FMFM 1, p. 46. 
270 In ASD states, laws require the military to be transparent to society. 
271 Huntington, The Soldier and the State, p. 9. 
68 
democracy, this feeling of responsibility is reinforced by a political system that relies on 
societal support.272 Society's demands provide a check against violations of democratic 
principles and violations against public trust. This particularly effects the military, 
because of its unique status as both a client ofthe state and the controller of the state's 
instrument of violence. As such, the military is entrusted with the lives of the state's 
citizens it employs, thus, with life or death hanging in the balance, military leaders are 
held even more accountable to society than other professions or institutions in a 
democracy. 273 This responsibility to the society which they serve requires military 
commanders to exercise the kind of leadership that complies with national values and 
emphasizes the "human dimension" of military science. 274 This kind of leadership is 
necessary for the development of highly disciplined units comprised of soldiers who 
possess high morale and enthusiastically obey their superiors -- the goal of leadership in 
ASD militaries. 
c. Discipline, Obedience, and Morale 
In armed forces throughout the world, discipline is the standard of 
personal deportment, work requirement, courtesy, appearance and ethical conduct that 
enables soldiers to perform the mission with optimum efficiency and sacrifice life and 
limb if necessary. 275 For the armed forces of a democracy, discipline is primarily the 
product of morale and leadership and is supported by the formal authority vested in the 
272 Ibid., p. 82. 
273 Ibid. 
274 US Army FM 100-5, Chapter 14, The human dimension refers to the soldiers' spirit, initiative, 
intelligence, discipline, courage, and competence-- the foundations of an effective army. 
275 d )1'/: The Arme Forces OJJlcer, p. 49. 
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officer corps, NCO corps, and the military justice system. The goal of military discipline 
in democratic armed forces is to predispose soldiers to willingly obey the legitimate 
authority of the military and the state. Willing obedience is achieved through "positive 
means", otherwise referred to by Janowitz as "manipulation".276 In a democracy, the 
concept of "manipulation," or the use of"positive means," is rooted in Hobbes' egoistic 
view of man and Locke's emphasis on innate human rights.277 In the broadest sense, 
citizens of the Atlantic style democracies, generally motivated by Hobbesian self-
interest, and accustomed to the concept of the "social contract" between the people and 
the government, have come to enjoy the Locke-inspired rights and protections afforded 
them by their constitutions. When the citizen becomes a soldier, he expects to retain 
many of the same rights he had as a civilian. At the same time, the citizen-soldier 
understands that the military system that operates in a free society must amend some of 
the basic rights of citizenship so that the military, with its demands and responsibilities, 
can function effectively as a military organization. Moreover, the professional officers 
and NCOs, who embody the democratic ideal of the citizen-soldier themselves, 
understand the expectations of the new recruit. Thus, military leaders have the same 
expectations and realize that the best way to achieve willing obedience is through 
"positive means." The use of the Soviet-style "negative means" or "domination" is not 
effective and invites a negative response from individuals who are accustomed to life in 
276 Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, (Glencoe Ill: Free Press, 1960), Part II. Janowitz lists two 
modes that organizations use to exercise authority: domination and manipulation. Domination is 
characterized by "negative means" of motivation such as threat of punishment--the reliance on formal 
authority to ensure compliance. Manipulation is characterized by "positive means" of motivation such as 
respect for soldiers rights, and the reliance on principles of leadership to motivate soldiers to comply with 
rules and regulations. 
277 Malham M Wakin, "Ethics of Leadership," Military Leadership, Buck and Korb, eds., pp. 97-98. 
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modem democratic states. In Democracy in America, Alexis De Tocqueville noted that 
imposing "blind, minute, submissive, and invariable obedience" on soldiers of a 
democracy would be counterproductive, and that "among democratic communities 
military discipline ought not to attempt to annihilate the free action of the faculties."
278 
De T ocqueville adds that "The obedience thus inculcated is less exact, but it is more 
eager and more intelligent. It has its root in the will of him who obeys; it rests not only 
on his instinct, but on his reason; and consequently it will often spontaneously become 
. d . ,279 
more stnct as anger reqmres. 
The importance of attaining discipline through "positive means" is best 
described by Major General John M. Schofield's famous speech delivered to the West 
Point class of 1879: 
The discipline which makes the soldiers of a free country reliable in battle 
is not to be gained by harsh or tyrannical treatment. On the contrary, such 
treatment is far more likely to destroy than to make an army .... The one 
mode or the other of dealing with subordinates springs from a 
corresponding spirit in the breast of the commander. He who feels the 
respect which is due to others, especially his subordinates, cannot fail to 
inspire in them respect for himself, while he who feels and hence 
manifests, disrespect for others, especially his subordinates, cannot fail to 
inspire hatred against himself?80 
Similarly, General George C. Marshall's view of discipline, as described 
by the general's biographer, Dr. Forrest C. Pogue, supports the emphasis on "positive 
means:" 
General Marshall believed in a discipline based on respect rather than fear; 
on the effect of good example given by officers; on the intelligent 
278 Alexis De Tocqueville, Democracy in America, Volume II, Book III, p. 279. 
279 Ibid. 
280 Virginia Tech Corps of Cadets, Guide for New Cadets, August, 1982. 
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comprehension by all ranks of why and order has to be and why it must be 
. d fd . d 281 carne out; on a sense o uty, on espnt e corps. 
To meet the expectations of soldiers in ASD militaries, officers pay 
attention to individual rights and human dignity and strive to develop in their soldiers a 
sense of self-esteem to help them actualize their fullest potential and to find meaning in 
their existence as soldiers?82 It is important for officers to pay attention to the individual 
needs of the soldier because individuals can better develop and flourish in environments 
where their psychological, social, and physical needs are met.283 By using positive means 
in an attempt to meet the expectations and individual needs of the soldier, the officer 
bolsters morale, inspires trust and confidence in his ability as a leader, encourages self-
discipline, and thus, creates an atmosphere in which the soldier willingly obeys. 
In addition, ASD militaries rely on their NCO corps to ensure that positive 
means are used as a method for enforcing discipline and building morale. NCOs provide 
the continuity of leadership that bridges the gap between the commander and the 
individual soldier.284 NCOs further enhance the military's effectiveness by providing 
supervision at the lower levels of command. At the tactical level, they enforce discipline, 
build morale, and ensure obedience through direct, proximate leadership on a daily basis. 
Moreover, the presence of an NCO corps that embodies the standards of democratic 
281 Michael 0. Wheeler, "Loyalty, Honor, and the Modern Military," War, Morality, and the Military 
Profession, Malham M. Wakin, ed., p. 173. 
282 This is the ideal method in ASD armies--some Western commanders use "negative means" as a primary 
tool to acquire discipline and ensure obedience. However, ASD militaries discourage this practice and 
often punish officers and NCOs that rely on "domination," hazing, and fear to motivate troops. In addition, 
ASD militaries such as the U.S. armed forces are not immune to incidents of hazing, ethnic tension, sexual 
harrassment, and other problems. But the system attempts to eliminate the conditions that lead to these 
problems by educating soldiers and emphasizing the "ideal" form of democratic military professionalism. 
283 Crocker, The Army Officers Guide, p. 37. 
284 Ibid., pp. 271-272. 
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military professionalism leads to the infusion of principles of democratic military 
professionalism throughout the entire chain of command in democracies. 
285 
As stated above, officers and NCOs instill discipline and build morale by 
exercising a style of leadership that emphasizes individual rights and human needs. The 
formal authority inherent in rank, position, and in the system of military justice are used 
as secondary means to achieve discipline. In most cases, ASD militaries strive to achieve 
discipline without having to resort to formal authority. In reality, however, discipline 
cannot always be obtained through the positive forces of leadership and high morale. To 
bolster these informal mechanisms of discipline, ASD militaries depend on a system of 
military justice and a formal hierarchy of authority. ASD militaries use formal authority 
and a military justice system in a supportive role to reinforce the impact of leadership and 
morale in producing discipline?86 All militaries distribute formal authority through a 
hierarchy of ranks and position that define a leader's power to reward and punish 
subordinates. ASD commanders administer punishments through a military justice 
system that respects individual and human rights. For example, the Uniformed Code of 
Military Justice (UCMJ) of the US military affords accused soldiers the right to remain 
silent and the right to counsel, two important rights afforded to US citizens by authority 
f h . . 287 o t e constitutiOn. 
285 Ulrich, p.ll6. 
286 For example, the US Army Officers Guide, pp. 280-281, states that "Where discipline is weak, 
leadership is faulty." In addition, the guide prescribes that a commander should always choose the lesser 
punishment (of punishments ranging from mild admonition to court-martial) for a soldier who has 
committed a disciplinary infraction, until convinced that the punishment will be ineffective. 
287 Ellen Jones, Red Army and Society, p. 134. 
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The Armed Forces Officer provides a good description of the dynamic 
relationship between leadership, discipline, morale, and obedience. 
Discipline and morale influence the inarticulate vote that is constantly 
taken by masses of men when the order comes to move forward--a variant 
of crowd psychology that inclines it to follow a leader. But the army does 
not move forward until the motion is carried. Unanimous consent only 
follows cooperation between the individual men in the ranks.288 
In other words, discipline and morale lead to the multiplied individual acceptance of the 
leader's order that is necessary to gain the corporate obedience of his unit. 289 
2. The Armed Forces of Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP) States 
a. Authority 
(1) Formal Authority- Authority of Legitimacy and Authority of 
Position. Legitimacy requires a political-social condition in which the government is 
able to justify its power in terms other than the mere fact of holding power?90 The 
communist regimes in Eastern Europe did not come to power through legitimate means, 
but rather through Soviet occupation. Moreover, as one-party authoritarian governments, 
the communist regimes never had the "procedural legitimacy" that ASD governments 
enjoy as a result of the processes and procedures of the democratic system. Thus, NSWP 
regimes could only gain "performance legitimacy"-- which depended on the regime's 
ability to "deliver to the people," because no other political-social condition existed to 
. "fy h . ' 291 JUStl t e regime s power. 
288 The Armed Forces Officer, p. 60. 
289 Ibid. 
290 Paul G. Lewis, "Obstacles to the Establishment of Political Legitimacy in Communist Poland," British 
Journal of Political Science (1982) XII, pp. 125-147. 
291 Huntington, The Third Wave, p. 258. Also refer to Paul G. Lewis, "Obstacles to the Establishment of 
Political Legitimacy in Communist Poland," British Journal of Political Science (1982) XII, pp. 125-147. 
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According to Huntington, the legitimacy of the communist regimes 
relied almost entirely on performance.292 Certain communist figures were able to gain 
brief periods of "performance legitimacy" for the regime through their ability to improve 
society's quality of life. However, during most of the Soviet era, the communist regimes 
failed to deliver to the people and did not enjoy any legitimacy. The Communist Party's 
inability to deliver economic and social well-being, and their repression of civil liberties 
created a situation in which the NSWP regimes depended on the coercive measures of 
Soviet occupation and internal oppression to maintain deference to their authority. The 
Soviet involvement in the quashing of popular revolts in Hungary and Poland in 1956, 
and Czechoslovakia in 1968; and Poland's own suppression ofSqlidarity in the 1970s 
and 80s, provide examples of the kinds of coercive measures that were necessary to 
d ~ . h . 293 ensure e1erence to commurust aut onty. 
In the NSWP states, the bearers of state power administered their 
system of coercion through the hierarchy of positional authority in civilian and military 
institutions. However, NSWP states were reluctant to trust those in positions of authority 
in the lower levels of the military chain of command and did not widely delegate 
authority to them?94 Specifically, the NSWP did not allow officers at the lower echelons 
to exercise autonomy of command and, although the officers with a good "communist 
conscience" were in theory encouraged to display initiative, most officers were reluctant 
292 Huntington, The Third Wave, p. 258. 
293 While Solidarity officially came to light in August, 1980, the movement actually began with the 
workers' strikes in the Baltic coast cities in December, 1970, when the Polish communist leadership 
ordered Polish armored units to suppress the striking workers. For a detailed description, see Roman Laba, 
The Roots of Solidarity (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991). 
294 Paul G. Lewis, p. 125. 
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to put their conscience to the test while under the watchful eye of the political officers.295 
According to British Air Commodore, E.S. Williams, the Russian saying "initisiyativa 
nakazuyema" - initiative is punishable, had serious implications for Soviet-style 
militaries. The reluctance of Soviet and Warsaw Pact officers to display initiative often 
led to situations where the officers took no action in the absence of detailed 
. . 296 
mstructwns. 
The monitoring activities of political officers and secret police 
operatives helped to further stifle initiative, innovation, and autonomy. By contrast to 
ASD militaries, the NSWP did not use mission-type orders. In accordance with a system 
of centralized control and centralized execution, NSWP commanders gave their 
subordinates detailed directives that left no room for initiative. Colonel Mark Victorson 
describes the nature of this system in his study of reform in the East German Army, 
Mission in the East. According to Victorson, the East German Army "used "stopwatch" 
standards to measure effectiveness--whatever could be timed was drilled, checked, and 
rewarded ... This attitude toward training originated from a "zero-defects" philosophy in 
an army where error could be punished by the party as well as by the military and it led to 
outstanding performance in individual soldier skill training ... Since the capacity to 
understand a commander's intent or to use originality in handling a mission could not be 
timed or checked easily and could lead to mistakes, these qualities were not inculcated in 
soldiers or leaders." 297 Thus, mission-type orders could not be used in a system that did 
295 Herbert Goldhamer, The Soviet Soldier (New York: Crane-Russak, 1975) p. 99. 
296 E. S. Williams, Air Commodore, "Morale, Motivation, and Leadership in the Soviet Armed Forces," 
Soviet Power: The Continuing Challenge, James Sherr, ed. (New York: St. Martin's Press pp. 234-235. 
297 v· 26 tctorson, p. . 
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not promote trust, autonomy, and initiative. Moreover, WP officers, who refrained from 
using initiative and creativity out of fear, came to expect orders that specified exactly 
how to perform each task.298 In the absence of specific orders, and with communications 
to a higher headquarters disrupted, most Soviet officers "would be at a loss." 
299 
Sovietologist Herbert Goldhamer notes that this lack of initiative is not simply due to a 
fear of taking risks.300 According to Goldhamer, "Senior officers, anxious to have their 
units make a good showing, surround their subordinate officers with so much attention 
and so many instructions that they fetter their initiative and inculcate in them the bad 
habit of awaiting orders."301 
Sovietologist Ellen Jones succinctly describes how the Soviet 
system discouraged military and civilian leaders from demonstrating initiative, 
innovation, and flexibility. According to Jones, "both the military and civilian manager 
must operate in an authoritarian, hierarchical system that touts the virtues of innovation 
and flexibility while rewarding rigidity and subservience. "302 
The Soviet command system gave officers absolute power over 
their subordinates, which they exercised through an exclusive right to issue orders and the 
assurance that these orders, regardless of what they might entail, would be followed 
unquestioningly.303 Moreover, the system relied on personal power and political and 
personal loyalty. Senior officers used their positions for their own ends, exchanging 
298 Goldharner, The Soviet Soldier, p. 96. 
299 Harriet Fast Scott and William F. Scott, The Armed Forces of the USSR, p. 402. 
300 Ibid., p. 101. 
301 Ibid. 
302 Ellen Jones, p. 219. 
303 Ulrich, p. 160. 
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favors with other officers in order to increase their influence and enhance their power 
within the military.304 Many senior officers thwarted initiative and innovation by using 
their positions of absolute power to further their own interests at the expense of their 
b d. 305 su or mates. 
In addition, the Warsaw Pact armed forces did not have an effective 
professional NCO corps to extend the chain of command.306 Instead, NCOs served 
primarily as specialists who performed technical functions in areas such as logistics, 
communications, and administration.307 Without professional NCOs in the chain of 
command, the WP militaries had to rely on second-year conscripts, who acted as squad 
leaders and in some cases platoon leaders, to maintain discipline and ensure that soldiers 
carried out orders.308 According to Eliot Cohen, one great weakness of the Soviet Army 
was its lack of an effective professional NCO corps, "and hence its reliance on second-
year conscripts to fulfill many of their functions, a practice fraught with disciplinary 
hazards. "309 
The absence of an effective professional NCO corps forced NSWP 
officers to fulfill many of the specialized functions performed by NCOs in ASD armed 
forces. British Air Commodore E. S. Williams pointed out that in the Soviet military 
system "everything depends on the officers .. .If the backbone of the British Army is the 
NCO, the backbone of the Soviet Army is the officer ... Simple aircraft refueling andre-
304 lbid.,p.161. 
305 Ulrich, p. 160. 
306 While the NSWP states had professional NCOs, they were not part of the chain of command, and they 
were not part of a professional corps ofNCOs. 
307 Based on the authors' interviews with Polish and Hungarian officers in August, 1996. 
308 Ibid. 
309 Cohen, p. 69. 
78 
arming is done by an officer, all tanks and APCs are commanded by officers, and routine 
jobs about the ship are done by officers."310 
In sum, NSWP states developed a system of formal authority to 
ensure that the Party could maintain control over the armed forces. To maximize party 
control, the NSWP forces did not extend lines of formal authority to their NCO corps and 
did not allow their officers to exercise autonomy in decision making. The NSWP reliance 
on formal authority reduced the need for officers to depend on functional forms of 
authority like competence and personal authority to motivate troops. 
(2) Functional Authority - Authority of Competence and Authority 
of Person. Like the ASD militaries, NSWP armed forces understood the need to develop 
competent officers. NSWP militaries stressed competence in the context of military skills 
and realized that an officer's competence helped to motivate troops.
311 In fact, 
competence served as one of the only means to motivate troops outside of formal 
authority. According to one Hungarian infantry officer, platoon and company 
commanders who could "shoot first, shoot best" had fewer problems motivating 
troops.312 Like the ASD, NSWP militaries expected their company grade officers to 
develop competence in their branch of service. However, NSWP company grade officers 
were much more specialized than their ASD counterparts.31
3 The NSWP expected their 
officers to attain the level of specialized competence that ASD militaries demand from 
310 Williams, p. 234. 
m Based on interviews with Hungarian and Polish officers, August, 1996. 
312 Based on interview with Major Horvath of the HDF, August, 1996. 
313 The Soviet system trained junior officers for duties not only in the various services but also in particular 
branches and specialized components of the armed forces. See Scott and Scott, p. 353. 
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NCOs who specialize in a particular ski11.314 The NSWP officer's specialized competence 
was appropriate for the WP system of centralized control and centralized execution.315 
In addition, NSWP armed forces depended less on personal forms 
of authority to gain the followership of their soldiers. Because communist leaders in 
Eastern Europe did not enjoy popular support, they realistically could not expect workers 
to be loyal or to display initiative in the conduct of their jobs. Likewise, the communist 
regimes could not expect their supervisors to willingly display the kinds of leadership 
traits required ofleaders in the ASD, such as loyalty, initiative, enthusiasm, and 
dependability.316 Thus, the communist regimes constructed dense overlapping 
bureaucracies of positional authority like the military's dual-command structure to ensure 
the loyalty and followership of the state's employees.317 The regimes used this system of 
formal authority to ensure that people did their jobs--without it, a largely apathetic work 
force could not have met the production goals of the state's planned economy. Similarly, 
the military's functional mechanisms of control in the NSWP enabled the armed forces to 
maintain discipline without depending on their officers to display initiative and 
leadership--the traits that form the basis of"personal authority." 
314 Ulrich, p. 164. 
315 Scott and Scott., p. 402. 
316 US Army FM 22-10 lists the following as leadership traits: initiative, enthusiasm, dependability, 
alertness, loyalty, endurance, courage, decisiveness., to name a few. 
317 The dual-command structure refers to the parallel hierarchy of commanders and political officers that 
existed in WP militaries. Thus, the WP armed forces had an operational chain of command and a political 
chain of command. 
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b. Leadership 
The concept of leadership, as it is understood in democratic militaries, did 
not exist in the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact.318 Officers in the Warsaw Pact relied on 
their formal authority to ensure followership in their commands. In addition, the WP 
militaries maintained a rigid authoritarian system of control - a system that subjugated the 
role of leadership to an emphasis on "absolute" obedience to formal authority. 
The NSWP sacrificed individual rights beyond the constraints necessary 
for military competence.319 Mirroring the communist societies in which they served, the 
NSWP militaries did not value principles such as individual rights, human dignity, trust, 
accountability to societal values, respect for civil liberties, and ethical behavior. Leaders 
did not depend on motivational forms of leadership to gain the willing followership of 
soldiers, rather they relied on coercion and the fear of punishment to "force" 
followership.320 As a result, human rights abuses were common and quality of life issues 
were of secondary concem.321 According to a former US Defense Attache in Moscow, 
Brigadier General Gregory Govan, the Soviet-style armed forces cultivated a system 
reminiscent of the feudal relationship between a master and his slave, in which the 
soldiers, like slaves, displayed forbearance toward their officers and suffered from harsh 
treatment.
322 Indeed, many of the leadership traits western armies look for in their 
commanders, those which inspire the willful trust, loyalty, and obedience of soldiers, 
318 There were exceptions to this. The WP, like all armed forces, had charismatic leaders who were able to 
motivate troops despite the authoritarian system. 
319 Ulrich, p. 110. 
320 Based on authors' interviews with Hungarian and Polish officers in August, 1996. 
321 Rakowska-Harmstone, Phase II- Vol I, p. 304. 
322 Ulrich, p. 152. 
81 
would have been punishable under the rigidly authoritarian Soviet-style system.323 
Essentially, the NSWP militaries used a highly impersonal system, based on the authority 
of position, to "force" obedience.324 Ironically, it is interesting to note, Russian military 
history contains examples of great military leaders who recognized the importance of 
"inspirational" leadership long before the Soviet era. For example, Alexander Suvarov 
wrote in the 18th century: 
An army is not only a physical power, a mass consisting of weapons of 
military operations, but it is as well a union of humans endowed with 
intelligence and heart. Spiritual force plays an important part in all 
considerations and calculations of the military leader, and consequently for 
the latter it is insufficient to rule armies as a machine. He must be able to 
rule the human being to fasten the army to himself, and with his spiritual 
h . d" . 1 h . 325 power overt e army acqmre con 1t1ona aut onty. 
Despite the existence of a Soviet-style authoritarian system which 
emphasized strict followership, NSWP militaries did make an effort to satisfy the most 
basic needs of the soldier. Unlike commanders in ASD militaries, who considered it part 
of their responsibility as leaders to take care of the individual needs of soldiers, NSWP 
commanders relied on their political officers to fulfill this leadership function.326 In 
addition to providing political oversight, the political officer was responsible for unit 
morale. The political officer paid particular attention to problems which were potentially 
323 v· 2 1ctorson, p. 5. 
324 This was true in most cases, although interviews of Polish and Hungarian officers indicate that some 
NSWP officers tried to use motivational forms of leadership whenever possible. According to the Poles and 
Hungarians, Party rhetoric encouraged civilian and military leaders to use motivational forms of leadership, 
but in reality, the system relied on the impersonal system of authority to force followership. 
325 Walter Pintner, "Russian Military Thought: The Western Model and the Shadow ofSuvarov," Makers 
of Modern Strategy, Peter Paret, ed., pp. 361-362. Also, on p. 356, Pintner notes that Western military 
theory inspired Suvarov, who Pintner refers to as the greatest of all Russian commanders. Suvarov' s ideas 
were revolutionary in Russian military thought. His most famous written work, The Art of Victory, is a 
manual of practical advice for junior officers and NCOs. In it, Suvarov emphasizes the importance of the 
troops' fighting spirit, and contains instructions on maintaining health and morale. 
326 Ellen Jones, pp. 128-131. 
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detrimental to good morale and discipline, including poor living and working 
conditions. 327 According to Soviet military thought, maximizing military performance 
meant creating living conditions that conformed to the requirements of regulations - that 
is, heated barracks in winter, hot meals, available medical care, reliable mail service, and 
d 1 d ..... .1. . 328 access to stores an aun ry 1ac1 1t1es. 
NSWP commanders only had to concern themselves with providing their 
soldiers with a subsistence level of existence--the minimum necessary to ensure military 
effectiveness.329 The NSWP did not focus on quality of life issues because the discipline 
and regimentation of the military environment--strict by Western standards--were 
acceptable in Warsaw Pact armed forces because such an environment was merely a more 
rigid version of the regimented civilian lifestyle in communist society.330 This 
generalization is illustrated nicely by the advice given to a prospective recruit by a 
respected Polish senior citizen: 
Do not be too perturbed ... the army is only a caricature of the totalitarian 
system to which , I think, you must have become accustomed already. As 
you well know, the totalitarian system is based on the principle of a net 
which is twisted all around us. But a characteristic of any net is that it has 
openings in which any man of even average intelligence can build a small 
peaceful nest-- which I heartily hope you will be able to do.331 
Citizens ofNSWP states were used to life under a communist government 
which did not trust the people, discouraged personal initiative, rewarded obedience, and 
denied individual rights?32 Upon entering the military, NSWP citizens did not have the 
327 Ellen Jones, p. 130. 
328 Ibid. 
329 Ibid.,. and corroborated by Hungarian and Polish officers interviewed by authors in August, 1996. 
330 Ellen Jones, p. 220. 
331 Rakowska-Harmstone, Phase II- Vol. 2, p. 112. 
332 Ibid., pp. 219-220. Based on authors' interviews with Hungarian and Polish officers. 
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same kind of expectations that their counterparts in ASD states did. Thus, NSWP 
militaries did not value a command climate that encouraged trust, initiative, and willing 
followership. In addition, without the kind of leadership that encouraged willing 
followership, morale suffered, and discipline and obedience had to be acquired through 
"domination. "333 
c. Discipline, Obedience, and Morale 
Soviet scholar Herbert Goldhamer referred to Soviet-style discipline as 
"exactingness,"-- the absolute observance of communist laws, military regulations, and 
the orders of command personnel.334 NSWP militaries relied on the "absolute" authority 
of the commander as the primary means of attaining discipline and obedience. The use of 
stringent, hierarchical and authoritarian discipline attained only the reluctant obedience 
of NSWP soldiers, who were not "attitudinally integrated" into the "Greater Socialist 
Army." Strict disciplinary regulations, which governed every aspect of the soldier's life, 
complemented the commander's authority. 335 In accordance with these regulations, 
commanders compelled NSWP soldiers to conform to harsh disciplinary standards.336 
And the NSWP did not afford its soldiers the same rights and privileges enjoyed by ASD 
service members.337 Soviet scholar Ellen Jones compares the normal life of a WP soldier 
333 Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, Part II, Janowitz lists two modes that organizations use to exercise 
authority: domination and manipulation. Domination is characterized by "negative means" of motivation 
such as threat of punishment--the reliance on formal authority to ensure compliance. Manipulation is 
characterized by "positive means" of motivation such as respect for soldiers rights, and the reliance on 
principles of leadership to motivate soldiers to comply with rules and regulations. 
334 Goldhamer, p. 142. 
335 Ellen Jones, p. 129; and Goldhamer, p. 214. Warsaw Pact disciplinary regulations were strict by 
Western (ASD) standards. 
336 Ibid., Disciplinary standards were strict by ASD standards. This fact is corroborated by Polish and 
Hungarian officers interviewed by the authors in August, 1996. 
337 Ibid., and Goldhamer, p. 142. 
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to that of a basic-trainee in the United States Army: "Tightly organized training fills 
most of the conscript's waking hours. The regimentation, routine, and discipline of the 
two- or three-year service hitch are similar [in intensity] to the U.S. army's basic-training 
course, [which is only six-to-eight weeks in duration.]."338 
NSWP militaries were able to maintain "severe" disciplinary standards 
because their soldiers, conditioned to the harshness of life in a communist society, did not 
expect the military to meet their individual needs or treat them with dignity?
39 Thus, 
when compared with their ASD counterparts, NSWP commanders expended little effort 
in trying to meet the individual needs of soldiers.
340 In Military Concepts and 
Philosophy, Rear Admiral Henry E. Eccles notes that "in a free [democratic] society, 
attaining discipline constitutes a greater challenge to the human mind and spirit [than in a 
totalitarian society]. "341 Discipline is more difficult to attain in democracies because the 
leader must respect the soldier's human dignity and individual rights, and meet the 
soldier's needs to a degree acceptable by a liberal democratic society. By contrast, 
attaining discipline in the militaries of totalitarian states, such as those in the NSWP, 
required simply the vigorous enforcement of strict disciplinary regulations. 
The Communist Party required military commanders to enforce discipline 
to the "letter of the law."342 A Warsaw Pact journal stated; "Commanders, officers, and 
sergeants are sometimes reprimanded because they do not enforce regulations "in the 
338 Ellen Jones, p. 162. 
339 Ibid., p. 220. 
340 Ibid., p. 163. 
341 Henry E. Eccles, Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy (ret.), Military Concepts and Philosophy, (New Brunswick, 
NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1965), p. 56. 
342 Goldhamer, p. 143. 
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minute detail that is demanded."343 Because the disciplinary regulations placed an 
unwieldy number of restrictions on conscript behavior, NSWP commanders had 
difficulty enforcing the regulations. 344 In fact, the strictness of the regulations and 
preponderance of restrictions on conscript behavior led to frequent disciplinary 
infractions in most NSWP units.345 Commanders relied heavily on the threat of 
punishment to enforce the disciplinary regulations, but also tolerated the existence of an 
"unauthorized" caste system among conscripts, which involved hazing and the use of 
arbitrary punishments to enforce disciplinary regulations during off-duty hours.346 
Commanders allowed this "unauthorized" system of "barracks discipline" because they 
could not rely solely on their constituted authority to enforce disciplinary regulations?47 
In addition, even though regulations prohibited it, commanders commonly used physical 
punishment to accompany authorized sanctions?48 This helped commanders to enforce 
discipline by causing soldiers to be afraid to do something wrong.349 Moreover, the 
NSWP did not afford their soldiers several of the rights enjoyed by their ASD 
343 KVS, no. 23, December 1969, pp. 45-50., quoted in Goldhamer, p. 144. 
344 Ibid., and Ellen Jones, p. 131. 
345 Ellen Jones, p. 131. 
346 Ibid. p. 130. Polish Military sociologist Dr. Henryk Dziewulski describes the "unauthorized" system of 
hazing in the Polish Armed Forces in his report, "Selected Issues of Civil-Military Relations in Poland," 
June, 1996. The Polish system of hazing, known as "the wave" was predominant throughout the 1980s 
and continues, to a lesser degree, today. 
347 Ibid. The most common forms of misconduct included: disobeying orders, unauthorized absences, 
alcohol abuse, theft of military property, and fights between draftees. ASD militaries have similar 
problems, but they occurred more frequently in NSWP militaries. 
348 Ibid., p. 135. Ellen Jones states that the use of physical force appears to have declined during the latter 
decades of Soviet domination as the Warsaw Pact militaries tried to shift their socialization methods away 
from coercion and toward persuasion. This was corroborated by Hungarian and Polish officers interviewed 
by the authors in August, 1996. The officers interviewed said that, despite the rhetoric which indicated a 
shift away from coercive methods, physical punishments and the unauthorized hazing among conscripts 
continued to exist in the last years of the communist era. 
349 Goldhamer stresses the importance of punishment in attaining discipline, quoting from a 1970 Soviet 
publication: "punishment forces the guilty soldier and his comrades to a deeper appreciation of the 
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counterparts, such as the right to demand trial by court-martial, the right to remain silent, 
d h . h "1350 an t e ng t to COUnCI . 
The NSWP system of discipline did not emphasize the importance of 
morale. According to Goldhamer, "Soviet military authorities appreciate the value of 
solidarity and morale in the armed forces, but nonetheless they show a certain unease in 
dealing with these intangible, elusive qualities so different from the specificity of 
regulations ... Social cohesion and morale cannot be "ordered" and cannot be 
"enforced"."351 In NSWP units, the political officer assumed the responsibility for morale 
and welfare and advised the commander in both areas. In fulfilling his responsibility, the 
political officer inspected barracks living conditions, organized unit competitions, and 
organized training, discussions, and lectures on disciplinary and military-legal subjects.352 
Moreover, the political officer recommended awards for soldiers, which included passes, 
leave, money, or promotion, or "moral incentives" such as commendations, certificates, 
and medals.353 Despite the efforts of the political officer, morale suffered in most NSWP 
units due to the enormous pressures of military life. Goldhamer elaborates: 
The continuous pressure of a rigorous training process, the severity of 
discipline, incessant political indoctrination, the pressure to study for and 
acquire higher specialist ratings, the lack of genuine recreational facilities, 
and the all-pervasive influence of socialist competition clearly have a 
depressing effect both on troop morale and on the morale of the officers 
impermissibility of violations of discipline." Goldhamer points out that "in the Soviet socialist state, 
Eunishment has the aim not only of compelling individuals to observe the law but also of education them." 
50 Ibid., p. 134. 
351 Goldhamer, p. 198. Corroborated by Hungarian and Polish officers interviewed by the authors in 
August, 1996. 
352 Ibid., pp. 129-130. The political officer inspected the barracks to ensure that living conditions met the 
subsistence-level standard set by regulation. 
353 Ellen Jones, p. 131. 
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who must administer these programs and who have equally rigorous 
treatment imposed on them by their superiors and by the Party.354 
For example, morale suffered in the Hungarian army during the Soviet era. According to 
Rakowska-Harmstone, few officers enjoyed the confidence of their men: "In one survey, 
48 percent of the servicemen interviewed said that their commanders show no interest in 
their personal problems."355 In addition, alcoholism and a high suicide rate among 
conscripts throughout the NSWP exemplified the extent of the morale problems in the 
S . 356 ov1et system. 
In the final analysis it is difficult for one to determine the effectiveness of 
Soviet-style authoritarian discipline because commanders and political officers frequently 
concealed disciplinary violations from their superiors.357 For example, in one Hungarian 
unit, hundreds of soldiers went absent without leave (AWOL) for entire weekends and 
received little or no punishment from their commanders who were unwilling to admit 
their inability to control their troops. 358 Similar problems occurred in the Polish army 
where soldiers admitted to as many as thirty unauthorized absences but were rarely 
. h d 359 purns e . 
C. SECONDARY FOUNDATIONS OF MILITARY PROFESSIONALISM 
Armed forces utilize personnel systems -- recruitment and retention and career 
development-- to assimilate military roles and to institutionalize forms of authority, 
354 Goldhamer, pp. 184-185. 
355 Rakowska-Harmstone, Phase II- Vo/3, p. 434. 
356 Ibid. 
357 Jones, p. 140. 
358 Rakowska-Harmstone, Phase II- Vo/3, p. 446. 
359 Rakowska-Harmstone, Phase II- Vol 2, p. Ill; According to Dr. Roman Laba, absenteeism and 
supervisors' lack of accountability were endemic in the civilian sector as well. 
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leadership, and discipline, morale, and obedience within the military organization. As 
secondary foundations of military professionalism, these personnel systems reflect a 
state's civil-military relations and largely determine the type and quality of 
professionalism maintained within its armed forces. Section one describes the two 
secondary foundations of military professionalism with respect to ASD states. Section 
two describes the two secondary foundations with respect to NSWP states. 
1. The Armed Forces of Atlantic-Style Democratic (ASD) States 
a. Recruitment and Retention 
The goal of recruitment and retention is to develop and maintain the 
manpower needs of the nation's military. ASD militaries attain this goal in accordance 
with democratic principles and laws in order to satisfy the requirements and expectations 
of a democratic society, while simultaneously ensuring the highest quality force possible. 
The inherent tension between a democracy and a professional military, which forms the 
essence of democratic civil-military relations, significantly complicates the military's 
recruitment and retention efforts. 
ASD militaries must attract people accustomed to life in liberal democratic 
civilian society to a conservative military institution that limits individual rights and 
privileges.360 To successfully recruit, the military must satisfy the needs and expectations 
of prospective soldiers. To meet their needs and expectations, ASD militaries modify 
their policies and regulations to accommodate current societal norms. For example, in 
recent years, ASD militaries have: relaxed off-duty dress codes; increased barracks 
360 Rudolf Joo notes, in The democratic control of armed forces ... , p. 54, that "Even in an established 
democracy, military service requires the acceptance by the individual of a number of personal restrictions." 
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privileges to permit more privacy and comforts for soldiers; and accelerated the 
integration of women into combat roles. In addition, ASD militaries attempt to offset the 
limitations placed on soldiers' rights and privileges by offering incentives for military 
service. These incentives, which include opportunities for education, advancement, and 
financial stability, serve to complement traditional reasons for joining the military: 
prestige, patriotism, and affinity for the military profession. 
In addition, the way society views the military affects recruitment. If the 
military is held in high esteem by society, it will be easier for the military to recruit. To 
attain such a level of prestige, servicemen and women must conduct themselves in a 
manner which will leave a positive impression on the civilian members of society. In 
addition, society must perceive the military as an institution that abides by the rule of law 
and acts in society's best interest. Moreover, the history of a state's civil-military 
relations and the strength of its military tradition can also effect society's view of the 
military. For example, the tragic history of civil-military relations in Germany prior to 
1945 caused postwar Germans to view the re-establishment of the military institution in 
the Federal Republic Germany with skepticism. In contrast, Poland's strong military 
tradition helped the post-communist Polish Armed Forces to attain a high level of 
prestige, despite the fact that the people viewed the Polish military with disdain after 
Jaruzelski's crackdown on Solidarity.361 
361 Jacques Rupnik, "From 'Party-State' to 'Army-State,"' The New Republic, January 6 & 13, 1982. Also, 
Stanislaw Jarmoszko, "Political System Transformation Versus Military Profession Social Value in the 
Polish Army," Study report for the European Research Group on Military and Society Biennial 
Conference, Torino, May 26-29, 1994. 
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In addition to prestige, quality of life and opportunities for advancement 
help the military to attract and retain good people. In his "Annual Report to the President 
and Congress," US Secretary of Defense William J. Perry states that: 
Readiness depends on attracting top quality people and retaining them 
after they have developed technical and leadership skills. To do so, the 
Department of Defense must offer not only challenging and rewarding 
work, but also an appropriate quality of life, a term used to encompass the 
entire package of compensation, benefits, and work and living 
• ~ "1" . 1 362 environments 10r mi Itary service personne . 
This statement highlights the importance of quality of life programs to 
ASD militaries, which, in order to attract and retain quality military professionals, must 
offer military members and their families a quality of life reasonably comparable to that 
which they could enjoy in the civilian sector. Quality of life programs assist ASD 
militaries in attracting good people by offering valuable incentives which include: pay 
and benefits, educational opportunities, career advancement, retirement, housing, health 
care, community and family support, religious support, and morale, welfare, and 
recreation. By providing these incentives, ASD militaries are able to meet the 
expectations of a broad segment of society while simultaneously building a quality force 
h . "d 1 . f . 363 t at IS WI e y representative o society. 
362 William J. Perry, Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to the President and the Congress, March, 1996, 
p. 35. 
363 The budget process has important implications for recruitment and retention. Smaller defense budgets 
force cuts in quality of life programs. These cuts negatively impact recruitment and retention efforts in the 
armed forces. Societal support for the military helps to influence politicians to approve larger defense · 
budgets. ASD militaries attempt to gain societal support by reflecting societal norms and values to the 
degree possible. 
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b. Career Development- Promotion/Advancement; Education/Training 
ASD militaries have a system of career development that provides 
opportunities for service members to meet personal expectations while simultaneously 
meeting the professional needs of the armed forces. For the purpose of this study, career 
development encompasses the following areas: promotions, career advancement, and 
professional education and training. 
In ASD militaries, the promotion system supports the principle of 
democratic civilian control by ensuring that promotions are conferred on the basis of 
merit, not political orientation.364 The merit-based system of promotions is strengthened 
through the use of standard benchmarks to determine the competence of each individual. 
Standard evaluation procedures help to guarantee the consistent and universal application 
ofthe standard benchmarks. In addition, to ensure an impartial, objective, and fair 
promotion system, ASD militaries rely on centralized promotion boards. Centralized 
boards reduce cronyism, standardize selection criteria, and facilitate equal opportunity 
initiatives. 365 
In addition, centralized systems support career advancement in ASD 
militaries. Centralized career management reduces cronyism and ensures that officers and 
NCOs continue to develop, then advance along established career paths. Clearly defined, 
well publicized career paths motivate young military professionals by providing them 
364 Amos Perlmutter and Valerie Bennett, The Political Influence of the Military: A Comparative Reader 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980), pp. 51-55; also Marybeth Ulrich, p. 112. 
365 Ulrich, p. 113. 
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with "road maps" that list what one must accomplish in order to advance to various 
levels along a particular path. Servicemembers who fail to advance because they are 
passed-over for promotion are discharged from active military service. This "up-or-out" 
system ensures that quality people are retained, and that the force structure is 
appropriately sized at each level in the military's organizational hierarchy. The 
competitive nature of the merit-based "up or out" system is reflected in a story by Colin 
Powell, former Chairman ofthe U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. As one offifty-two newly 
promoted brigadier generals in 1979, Powell attended a briefing by the Army Chief of 
Staff, General Bernard Rogers, who told the brigadiers: "Let me tell you how keen the 
competition is at this level.. .All of you could board an airplane and disappear over the 
Atlantic tomorrow, and the fifty-two colonels we'd replace you with would be just as 
good as you are. We would not be able to tell the difference. "366 
Moreover, ASD militaries incorporate professional education in career 
paths to prepare each military professional for the new responsibilities that come with 
each consecutive career phase. Professional military education for officers includes four 
major educational phases: pre-commissioning, junior officer, mid-grade officer, and 
senior officer. 
In all educational phases, but especially in the precommissioning 
programs conducted at service academies, civilian universities, and officer training 
schools, officers and cadets are taught the principles of democratic military 
professionalism. Students learn that soldiers in a democracy must be committed to the 
366 Colin Powell, with Joseph E. Persico, My American Journey (New York: Random House, 1995), p. 244. 
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principles of civilian political control of the military and democratic accountability.367 
They are also taught that citizen-soldiers do not owe their allegiance to an ethnic 
"nation," "fatherland," a particular political party, or a charismatic leader.368 Soldiers in a 
democracy are committed to the constitution and the morals, ethics, norms, and values of 
democratic ideology and society. In addition, they carry out the orders given to them by 
the democratically elected civilian president or prime minister and others lawfully 
appointed in the military chain of command.369 They do this for two reasons. First, 
soldiers serving a democratic government firmly accept the principle of civilian 
supremacy and believe that their civilian leaders exercise legitimate authority. And 
second, soldiers are confident that their civilian leaders, as representatives accountable to 
society, will give orders that are consistent with democratic norms and values. 
In addition, students are taught ethics to ensure that they have the moral 
grounding necessary to make appropriate decisions. This is especially important in 
democratic militaries, where officers exercise considerable autonomy of command. 
Through ethics training, ASD states strive to prepare officers for situations that may 
require them to deconflict the force of law, the force of public opinion, the force of 
conscience, and the use of military force in order to carry out their mission.370 ASD 
militaries stress integrity above all other military virtues.371 General Sir James Glover, 
former commander in chief of the United Kingdom Land Forces, defines integrity as 
367 Ibid., p. 120. 
368 Ibid. 
369 Ibid. 
370 James Glover, "A Soldier and his Conscience," The Parameters of Military Ethics, p. 149. 
371 Ibid. 
94 
"being true to your men, true to your outfit, and above all true to yourself. Integrity of 
purpose, loyalty upward and loyalty downward, humanity, unselfishness -- these are its 
components."372 Glover goes on to add that "without [integrity], the leader is lost."
373 
The importance of ethics in democratic military professionalism is underscored by the 
Bundeswehr' s Innere Fuehrung, which aims "to develop an army of morally self-
d . . ld" ,374 eterm1mng so 1ers. 
ASD states also require officers to take leadership courses throughout the 
professional education process. In these courses, officers learn the leadership principles 
and techniques that will help them to inspire and motivate soldiers. By learning how to 
lead, officers learn to cultivate discipline and morale in their commands without relying 
on their authority and dominating soldiers through fear. Officers at all levels learn that 
care for troops ranks supreme among leadership principles. 
The professional education system in ASD states involves a mixture of 
civilian and military staff to ensure that both officers and civilians are well versed in 
defense-related issues. Moreover, the complexity of democratic civil-military relations 
demands that the military education system employ instructors who are well versed in 
the subject. The presence of civilian instructors in military schools and the training of 
military instructors in civilian universities enhances the cross-flow of ideas and methods 
fr . 375 om society. 
372 Ibid. 
373 Ibid. 
374 Ibid., p. 148. 
375 Ibid., p. 121. 
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2. The Armed Forces of Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP) States 
a. Recruitment and Retention 
Recruitment and retention presented much less of a problem for NSWP 
militaries who were uninhibited by the demands of democratic accountability. In NSWP 
states, the communist party had complete control over the recruitment and retention of 
officers through its ability to regulate the political and economic benefits associated with 
professional military service. 
The Communist Party in each of the NSWP states recognized the need for 
incentives to ensure recruitment and retention of a quality officer corps. As a result, 
NSWP officers received better pay and more perquisites than their civilian equivalents.376 
In addition, the NSWP established military academies which offered civilian degrees 
along with commissions to boost the prestige of military service.377 Despite efforts to 
enhance the military's prestige, material benefits such as housing, pay, and generous 
pensions provided the greatest attraction for military service. These incentives formed 
the basis for recruitment and retention in the WP armed forces. 
By contrast to the U.S. "up or out" policy, which links retention to 
promotion, the retention policy of NSWP militaries linked retention directly to age?78 
The NSWP transferred officers to reserve status when they reached the maximum age for 
a given rank. This policy allowed lieutenants to serve to age forty and majors to forty-
five, and had the effect of diluting the "up or out" principle and, thus, increasing the 
376 Ellen Jones, p. 83. 
377 Ibid., p. 85. 
378 Ellen Jones, p. 89. This resulted in more of an "up and stay" structure. 
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social heterogeneity and age range of each rank. 379 It also helped to retain the relatively 
large number of officers required to staff the overlapping political-military bureaucracies. 
h. Career Development- Promotion/Advancement; Education/Training 
In the career development of WP officers, loyalty to the communist party 
and ideological convictions were more important than military effectiveness. Although 
the NSWP evaluated both an officers military skills and political reliability, the 
communist party's influence in the military caused political considerations to take 
precedence in an officer's selection for promotion or advancement. Marshal Grechko, 
former commander of the Warsaw Pact, stated that "the first and foremost requirement 
(of officers) is to be ideologically convinced ... an active champion of Party policy. "380 
Thus, political officers could deny promotion to an officer who failed to demonstrate 
loyalty to the party. 
In addition, cronyism played a significant role in the advancement of 
officers. 381 The existence of a decentralized promotion system meant that an officer's 
immediate chain of command could act in self-interest to either approve or reject an 
officer's promotion. For example, a commander may prevent a qualified officer from 
advancing in order to retain the officer as long as possible, while, at the same time, 
enthusiastically recommending the advancement of a poor-performing officer to "get rid 
fh. ,382 0 liD. 
379 Ellen Jones, pp. 91-92. 
380 Goldhamer, p. 206. 
381 Confirmed by authors' interviews with Polish and Hungarian officers in August, 1996. 
382 Ellen Jones, p. 89. 
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In addition to being decentralized, the promotion system essentially 
advanced officers through the rank of lieutenant colonel automatically, according to time 
in service and the rank authorized for the officers assigned billet.383 Thus, upwardly 
mobile senior lieutenants frequently commanded companies, even though the company 
commander position called for a captain by "position category."384 Once an officer 
moved into a position calling for the next higher rank, he then became eligible for 
promotion. 385 The officer's promotion then depended on his time in service relative to 
other "promotables" and the number of allocations available for the next higher rank.386 
As result, the WP militaries maintained an officer corps which had a disproportionate 
number of middle grade and senior grade officers. Moreover, the absence of a merit-
based promotion system and lack of an "up-or-out" policy for career advancement, left 
many officers stagnating in levels of responsibility not commensurate with their rank. 387 
Most NSWP officer education programs were congruous with the 
standardized Soviet network of curricula and methods. 388 The education system 
consisted of three tiers, which included precommissioning, mid-career, and General Staff 
schools. The NSWP officers received their precommissioning education at local four-year 
military colleges, known as "higher military schools," which prepared cadets for service 
383 Based on authors' interviews in August, 1996 with Polish and Hungarian officers who served in the 
Socialist Officer Corps. The officers indicated that only "political unreliability" kept an officer from being 
promoted in due course. An officer became eligible for promotion upon moving into a billet (position) 
coded for a higher rank. 




387 Based on authors' interviews with Polish and Hungarian officers in August, 1996. 388 Christopher D. Jones, Soviet Influence in Eastern Europe: Political Autonomy and the Warsaw Pact (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1981), p. 225. 
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as lieutenants in a specific branch of service, which included ground forces, air forces, air 
defense, naval forces, political officers, and engineers.3
89 Upon reaching the rank of 
captain or major after several years of active duty, officers were eligible to attend one of 
several mid-career, postgraduate military academies in either their own country or in the 
Soviet Union.390 NSWP officers who graduated from mid-career academies in the Soviet 
Union, such as the Frunze Academy or Lenin Academy, were assigned according to a 
special nomenklatura, or list, of positions reserved for graduates of Soviet military 
academies.391 The nomenklatura system ensured that only politically reliable officers 
were appointed to key positions. 392 The highest level of professional military education, 
offered exclusively at the Voroshilov General Staff Academy in Moscow, trained WP 
colonels and generals in operational-strategic combined arms.
393 
Officers and cadets in the NSWP armed forces received more specialized 
training and education than their counterparts in the United States. 
394 The higher schools 
taught platoon and company level tactics and the mid-level schools taught joint-combined 
operations.395 With the exception of the General Staff Academy, and to a lesser extent 
the mid-level academies, NSWP professional education focused on specific military 
subjects and did not expose officers to a broad range of topics. 
389 Ibid., p. 210. 
390 Ibid., p. 212. 
391 Scott and Scott, p. 371. 
392 Ibid. 
393 Christopher D. Jones, p. 219. There were different levels of nomenklatura in all communist institutions 
to ensure reliablility throughout the system. 
394 Scott and Scott, p. 402. 
395 Christopher D. Jones, p. 204. 
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In addition to coursework in one of three general categories of 
specialization: command, political, or engineering, all higher school cadets took a series 
of core courses which included military-political indoctrination.396 Aimed at developing 
a reliable corps of officers, the military-political indoctrination emphasized the 
importance of Soviet supremacy in the "international socialist system" and the 
preeminence of the Party in each state.397 The nomenklatura system, which gave 
preference for advancement to officers who attended mid-level schools in the Soviet 
Union, served to reinforce Soviet supremacy in the minds ofNSWP officers.398 Political 
officers controlled the indoctrination of officers and censured ideas and values that 
conflicted with communist ideology.399 Students learned a style of military 
professionalism that ignored many of the ethical underpinnings of democracies, such as 
the importance ofthe individual, freedom, and compassion.400 
396 Ellen Jones, p. 85. 
397 Rakowska-Harmstone, Phase II- Vol/, pp. 41-44. 
398 Ibid., p. 46. 
399 Ellen Jones, p. 148 states that "only one [set of values]-- that approved by the political leadership-- is 
communicated." This applies to all of communist society, not just the military. 
40
° Clay T. Buckingham, "Ethics and the Senior Officer, " The Parameters of Military Ethics, Lloyd J. 
Matthews and Dale E. Brown, eds. (Washington, D.C., Pergamon-Brassey's Publishers, 1989), p. 88. 
Buckingham traces the origins of traditional democratic values to Judeo-Christian heritage. 
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IV. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS AND MILITARY PROFESSIONALISM 
IN POLAND AND HUNGARY, 1996 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Chapters II and III described different forms of civil-military relations and 
foundations of military professionalism in ASD and NSWP states. The present chapter 
seeks to use the ASD and NSWP models from the previous chapters as a framework to 
analyze civil-military relations and military professionalism in Hungary and Poland in the 
midst of PFP and possible NATO accession. 
This thesis is based on the notion that the development of a new form of military 
professionalism in post-communist Hungary and Poland must coincide with the reform of 
formal civil-military arrangements to ensure that their militaries are effective instruments 
of national security in a democracy. 401 Both Hungary and Poland initiated reforms of 
their formal civil-military relations and the professionalism of their armed forces in the 
early 1990s. Today, East-Central European states remain in a transitory stage of 
development, in which elements of the old authoritarian regimes and the new democratic 
system coexist.402 Conflicting laws, institutions, policy-making mechanisms, political 
cultures, and social and cultural norms and values are endemic in societies making the 
. . fr . 1 d 403 I h" d trans1t10n om one-party commumst ru e to emocracy. n 1s recent stu y on 
democratization, The Third Wave--Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, 
Samuel Huntington notes that states like Poland and Hungary must overcome the 
401 Ulrich, "Democratization and the Post-Communist Militaries." 
402 Joo, p. 20. 
403 Ibid. 
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following "transition problems" to consolidate their democratic political systems. They 
must: abolish authoritarian agencies such as the secret police; sever Party-government 
ties; dismiss pro-authoritarian officials; establish democratic constitutional and electoral 
systems; reform the military; and repeal or modify laws that are unsuitable for 
democracy.404 According to Huntington, countries "in transition" must also tackle 
"contextual problems," stemming from the nature of their particular society, economy, 
culture, and history.405 In addition, once the new democracies of Eastern Europe 
consolidate and stabilize, they need to recognize certain "systemic problems" inherent in 
a democratic system: the inability to reach political consensus, susceptibility to 
d d d . . f d . . 406 emagoguery, an ommat10n o veste economic mterests. 
B. DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL CONTROL OF THE MILITARY 
To overcome the "transition problems" and make a complete and successful shift 
to democracy, Hungary and Poland must first ensure democratic political control of the 
military. Democratic political control helps to prevent the armed forces from using their 
monopoly of force to intervene on behalf of a particular political party. The turmoil that 
followed the collapse of communism provided an opportunity for the military to 
intervene to keep the Communist Party in power, and thus, endanger the democratization 
404 Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave- Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman OK: 
University of Oklahoma Press, 1991) p. 209. 
405 Ibid., According to Huntington these problems include: communal conflict, regional and ethnic 
antagonisms, poverty, socioeconomic inequality, inflation, external debt, and low rates of economic 
growth. 
406 Ibid., p. 210. Also on pages 258-270, Huntington contends that a developed democratic political culture 
helps a state to deal with these systemic problems more effectively. A good definition of democratic 
political culture is found in the NATO Draft General Report, "Democratization in Eastern Europe: An 
Interim Assessment," NATO Website, May, 1994; The report states that "Democracy is a set ofvalues that 
has to be acquired and nurtured .... A "democratic culture" involves the respect for others, the ability to 
distinguish between personal opinion and political programmes, the acceptance of the need to relinquish as 
well as assume power, a capacity for rational debate and, finally, a spirit of compromise." 
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process. The new rulers in Hungary and Poland averted this problem by successfully 
separating the military from the structures of the Communist Party through a process of 
de-politicization of the armed forces. 407 In addition, both countries dismantled the secret 
police and reformed their security services.408 In the gradual democratization process that 
followed, Hungary and Poland worked to subordinate their militaries to a democratic 
multi-party system.409 Like their communist predecessors, the democratically elected 
leaders of Eastern Europe understand that civil supremacy prevents the abuse of military 
power.410 According to Dr. Jeffrey Simon, "the absence of any clear command authority 
and of civilian control over the military is a recipe for disaster."
411 S.E. Finer states that 
the military is more likely to disregard civilian supremacy and intervene: when the 
military owes its primary loyalty to the state rather than to the government in power;
412 
when military leaders, as defense experts, refuse to accept the decisions of civilian leaders 
407 Joo, p. 33. According to Dr. Joo, depoliticization included: "abolishing the communist party's 
monopoly and privileges in the armed forces; disbanding Party organizations and committees in the 
military and eliminating the posts of full-time Party workers in the armed forces; forbidding all 
discrimination within the armed forces, based on political or ideological criteria, directed against religious 
believers and non-communists." 
408 Amy Knight, Spies Without Cloaks (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), pp. 247-249. 
409 Huntington, The Third Wave, p. 232; also Jeffrey Simon, "Central European Civil-Military Relations 
and NATO Expansion," McNair Paper 39, April, 1995, National Defense University, Washington, D.C., 
pp. 154-155. 
410 The state must prevent civilian politicians and military officers from misusing the military's monopoly 
of force to attain political goals or resolve partisan political disputes, see Danopolous and Zirker, p. xii, 
xiv. In addition, Dr. Joo states the continuing potential danger of military intervention into politics: "With 
an increasing part of society in economic difficulty, the desire for order and prosperity could also lead a 
growing segment of society to look for a "strong man," a savior in uniform. This is not a concrete and 
imminent danger, but it remains a potential threat." Joo, p.33. 
411 Jeffrey Simon, "Central European Civil-Military Relations and NATO Expansion," McNair Paper 39, 
April, 1995, National Defense University, Washington, D.C., p.154. 
412 This leads to situational conflicts when military leaders disagree with the civilian commander-in-chief 
over the "national interest." In other words, problems arise when the military sees itself as the ultimate 
guardian of the state and "defmer of the national interest." For example, Professor Roman Laba states that 
a danger for Poland lies in the potential for the military to see itself as the ultimate guardian of the state, as 
the Catholic Church sees itself as the ultimate guardian of society. 
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with respect to defense matters; and when the state's civilian leaders abuse their authority 
by using the military to coerce their domestic opposition.413 
To guard against the military's intervention and ensure democratic political 
control, Poland and Hungary must order their civil-military relations to include the 
following formal arrangements: First, clear legal and constitutional provisions that define 
the basic relationship between the state and the armed forces; Second, a legislature with 
significant power in defense and security matters; Third, a civilian ministry of defense 
that provides civilian supervision and administrative oversight of the military.414 
1. Constitutional Provisions 
In the post-Communist era, Hungary and Poland have established democratic 
constitutional provisions to define the role of the armed forces. In both countries, the 
military defends the Republic from external aggressors. According to The Basic 
Principles National Defence in the Republic of Hungary," [Hungary's] policy ofnational 
defense is of a defensive character, we do not regard any country as an enemy, nor do we 
have an enemy image."415 Likewise, Polish security policy calls for the "inviolability of 
existing international borders, abandonment of territorial demands, respect for 
sovereignty, and non-interference in internal affairs."416 
413 Finer, pp. 22-23. 
414 Joo, Simon, and other experts in the field agree on the importance of these three areas. 415 The Basic Principles of National Defence in the Republic of Hungary, Ministry of Defence, Budapest, 
1993. 
416 Polish Armed Forces Guide '95, Ministry of National Defense, Warsaw, 1995, p.l6; Also, a Polish 
MOD brochure entitled "Poland's Security Policy," translated in FBIS-EEU-96-131 (1 Jan 96), which 
states that the basic principles of Polish policy on domestic and foreign security are defmed by two 
documents adopted by the Committee for National Defense on 2 November 1992: "Premises of Polish 
Security Policy," and "Security Policy and Defense Strategy ofthe Republic of Poland." 
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In addition, Poland and Hungary created legal and institutional mechanisms that 
define the relationship between the armed forces and the civilian branches of 
govemment.417 Constitutional provisions, service acts and defense laws subordinate the 
military to the President of the Republic, the parliament, and a civilian Ministry of 
Defense. Moreover, provisions allow for the formation of presidential advisory bodies, 
such as a National Security Council (NSC), to enhance executive oversight of the 
military.418 Despite conflicts that resulted from confusion over ambiguous verbiage in 
previous versions of the constitutions, service acts and defense laws, both countries are 
committed to the principle of democratic civil control of the military.
419 
2. The Role of the Legislature 
Parliament ensures civil supremacy by exercising oversight and control of the 
budget and the deployment of the armed forces in emergency and war.
420 Polish and 
Hungarian Parliaments delegate responsibility for oversight of the military to Defense 
Committees.421 According to Dr. Jeffrey Simon, the Hungarian National Assembly 
exercises legislative oversight of the military through budgetary controls, the Basic 
Principles of National Defense, the Defense Bill, and the power to deploy the armed 
417 For example, Poland's Minister of National Defense Act clarified the chain of command between the 
Ministry of Defense and the President with respect to the military. 
418 Based on authors' interview with Dr. Jeffrey Simon, Senior Fellow, Institute for National Strategic 
Studies, National Defense University, Fort McNair, Washington, D.C., May, 1996. 
419 Ibid. Jeffrey Simon states that Hungary and Poland's constitutions need to address fundamental civil-
military problems that still exist, notably presidential and governmental powers in peacetime and in war 
must be clarified. 
420 s· 15 ImOn,p. . 
421 The Hungarian Defense Committee consists of 19 members of Parliament who represent all major 
political parties in the Assembly. It also includes the former Minster of Defense and two retired generals. 
See Janos Szabo, "Fostering Democratic Civil-Military Relations" Zrinyi Miklos Military Academy Paper, 
June, 1996. Budapest. 
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forces.422 And despite earlier problems, Poland's Parliament has assumed effective 
oversight of the defense budget, overall direction of defense policy, the structure of the 
armed forces, and the deployment of the military during times of crisis.423 
3. Ministry of Defense (MOD) 
The ministry of defense is the third leg in a "triad" of mechanisms designed to 
ensure civilian control. To exert effective civilian oversight, civilian defense ministries 
should control the preparation of the military budget, access to intelligence, strategic 
planning, force sizing and structure, procurement and acquisitions, deployments, and 
promotions.424 In the early 1990s, Hungary and Poland promulgated defense acts that 
subordinated their armed forces to a civilian Minister ofDefense.425 However, a shortage 
422 Ibid., p.l 04. According to Col. Szurgyi, USDAO in Budapest, the anned forces must consult the 
Defense Committee on all matters that involve over 1000 men. 
423 Simon, p. 154; The Polish Armed Forces Guide '95, pp.32-33; Pawel Swieboda, "In NATO's Waiting 
Room," Transition, 19 April 1996, p. 52; and the "Woodrow Wilson Center Meeting Report: East 
European Studies," Jan-Feb 1996, In this report Professor Andrew Michta stated that there were three 
occasions in Poland during the post-Communist era in which civil-military relations were at the center of 
government crises: "In 1992 and 1994, ministers of defense were dismissed amidst controversy over 
civilian oversight and the anny's involvement in politics; and in February 1995, rumors in the press that 
General Tadeusz Wilecki, the chief of the General Staff, was being called to Warsaw to serve as prime 
minister undermined parliamentary support for the government of Waldemar Pawlak. Finally, an argument 
over whether the chief of the general staff should be subordinated directly to the president or remain 
subordinated to the defense minister became a focal point of President Lech Walesa's struggle with the 
parliament in 1995." In an interview conducted by the authors in May, 1996, Dr. Jeffrey Simon, Senior 
Fellow at the National Defense University, Washington D.C., stated that many of the problems have been 
resolved since the end of 1995 as a result of a "revolution in Defense Reform." 424 Simon, pp.l53-154. 
425 Joo states that the Defense Act of 1993 "stipulates a complex system of checks and balances whereby 
the Cabinet, Parliament, and the President all individually have a say in matters of defense policy. 
According to Professor Janos Szabo, The Hungarian Minister of Defense approves the command structure 
and operating procedures of the Hungarian Defense Forces (HDF), directs procurement, determines the 
principles of human resource management, and responsible for initiating disciplinary procedures against 
general officers and colonels in the HDF. In addition, he exercises jurisdiction in relation to military 
educational institutes and appoints military attaches. He ensures compliance with the decisions of civilian 
political authorities. The chain of command flows from the President of the Republic to the Defense 
Minister, to the Commander of the HDF. 
According to a 1996 report by Col. Dr. Adam Kolodziejczyk, Director of the Military Institute for 
Sociological Research in Poland, the Polish Minister of Defense manages the development of the armed 
forces, training and preparation, administration, personnel and social affairs, and reserve manpower. The 
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of civilian defense experts and general political instability has slowed the process of 
"civilianizing" the MODs in Eastern Europe and, in fact, caused a certain degree of "re-
militarization" of the defense ministries.426 Former Deputy Hungarian Defense Minister 
Dr. Joo, comments on the problem: "the process of"civilianizing" the [MODs] is on the 
whole falling short of the initial hopes of those politicians who wanted a more dynamic 
transformation of defense management. "427 The inclination of the General Staffs to resist 
relinquishing their power to inexperienced civilians is certainly understandable. 
Clausewitz himself stated that "a certain grasp of military affairs is vital for those in 
charge of general policy."428 In Poland and Hungary, an unwillingness of the General 
Staffs to accept subordination to inexperienced civilian authority and the presence of 
recently retired military officers in key positions in the MODs has undermined the 
civilianization process.429 For example, some officers in the Polish General Staff have 
indicated their resentment toward civilian authority by making sarcastic comments like 
"Civilian officials would also like to control how straight a single soldier fires a shot."430 
According to Finer, military leaders must refrain from the temptation to intervene despite 
chain of command flows from the President to the Minister of Defense to the Chief of the General Staff. In 
both countries, the President is the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. 
426 Joo, p. 32. In both countries, the previously all-military Defense Ministry has been divided into two 
separate components: a civilian-led, civil-military component, responsible for the formulation of defense 
policy, administration, finances, and staffmg; and a General Staff, responsible for operational command. 
427 Joo, p. 31. 
428 Karl von Clausewitz, On War, Chapter six, Book eight, p. 608. 
429 Based on the authors' interview with Dr. Jeffrey Simon, May, 1996. However, Dr. Simon also pointed 
out that recent (and announced) personnel changes in top positions within the General Staffs and MODs 
bode both countries well in the recent and coming months with respect to MOD-General Staff reform. For 
example, Poland has taken significant steps in 1996 to strengthen the MOD vis a vis the General Staff. 
One significant change was the creation of a new financial division at the MOD and liquidation of its 
duplicate at the General Staff in late January, 1996. 
430 Polityka, Warsaw, "All Power into the Hands ofMON? Squaring the Four-Cornered Cap," 2 Mar, 1996, 
as translated in FBIS-EEU-96-045 (2 Mar 1996), pp. 3-4,6-7. 
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their disenchantment with the lack of civilian competence in defense matters.431 To help 
correct this problem, both countries have implemented educational programs to develop 
. "1" . . d fi 432 ctv11an expertise m e ense matters. 
In addition, Hungary and Poland recognize the need to improve the working 
relationship between the General Staff and the civilian MOD.433 Efforts are underway in 
both countries to improve the working relationship between the MOD and General Staff, 
particularly in the areas of strategic defense planning and defense resource 
management.434 In Poland, conflict arising from different interpretations of the law 
regarding, among other things, the powers ofthe MOD and General Staff has been 
formally resolved by the introduction of new "Organizational Regulations" signed by the 
Minister ofNationa1 Defense, Stanislaw Dobrzanski in November, 1996.435 However, 
the tension between the Polish General Staff and the MOD remains a significant problem 
for Poland's civil-military relations.436 Roman Kulczycki, consultant to the Prime 
Minister and professor at the National Defense Academy in Poland, recently commented 
431 Finer, pp, 22-23. 
432 Based on the authors' interviews with Hungarian and Polish MOD officials in August, 1996. For 
example, Poland has instituted a National Security Program at Warsaw University to educate future civilian 
managers and policymakers in defense issues. In addition, both countries are recipients of the Expanded 
IMET (EIMET) program administered by the US Defense Security Assistance Agency. 
433 Based on authors' interviews with Dr. Jeffrey Simon in May, 1996 and with Polish and Hungarian 
officers in August, 1996. 
434 This is being done with the help ofNATO countries. For example, the Defense Resource Management 
Study Program (DRMS) ofthe US Office ofthe Secretary of Defense helps the MODs develop effective 
defense resource and budget systems, which require General Staff input. 
435 Polska Zbrojna, "A New Code of the Defense Ministry; The 'Organizational Regulations ofMON' 
Enter into Force," Warsaw, 22-24 Nov 96, as translated in FBIS-EEU-96-228 (24 Nov 1996), pp. 1, 3. The 
regulations were drafted by a team headed by Deputy Minister Andrzej Karkoszka in order to expound on 
the general provisions set forth in the Law on the Office of the Defense Minister passed by parliament in 
December, 1995. See Polska Zbrojna, Warsaw, "Reforming the Ministry," 15 Jul 96, as translated in 
FBIS-EEU-96-137 (15 July, 1996), pp. I, 3. 
436 Based on conversations with Dr. Donald Abenheim -- in consultation with Dr. Jeffrey Simon, Nov 96. 
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on one symptom of the problem, "Not everyone must travel en masse to the West in order 
to join the Polish Republic to NATO and lose time in droves attending foreign language 
courses. It would be good if, instead of such tourism, at least some politicians and 
military [officers] would attend to building Poland's national defense system."437 In 
Hungary, tension also exists between the ministry's political leadership and the army's 
professional leadership. However, the Hungarian Chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant 
General Ferenc V egh dismisses this tension as "a natural development in an evolutionary 
process," adding that "The differences of views between the ministry and the army 
mostly originate from different approaches to the same circle of problems. "
438 
Much of the tension between the civilian and military leadership in both countries 
stems from downsizing and restructuring of the defense ministry staff and the armed 
forces.439 Restructuring of the defense ministries in Poland and Hungary has meant the 
dismissal and early retirement of a number of senior military and civilian staffers.
440 In 
addition, personnel strength reductions and inadequate defense budgets have created 
morale problems in the HDF and PAF, particularly in the officer corps.
441 
437 Polska Zbrojna, "On Effective Control of National Defense," interview with Roman Kulcyzcki 
translated by FBIS-EEU-96-197 (9 Sep 96), pp. 1-2. 
438 Nepszabadsag, Budapest, "We Even Need More Uniforms," Interview with Lieutenant General Ferenc 
Vegh, as translated by FBIS-EEU-96-197 (8 Oct 96), pp. 1, 8. 
439 Ibid.; also Polska Zbrojna, "Reforms Yes, but without Haste," 12-14 Apr 1996, interview with Polish 
Defense Minister Stanislaw Dobrzanski, as translated by FBIS-EEU-96-074 (16 Apr 1996), pp. 1, 3. 
440 Polska Zbrojna, Warsaw, "Reforming the Ministry," FBIS-EEU-96-137, pp. 1,3; and MTI, Budapest, 
"General Staffs Reoganization Plans Viewed," FBIS-EEU-96-033-A (9 Feb 96). 
441 Based on authors' interviews with Hungarian and Polish officers in August, 1996. Morale problems 
primarily effect the professional officer corps. They no longer hold a "privileged" status in society and the 
restructuring of the armed forces has severely limited their career opportunities. 
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C. DEMOCRATIC CITIZEN-SOLDIER 
In addition to the formal mechanisms provided by constitutional provisions, 
empowered democratic legislatures, and civilian-controlled MODs, society's 
participation in the democratic process enhances democratic political control. The 
citizens of a democracy influence political decisions that effect the military through their 
political representation in the legislature and their individual right to vote. This creates a 
tendency for society to impose its liberal values and norms on the military through the 
political process. On the other hand, the military must retain its "conservative" values and 
norms to be effective. The state reconciles the competing demands of liberal society and 
the requirements of a conservative military by ensuring that the members of the armed 
forces embody the ideal of the democratic citizen-soldier. 
Today, Polish and Hungarian military reformers recognize the need to re-build 
their armed forces around the concept of the democratic citizen-soldier. However, the 
legacy of the communist citizen soldier complicates the military's efforts toward this end 
for two reasons. First, Eastern Europeans associate the communist citizen soldier with the 
former Soviet-controlled militaries that provided the means for internal and external 
oppression. Thus, Eastern Europeans learned to distrust an institution that, in their view, 
did not owe its loyalty so much to the people or the nation as to the Party and the Soviet 
Union.442 And Second, the fact that communist and democratic citizen soldiers embodied 
disparate values and forms of professionalism further complicates efforts to reform the 
armed forces. Despite their failure to gain the "attitudinal integration" of most Eastern 
442 Victorson, p. 10. 
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European soldiers, NSWP leaders continually tried to shape them into the ideal New 
Socialist Man who obeyed the Party, believed in the Marxist-Leninist world view, and 
scorned bourgeois ideology.443 By contrast, the ideal democratic citizen-soldier embodies 
democratic principles based on respect for the individual. 
Determined to overcome their communist legacy, Poland and Hungary are trying 
to re-build the image and prestige of the military by developing a legal-political culture 
that accepts the idea of the "citizen in uniform."444 In addition, Polish and Hungarian 
armed forces are inculcating their officers and soldiers with the ideal of the democratic 
citizen-soldier. 
As noted in chapter two, the ideal democratic citizen-soldier is a soldier who: 
First, is representative of society; Second, serves the nation primarily out of a sense of 
duty and civic responsibility; Third, respects democratic civilian control of the military 
and remains non-partisan; and Fourth, retains the rights of a democratic citizen, limited 
only to the extent required to perform his military duties. The following analysis reveals 
how Hungary and Poland are introducing the ideal of the citizen-soldier into their armed 
forces. 
1. Democratic Citizen-Soldiers are Representative of Society 
The officers in the Hungarian and Polish armed forces, stripped of their ties to the 
Communist Party and Soviet military, no longer hold the privileged social status that 
443 Jones, p. 149. Even though most soldiers refused to be "attitudinally integrated," they were still 
"functionally integrated" into the Soviet military system. 
444 Joo, p. 55, and Simon, pp. 154-155. As pointed out later in this chapter, the Polish military enjoys a 
much higher level of prestige than the Hungarian military today. 
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isolated them from the mainstream of society under Soviet domination. 445 The successful 
separation of the officer corps from the Communist Party helped to remove the apparatus 
that once held the armed forces above the rest of society. In addition, the loss of their 
Communist Party perquisites closed the socioeconomic gap between the officer corps and 
society. For example, in the Soviet era, officers enjoyed special rights and privileges 
which included: higher pay and better housing, priority status with respect to receiving 
goods and services, and robust retirement benefits, to name a few. Today, Hungarian and 
Polish officers feel "more appreciated" and "closer to the people" because they are no 
longer linked with the oppressive apparatus of the "old system" and they no longer 
receive the perquisites which gave them a privileged status in society.446 
The severance of Communist Party ties and the elimination of special Party 
privileges for officers are the first steps that the Hungarian and Polish militaries have 
taken to eliminate the barrier that prevents military officers from being representative of 
society. This requirement fulfilled, Poland and Hungary are now attempting tore-
socialize the military and society to enable soldiers and civilian citizens to understand the 
dynamics of the relationship between the military and a society in a democratic system.447 
Although the soldiers and societies of Poland and Hungary shared national aspirations 
and Western cultural attraction during the communist period, they have never had a 
445 Based on authors' interviews with Polish and Hungarian officers in August, 1996. The officers 
indicated that they are now viewed as normal members of society -- experiencing the same socioeconomic 
hardships. 
446 Ibid. 
447 For example, in Hungary and Poland, the armed forces publish weekly magazines, such as Hungary's 
Honved, which are available to the public and have articles on democratic political control and democratic 
civil-military relations issues. 
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democratic political culture.448 For example, Rakowska-Harmstone describes the Polish 
political culture as "highly individualistic yet contentious ... , pluralistic and egalitarian, 
but class-conscious and nostalgic for authority figures" -- a political culture reflected in 
the political history of Poland's interwar Second Republic, characterized by a weak 
parliamentary system with a high turnover of coalition governments and the "de-facto" 
dictatorship of JozefPilsudski.449 She adds that, "On the whole, the basic features of 
Polish political culture [were] totally incompatible with Marxism-Leninism .... This 
incongruity, reinforced by [Polish] nationalism and religion, [was] at the source of the 
political instability which plagued communist Poland throughout.. .its existence.450 As the 
fledgling Polish and Hungarian democracies begin to institutionalize democratic political 
culture, their societies will increasingly impose their growing demands on the military.451 
As discussed in chapter two, democratic societies, as a minimum, demand that the 
military reflect democratic principles. As the military embraces democratic norms and 
values, it becomes more closely tied to civil society. When the citizen enters the military, 
a soldier retains many of the rights of a citizen, and thus he remains "representative" of 
448 Rakowska-Hannstone, Phase II -Vol. 1, pp. 327-328. 
449 Rakowska-Hannstone, Phase II- Vol. 2, pp. 24-25. 
450 Ibid., p. 25. 
451 Huntington, The Third Wave, p. 265; In addition, according to Hungarian Col Janos Szabo, pressure 
groups are surfacing to force the military to change its policies. Groups such as the "Alba Circle," who 
support conscientious objectors and anti-conscription are trying to influence defense policy. 
In Poland, according to Col Adam Kolodziejczyk, Director of the Polish Military Institute for 
Sociological Research, a longitudinal study shows that in 1990, Polish military professionals held more 
conservative values than society, but in 1993, the military professionals and society held similar values. 
Col Kolodziejczyk attributes this to a liberalization of values in the military. In another study, "Selected 
Issues of Civil-Military Relations in Poland," June, 1996, Col Henryk Dziewulski discusses media's impact 
on the military's relationship with society. By exposing social problems within the military, the media 
forces the military to publicly interact with society on a daily basis. 
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the democratic citizen. The military does not strip him of his identity as a democratic 
citizen, nor does it place him in a privileged position above society. 
2. Democratic Citizen-Soldiers Serve out of a Sense of Duty and Civic 
Responsibility 
As citizens in Hungary and Poland gain a greater awareness of democratic 
principles, individual rights, and the dynamics of the relationship between the military 
and society, they will also begin to understand the importance of the democratic citizen-
soldier. As part of this understanding, people must appreciate that the rights afforded 
them by a democratic system does not exempt them from civic and military obligations. 
People must also realize that the military plays a legitimate and necessary role as the 
defender of their democratic way of life. 
Today, many Hungarians and Poles are striving to comprehend their newly-
acquired democratic rights and responsibilities. However, the lack of a democratic 
tradition in these countries initially makes it difficult for the people to fully grasp the new 
ideology.452 George Schoepflin, a professor of Slavonic and East European studies at the 
University of London aptly describes the problem: 
The democratic experiment in Central and Eastern Europe is beginning to 
resemble the imposition of communism: in as much as communism was 
an attempt to introduce a proletarian revolution without a working class, 
what is now happening is the introduction of democracy without 
democrats. 453 
452 Based on authors' interviews with Polish and Hungarian officers in August, 1996. 
453 George Schoepflin, "Postcommunism: The Problems of Democratic Construction," Daedalus, Summer, 
1994,p.l29. 
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Since the dawn of the Enlightenment, East Central Europeans have struggled with the 
basic paradox in ECE politics; the incompatibility of its endorsement of Western 
civilization, political ideas, and institutions, and the reality of the region's social, 
. d hn" bl 454 economic an et 1c pro ems. 
For example, the Polish Constitution of 1791 proclaimed that the principles of 
Constitutional democracy applied to all of the people ofPoland. In reality, though, only a 
small percentage of Poles were able to enjoy the individual rights and political freedoms 
set forth in the Constitution.455 With serfdom firmly in place, only the szlachta, or Polish 
aristocracy were considered "citizens" eligible to benefit from the Enlightenment ideas of 
liberty, equality, and freedom.456 Similarly, Hungarian revolutionaries, influenced by the 
European Revolutions of 1848, embraced the Enlightenment ideas as an affront to the 
Hapsburg Imperial bureaucracy.457 However, the revolutionaries' undermined their own 
efforts to spread the Western democratic values when they refused to challenge the 
privileged status of the Hungarian nobility.458 
In addition, ethno-nationalism served to undermine reformist attempts to inculcate 
liberal democratic values into ECE political culture. For example, the new borders drawn 
at the Paris Peace Conference exacerbated ethnic disputes because ethnic boundaries did 
not nearly correspond with political boundaries, as they did in Western Europe. 
Moreover, East Central Europeans tended to view themselves in "national" terms rather 
454 Jacques Rupnik, The Other Europe (New York: Pantheon Books, 1989), p. 13. 
455 Ibid. 
456 Ibid. 
457 Ibid., p. 14. 
458 Ibid. 
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than in "individual" terms.459 In many cases, the collective rights of the nation were 
placed before the rights ofthe individual. Both the Declaration of Independence ofthe 
Hungarian nation and the Manifesto of the Pan Slavic Congress of 1848 emphasized the 
importance of the "nation" in terms equal to or beyond the status of the individual.460 
The ECE political paradox continued into the twentieth century, when during the 
interwar period, Western style democracy again failed to take root in ECE. In 1919, 
Woodrow Wilson's call for self-determination and the spread of liberal democracy, 
emboldened the new ECE states to draft Western style Constitutions. Based on the model 
of the French Third Republic, the new constitutions created inherently weak political 
structures and relationships by making the legislative branches of government stronger 
than the executive--a condition which directly contributed to the political instability of 
the interwar period.461 Jacques Rupnik discusses some of the reasons why democracy 
failed in ECE in The Other Europe: 
459 Ibid. 
460 Ibid. 
There were a number of reasons why the democratic experiment proved 
unsuccessful. Prominent among them the problem of introducing a 
political system based on values and institutions derived from the French 
Revolution in archaic, predominantly peasant countries. In the absence of 
genuine land reform, what could words such as freedom, equality and 
fraternity mean to the Hungarian or Romanian peasant? The old stable 
patriarchal system was breaking down without sufficient provisions for 
integration of large sections of society into the new democratic system. 
They-the peasantry but also many members of the intelligentsia-became 
vulnerable to the appeal of right-wing radical demagogues.462 
461 Ibid., p. 16. 
462 Ibid. 
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In short, ECE political history is best described as an amalgam of conflicting and 
competing ideas, values, and social development. Such a problematic political and social 
landscape makes it difficult for the states like Hungary and Poland to infuse Western 
liberal democracy into their societies today; thus, also making it difficult for the people to 
understand their rights and obligations as citizens.463 Ideally, as Eastern European 
societies develop a democratic culture, their citizens should begin to feel obliged to serve 
in the military out of a sense of duty and civic responsibility when called upon to do 
464 
so. 
Simply an understanding of what it means to be a democratic citizen is often not 
sufficient to impel a citizen to serve in the military. An additional impetus to serve comes 
from how the citizen views the military institution. If society is confident in the military 
and sees it as a prestigious, legitimate institution, the citizen will more willing to serve in 
its ranks.465 Since 1989, Poland and Hungary have attempted to restore the prestige of 
their armed forces and citizen confidence in the military institution. The disparate 
histories of the military's relationship with society in Hungary and Poland require one to 
discuss each state separately. 
Hungary had a strong military tradition until1945. Professor Ivan Volgyes states 
that prior to the Second World War, "the Hungarian military was for centuries the most 
highly regarded stratum of Hungarian society. The swashbuckling Hussar, usually the son 
463 NATO Draft General Report, "Democratization in Eastern Europe: An Interim Assessment," NATO 
Website, May, 1994, p. 4. 
464 The authors' are not suggesting that all citizens of a democracy feel an obligation to serve at any time in 
the military. Quite to the contrary, citizens in countries with an Anglo-Saxon heritage tend to abhor being 
compelled to serve in the military during peacetime. As noted in the previous chapter, some ASD states 
have eliminated conscription, in part, for this reason. 
465 Based on readings of Simon, Joo, and interviews with Polish and Hungarian officers in August, 1996. 
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of a noble family, fulfilled a highly visible and extremely well regarded social-political 
function throughout Hungarian history."466 The officer corps retained its status during the 
interwar period despite the fact that the Austro-Hungarian armies lost the First World 
War. However, the people did not blame the army for the defeat, instead, Hungarians 
rallied around the armed forces in appreciation of their valiant efforts on the battlefield.467 
The prestige of the Hungarian army deteriorated in the last years of the Second World 
War as much of the Hungarian officer corps, faced with the choice of"subjugation" to 
Stalin or "independence" with Hitler, chose to fight for the latter. This decision, 
combined with the disastrous loss of an entire Hungarian army on the Eastern Front 
during the battles for Stalingrad eroded public support for the military institution.468 
Moreover, the inability ofthe Hungarian army to repulse the Red Army in 1945 caused a 
further decline in popular support for the armed forces. After the war, the Russians 
considered the "fascist, bourgeois officer corps" a threat to the new Hungarian-
communist state, and banished many officers to the gulag.469 By the late 1940s, "the 
Hungarian army had reached the abyss, an abyss of scorn, poor morale, and low social 
status."
470 Throughout the Soviet-era the army had problems re-gaining its prestige, 
especially after many officers and soldiers refused to fight the Soviets during the 1956 
uprising.471 Thus, by the 1990s Hungarian society viewed the military as the institution 
that had lost two world wars, had failed to support the people's revolt in 1956, and who, 
466 Ivan Volgyes, "The Military and Political Socialization," p. 147. 




471 Based on authors' interview with Col. Szurgyi, USDAO, Budapest, August, 1996. 
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as the "guardians of the regime," had helped the Soviet Union maintain their grip on 
Eastern Europe".472 
Today, Hungary is attempting to improve the prestige of the military to make it a 
viable and effective institution in the new Hungarian democracy. For example, the 
Hungarian MOD's new Social Relations and Cultural Department analyzes and monitors 
public opinion and strives to create a positive image for the Hungarian Defense Forces.
473 
In addition, the MOD established a press office and a "Correspondent's Club" to help 
educate the media on defense matters.474 Moreover, the need to improve prestige and 
inculcate the people with a sense of duty and civic responsibility is codified in the "Basic 
Principles ofNational Defense in the Republic ofHungary:" 
The shaping and development of appropriate attitudes of awareness, 
emotion and psychology are indispensable for ... preparing society for 
national defense. The awareness of belonging to the nation, the will and 
determination to defend the homeland and the democratic legal order 
must be reinforced. The broadest sections of society must be made to 
accept their national defense and civil defense obligations. Preparations to 
reach a certain level of awareness must extend to all spheres of public life. 
In shaping this it is indispensable to strengthen the openness, social 
relations and social control of the armed forces ... 475 (emphasis added by 
authors). 
According to Hungarian officers interviewed by the authors, these initiatives have helped 
to improve the prestige of the Hungarian Defense Forces and foster a sense of duty 
h . . 476 among t e citizenry. 
472 1bid., also, Joo, p. 53. 
473 Col. Szabo, "Fostering Democratic Civil-Military Relations," p. 12. 
474 Ibid. 
475 
"The Basic Principles ofNational Defense in the Republic of Hungary," Ministry of Defense, Budapest, 
1993. 
476 Based on authors' interviews with Hungarian officers in August, 1996. 
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By contrast, Poland's military enjoys a rich pre-communist modem tradition that 
spans two previous Republics and both World Wars. Punctuated by King Jan Sobieski's 
defeat of the Turkish armies outside of Vienna in 1683, Marshal JozefPilsudski's defeat 
ofthe Soviets outside of Warsaw in 1920, and the struggles for independence during the 
first and second World Wars, the military's precommunist tradition remains a symbol of 
P 1. h . 1" 477 o 1s natwna 1sm. 
Throughout most of the communist era, the Polish army enjoyed prestige due to 
its "glorious tradition" in Polish history, its role in post-war reconstruction, and its 
perceived restraint in carrying out internal police functions.478 Even after the army's 
involvement in the suppression of rioting workers in 1956 and 1970, the Polish people 
believed in the "myth" that their army would not move against them.479 The army's 
477 Raymond Taras, Consolidating Democracy in Poland (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995), pp. 23-28; 
and Norman Davies, Heart of Europe: A Short History of Poland (Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1984). 478 Based on a study report by Stanislaw Jarmoszko of the Military Institute for Sociological Research, 
Poland, entitled "Political System Transformation versus Military Profession Social Value in the Polish 
Army," presented at the IV Biennial Conference of the European Research Group on Military and Society, 
Torino, May 26th-29th, 1994. 
479 Roman Laba, The Roots ofSolidarity (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1991), pp. 88-
92; Dr. Roman Laba states that Poles were generally ignorant about the actual mechanisms of repression 
that existed within the military. Moreover, Poles did not understand, nor did they want to believe, that 
their army could be used against them. Thus, Polish society was taken-in by the "authoritarian myth" that 
the army would not act against it and would always "be with the people." According to Dr. Laba, Poles 
viewed the army as a conscript army; they were largely unaware of the expansive professional components 
of the military and the paramilitary forces used to enforce and carry out the military's role in internal 
repression. As a result, Polish society often placed the blame for repression on the police and failed to 
recognize the army's role in it. In Warsaw Pact: The Question of Cohesion, Phase II- Vo/1, p. 337, Dr. 
Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone refers to the ratio of the combined total of professional cadre and special 
security troops to conscripts as the "ratio of distrust." She explains that the ratio increased as the level of 
distrust in the conscript forces increased. In other words, more professional cadre and special security 
troops were used to ensure that repression would be carried out, despite the less reliable conscript elements. 
She notes that Poland had the second highest "ratio of distrust" of the NSWP states (only East Germany (GDR) had a higher ratio). Both Poland and the GDR had a ratio of distrust greater than one. In other 
words, the number of professional cadre plus special security troops was greater than the number of 
conscripts. However, the fact that the Polish people still viewed the military as a conscript force (thus, 
representative of society) only helped to reinforce their belief in the "myth" that the army would not move 
against Polish citizens. 
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idealized historical image, society's view of the military as a conscript force, and 
deliberate attempts by the regime to absolve General Jaruzelski and other top 
commanders of involvement in the suppression of workers in 1970, helped the "myth" to 
persist.480 In The Roots of Solidarity, Roman Laba states that this "myth" "received a 
powerful stimulus in the 1976 crisis when it was widely reported that General Jaruzelski 
had said at an emergency meeting of the Politburo that "Polish soldiers will not fire on 
Polish workers.'"'481 Polish society's belief that the army could not move against it 
persisted until Jaruzelski' s crackdown on Solidarity in 1981.482 In fact, an opinion poll 
conducted just prior to the imposition of martial law indicated that the Polish army 
ranked third-- only behind the Catholic Church and Solidarity, and far ahead of the Party, 
in terms of public confidence.483 However, the year of martial law shattered the military's 
mystique in the minds of Poles. 484 Prior to 1981, Poles viewed the Polish Peoples Army 
as the inheritors of Poland's proud insurrectionary-patriotic tradition and its symbol- the 
white eagle.485 After the imposition of martial law, Poles came to realize that the "white 
eagle" was indeed "red." In his book Red Eagle: The Army in Polish Politics, Andrew 
Michta describes the situation at the end of the 1980s: 
480 Ibid., p. 89. Laba describes the misinformation campaign that followed the changeover of regimes in the 
wake of the crisis of Dec '70- Jan '71 to protect the armed forces from public disapproval. The new 
regime of Edward Gierek absolved Jaruzelski and other top military commanders, claiming that Gomulka 
had ordered the suppression of workers without the military leadership's cooperation. Laba adds that the 
"violence was blamed on the police, and .. .it was widely reported that General Jaruzelski and [other top 
military figures] had even been placed under house arrest until Gierek came to power." 
481 Ibid. Dr. Laba explains that Jaruzelski's comments were never substantiated, but the story's 
dissemination certainly helped to elevate the "myth" in the minds of Poles and Western defense analysts. 
4821bid. 
483 Jacques Rupnik, "From 'Party-State' to 'Army-State,"' The New Republic, January 6 &13, 1982, pp. 
17-20. 
484 Andrew A. Michta, Red Eagle: The Army in Polish Politics, 1944-1988 (Stanford University, Stanford, 
California: Hoover Institution Press, 1990), p. 209. 
485 Ibid., p. 207. 
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For almost a decade now, the army has held the party together and 
preserved its dominant position in the country's politics, but it has paid for 
this achievement with its prestige. The army that kept its distance from 
internal party struggles and took no responsibility for the party's 
inefficiency and corruption, used to be, in the eyes of Poles, a guardian of 
the country's past and its hope for the future. The generals who are now 
wearing the suits of party apparatchiks are no longer trusted by their 
486 
countrymen. 
In addition, the army's loss of prestige contributed to morale problems, and Polish 
officers viewed themselves in a poor light. Underground publications during the 1980s 
described the officer corps as full of self-doubt and riven with guilt over its role in the 
country's postwar history.487 Moreover, the officers resented their association with the 
increasingly unpopular regime.488 In fact, most officers supported the opposition 
candidates in the parliamentary elections in 1989.489 
Since 1991, the prestige of the army has largely been restored through the Polish 
Republic's break with communist traditions, and its revival ofprecommunist military 
symbols, including: national monuments to honor military heroes like Jozef Pilsudski; 
national holidays, such as Polish Armed Forces Day-- the anniversary ofPilsudski's 
"miracle on the Vistula;" and traditional uniforms, ceremonies, regimental histories and 
colors.490 And, like Hungary, Poland has established a public relations service to 
486 Ibid., p. 210. 
487 Ibid., p. 194. 
488 Supported in a study report by Stanislaw Jannoszko of the Military Institute for Sociological Research, 
Poland, entitled "Political System Transformation versus Military Profession Social Value in the Polish 
Army" presented at the IV Biennial Conference of the European Research Group on Military and Society, 
Torino, May 26th-29th, 1994. 
489 Ibid. 
490 Based on authors' interview with Col Zdzislaw Harezlak, Vice-Director, Department of Social 
Relations, Polish Ministry ofDefense, in August, 1996. Also, "Remembering Pilsudski's Miracle," The 
Voice, Poland's English-Language newspaper, August 25, 1996; Polish Armed Forces Guide '95, pp. 142-
160; and Andrew Michta, "Woodrow Wilson Center Meeting Report: East European Studies," Jan-Feb 
1996. 
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"popularize" the armed forces and to develop public awareness with respect to defense-
related issues.491 Moreover, the Polish military's participation in recent international 
peacekeeping missions, to include Kuwait, Bosnia, and Haiti, and its involvement with 
NATO in Partnership for Peace contribute to its continued prestige.
492 According to 
Professor Michta, "Poles rank the military among their most trusted institutions ... [and] 
the army remains the foremost representative of national sovereignty and independence, 
still major public concerns." 493 
In short, both Hungary and Poland have improved the public image of their armed 
forces.494 At the same time, they have attempted to foster a sense of duty and civic 
responsibility among members of society. These efforts will come to fruition as Hungary 
and Poland develop a democratic culture. And as noted above, Hungarian and Polish 
society must develop a sense of duty and civic responsibility, and the military must 
bolster its prestige to galvanize the relationship between the armed forces and society. 
Thus, producing two of the conditions necessary for the ideal of the democratic citizen-
soldier to flourish. 
3. Democratic Citizen-Soldiers Respect Democratic Civilian Control and 
Remain Non-Partisan 
In addition, Hungary and Poland must ensure that its officers and soldiers respect 
democratic civilian control and remain non-partisan as a pre-condition for establishing 
491 Polish Armed Forces Guide '95, pp. 131-136. 
492 Poland has been involved in peacekeeping activities since 1953, according to Polish Armed Forces 
Guide '95, pp. 109-115. 
493 Professor Andrew A. Michta remarks in "Woodrow Wilson Center Meeting Report: East European 
Studies," Jan-Feb 1996; (meeting held in November, 1995). 
494 This conclusion is supported by Hungarian and Polish officers and Dr. Joo and Dr. Simon; Also, in 
Simon, p. 157, Dr. Jeffrey Simon states that "All four Visegrad states have made notable progress in 
restoring military prestige to their respective armed forces." See Simon, p.157. 
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the ideal ofthe democratic citizen-soldier.495 To achieve this, Hungary and Poland must 
order their civil-military relations to satisfy three conditions: First, the military must 
realize that it is not the ultimate guardian of the state's social/political order, nor is it the 
exclusive definer of the national interest; Second, the states must assign to the military a 
credible and honorable role in national defense and accomplishing state goals; and Third, 
the states must prevent civilian politicians and military officers from misusing the 
military's monopoly of force to attain political goals or resolve partisan political 
d. 496 1sputes. 
According to Finer, military leaders' "purported care for the national interest" is 
one of the main reasons that the military might encroach on civilian authority.497 Three 
episodes from American history provide examples of military encroachment on civilian 
authority to protect the "national interest:" MacArthur's dispute with Truman over the 
conduct ofthe Korean War in 1952; the Joint Chiefs of Staff statement to Congress that 
maligned President Eisenhower's position on the extent of the Soviet threat in the mid-
1950s; and General Singlaub's public denunciation ofPresident Carter's plan to 
withdraw forces from the Korean Peninsula in 1978.498 In each case, the generals' 
believed that civilian decision makers misconstrued the national interest. As specialists in 
their field, the generals felt that they alone possessed the competence to determine the 
495 In "The Poland-NATO Report" of September, 1995, Polish representatives of the Euro-Atlantic 
Association called for Poland to commit to the "rigorous observance of the principle of non-involvement in 
politics of the armed forces at all levels of the military hierarchy," in Poland's drive for NATO 
membership. 
496 Danopolous and Zirker, p.xii, xiv; Also, Joo, p. 5. 
497 Finer, p. 23. 
498 Johnson and Metz, p. 5. 
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appropriate course of action.499 Democratic political control demands that military leaders 
subordinate themselves to the legally constituted authority of the executive branch of 
government. Civil-military relations suffer when military leaders see themselves as 
. soo F l · . 
servants of the state, rather than of the government m power. or examp e, m mterwar 
Germany, General von Seekt believed that the Reichswehr owed primary allegiance to the 
German Reich, and not the transient politicians of the Weimar Republic. This attitude, 
combined with the army's desire to regain its pre-war status, brought the army into 
collision with the Republic and helped to enable the National Socialists to co-opt the 
German Army and assure Hitler's ascendancy to absolute power.
501 
Hungarian and Polish leaders should be aware of the historical cases that 
demonstrate how the military can sometimes display loyalty to the state rather than the 
government. This is especially important when one considers the extent to which the 
military dominated politics in the interwar period and the Soviet era. Horthy, Pilsudski, 
and the Hungarian and Polish communists provided a legacy of military involvement in 
politics. Through the process of separating the armed forces from its ties to the 
communist party, Hungary and Poland have convinced most members of the armed 
forces that they are not the ultimate guardians of the state's social/political order. 
However, depoliticization has yet to fully permeate the chain of command. Polish 
General Stanislaw Koziej recently commented that: " Because of the insufficiently 
crystallized and effective system of formulating and determining the country's defense 
499 Ibid. 
500 Ibid., p.22. 
501 Ibid., p.44. 
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requirements, and perhaps also because of being accustomed to traditional ways of doing 
things, some members of the military still consider it right to solve all military matters by 
themselves."502 Poland's civil society must also be convinced of the importance ofthe 
principle of civilian control of the military. Polish political advisor Roman Kulczycki 
reflects the uneasy disposition of Poles toward civilian control of the military in a recent 
interview, in which he states: "The introduction of the rules of a democratic state, 
including civilian control over the military, which is not quite acceptable to the mentality 
of Poles, shifts the responsibility for the defense of Poland onto politicians (emphasis 
added by authors)."503 Thus, despite the introduction of formal legal documents which 
provide for civilian control of the military, the attitudes of soldiers and civilian citizens 
have yet to be completely reformed. Moreover, the legacy of the army's historical role in 
Polish society does not help efforts to institutionalize the principle of civilian control. 504 
The second condition to ensure the military's respect for civilian control requires 
that the state assign to the military a credible and honorable role in the defense of the 
state and the accomplishment of state goals. Today, the Hungarian and Polish armed 
forces fulfill a credible role as protectors of state sovereignty and territory. And an 
honorable role as defenders of the nation--the unique ethnic, cultural, and religious 
identity of Poles and Magyars. 505 In addition, the armed forces are helping to accomplish 
502 Pawel Swieboda, "In NATO's Waiting Room," Transition, 19 April1996, p. 53. 
503 Polska Zbrojna, Warsaw, "On Effective Control of National Defense," Interview with Roman 
Kulczycki, consultant to the prime minister and professor at the National Defense Academy, translated by 
FBIS-EEU-96-197 (9 Sep 1996), pp. 1-2. 
504 Based on comments made by Professor Roman Laba, November, 1996 at the Naval Postgraduate 
School. 
505 The Polish Armed Forces Guide '95 and Hungarian Defense and Service Acts outline the contemporary 
role of the Polish and Hungarian armed forces. In addition, interviews with officers from these countries 
substantiate the claim that the military plays a credible and honorable role today. Also, for a complete 
126 
state goals by their pivotal role in Poland and Hungary's efforts to obtain NATO 
membership. 
And finally, the state must ensure that service members remain non-partisan to 
obviate the loss of democratic political control. The legacy of loyalty to one party in the 
communist system is unhelpful in the Polish and Hungarian endeavor to shape a non-
partisan officer corps. De-politicization initiatives have assisted in re-educating service 
members to help them understand the proper role of a professional officer corps in a 
democracy. This role requires members of the armed forces to remain neutral and non-
partisan so that the military officer can serve successive governments.506 Polish and 
Hungarian initiatives to ensure a non-partisan officer corps include: the introduction of 
service laws that prohibit membership in any political party; the dismantling ofthe MPA, 
the elimination of political officers and secret police apparatuses within the military; the 
purging or retiring of officers who could potentially endanger the democratization 
process; and the reorientation of military forces to military missions. 507 
However, Eastern European reformers need to realize that being "apolitical, "or 
"non-partisan" does not mean the total isolation of the military from civilian decision and 
policy-making processes. Military officers who embody the ideal of the democratic 
citizen-soldier are "apolitical" in the sense that they respect democratic civilian control of 
the military, refrain from intervening in partisan political disputes, and do not use the 
discussion on the difference between a "state" and a "nation," see Walker Conner, Ethno-Nationalism 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), pp. 91-114. 
506 Joo, p. 21. 
507 Based on authors' interviews with Hungarian and Polish officers, August, 1996. Also in Andrew A. 
Michta, East Central Europe After the Warsaw Pact: Security Dilemmas in the 1990s, (New York, 
Greenwood Press, 1992), pp. 90-97 and 150-155. 
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military's monopoly of force to attain political goals or conduct a coup d'etat. 508 In 
subordinating military objectives to policy, senior military figures in the ASD help shape 
national defense policy and ensure that the military institution is properly armed and 
trained to conduct the missions assigned to it by civilian authorities. 509 
4. Democratic Citizen-Soldiers Retain their Rights 
In addition to de-politicization, Hungary and Poland must give the soldier the 
rights of a democratic citizen, limited only to the extent required to perform his military 
duties. The previous chapter noted that democratic states need to strike a balance between 
the needs of the military and the demands of society to minimize the tension inherent in 
democratic civil-military relations. This balance will maximize military security and the 
least sacrifice of individual rights and democratic norms and values. Today, political and 
military reformers in Hungary and Poland appreciate the need to preserve soldiers 
democratic rights but also recognize the requirement to limit some of those rights to 
ensure military effectiveness. Former Hungarian Deputy Defense Minister Rudolf Joo 
recognizes the need to limit soldiers' freedoms and rights, but adds that "the limitations 
508 The General Staffs of Hungary and Poland should be especially aware ofthe information presented here 
in light of their collusion with the Communist Party. 
509 In Chapter six, Book eight of On War, Clausewitz recognizes the role of military officers in shaping 
national military policy. First, he emphasizes that the military point of view is always subordinate to the 
political point of view because "war is an instrument of policy." Then he adds the following (p. 607): "The 
assertion that a major military development, or the plan for one, should be a matter for purely military 
opinion is unacceptable .... Nor indeed is it sensible to summon soldiers, as many governments do when 
they are planning a war, and ask them for purely military advice." In other words, senior military figures 
should offer, if not precisely political advice, at least politically-informed advice, concerning the use of the 
military. Professor Daniel Moran notes that the emergence of the western conception of the "nation in 
arms" created a greater need for military strategists to understand the political, social, and economic 
environment because war ceased to be purely military in nature. Professor Moran adds that the uncertainty 
of the post-cold war international order requires contemporary senior military figures to be especially 
cognizant of the extra-military environment, even in peacetime. (Based on authors' interview with 
Professor Moran, National Security Affairs Department, Naval Postgraduate School, in Monterey, 
California, November, 1996). 
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must be codified, and they should not lead to abuse of power by superiors or to any 
subjective limitation of individual rights."510 
In their endeavor to instill the ideal of the democratic citizen-soldier in the 
military and society, Hungary and Poland promulgated service laws that protect soldiers 
rights and promote the concept of the "citizen in uniform." 
511 
"The Basic Principles of 
National Defense in the Republic of Hungary" states: 
The soldier as a uniformed citizen is entitled to fundamental rights that are 
due other citizens by virtue of the constitution and European norms. The 
restriction of such rights is to the least extent possible and in the 
circumstances absolutely required by the particular features of the 
. 512 
servtce. 
Service laws and regulations that govern the Polish and Hungarian armed forces protect 
the soldier's basic individual freedoms and rights afforded them as citizens. These 
include: personal freedoms such as freedom of religion, freedom of speech, the right to 
assembly, freedom of artistic expression, and the right to vote. 513 In addition, soldiers are 
protected by Western-inspired military justice systems that are transparent to the public 
and provide to soldiers the rights of "complaint, appeal, and judicial redress."514 
Hungary and Poland fashioned their service laws and regulations after those of the 
ASD in general, and the Federal Republic of Germany in particular, to create their own 
brand of democratic citizen-soldier.515 Today, the Hungarian and Polish armed forces use 
510 Joo, p. 54. 
511 Based on authors' interviews with Hungarian and Polish Military Liaison Team members of the US 
JCTP. 
512 
"The Basic Principles ofNational Defense in the Republic of Hungary," Section V. 
513 Reform of the Armed Forces, Hungarian Ministry of Defense, 1995; also interviews of Hungarian and 
Polish officers conducted by the authors in August, 1996. 
514 Ibid., also, NATO Partnership for Peace Guide, U.S. DOD Publication, March, 1996, p.23. 
515 Based on authors' interviews with Hungarian and Polish officers. 
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the German leadership style Innere Fuehrung and other Western forms of democratic 
military professionalism as models to guide their effort to forge democratic citizen-
soldiers. Polish Colonel Adam Kolodziejczyk, Director of the Military Institute for 
Sociological Research in Poland, notes that the German conception of the "Staatsbuerger 
in Uniform" provides a cogent example for the Polish military as it strives to galvanize its 
1 . h" . h . 516 re atwns 1p Wit society. 
In short, today, Hungary and Poland strive to operationalize the democratic 
"citizen in uniform" ideal in their post-communist armed forces by attempting to ensure 
that the soldier is representative of society; serves the nation-state out of a sense of duty 
and civic responsibility; respects democratic civilian control and remains non-partisan; 
and retains the rights of democratic citizen, limited only to the extent required to perform 
his military duties. 
D. FOUNDATIONS OF DEMOCRATIC MILITARY PROFESSIONALISM 
As noted in the introduction ofthis thesis, shifts in political systems necessarily 
result in changed patterns of civil-military relations.517 For example, a communist 
political system is characterized by communist civil-military relations, and a democratic 
political system is characterized by democratic civil-military relations. When states 
change from one political system to another, they must also reorder their civil-military 
relations to ensure the military plays a role that is congruous with the principles, norms 
and values of the new political system.518 In addition, a change in the political system 
516 Based on interviews with Col. Kolodziejczyk, Col. Dziewulski, and Lt. Col Jarmuszko at the National 
Defense Academy in Warsaw-Rembertow, Poland, August, 1996. 
517 Ulrich, p. 131. 
518 Ulrich, p. 132; also Huntington, The Soldier and the State, p. 2; and Victorson, pp. 3-4. 
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transforms the nature of the military's relationship with society. To ensure that the 
military's role is congruous with changes in the political system and society, the state 
must change the mechanisms of political control, develop a new concept ofthe "citizen-
soldier," and create a new form of military professionalism. 
As Hungary and Poland convert from a communist to a democratic political 
system, they must also change from a communist to democratic form of civil-military 
relations. Thus, Hungary and Poland must create mechanisms of democratic political 
(civilian) control; inculcate society and the military with the concept of the democratic 
citizen-soldier; and institutionalize democratic military professionalism within the armed 
forces. 
Building armies of democratic citizen-soldiers that possess the qualities necessary 
to perform effectively in combat, requires the HDF and P AF to institutionalize a new 
form of military professionalism. As the democratic culture in Poland and Hungary 
inspirits individuals to display initiative and creativity, the armed forces can harness these 
traits by creating the Clausewitzian command climate that encourages soldiers to display 
them. In sum, democratic military professionalism will allow Poland and Hungary to 
build armies of democratic citizen-soldiers who possess qualities that will enable them to 
display the "genius" necessary to surmount the "frictions" of war. The remainder of this 
chapter examines Poland and Hungary with respect to the three "primary foundations" of 
military professionalism: authority; leadership; discipline, morale, and obedience and 
two "auxiliary foundations" of military professionalism: recruitment and retention, and 
career development. 
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1. Primary Foundations of Military Professionalism in Hungary and 
Poland 
a. Authority 
(1) Formal Authority-Authority of Legitimacy and Authority of 
Position. In the Soviet era, the communist governments ofHungary and Poland did not 
to come to power through legitimate means, but rather through the coercive mechanisms 
of Soviet occupation.519 As one-party authoritarian governments, the regimes never 
gained "procedural legitimacy" through the direct participation of the people. 520 Except 
for brief periods in the Soviet era when certain Party leaders may have gained 
"performance legitimacy" by improving the quality of life of their people, the communist 
governments of Hungary and Poland primarily depended on coercive measures to ensure 
d .c th . 521 e1erence to au onty. 
In order for the new democratic governments to gain "procedural 
legitimacy," they must build a new political-social contract with the people that will 
empower the government with the "authority of procedural legitimacy. "522 This contract 
must be based on democratic, rather than authoritarian, values and principles. In order for 
these governments to build a new relationship with their people, they must ensure that 
legal-rational authority is established through democratic processes, to include the direct 
participation and consent of the people. The legitimacy of ASD governments does not 
depend on the ability of a particular political leader or party in office to satisfy the 
519 Paul G. Lewis, "Obstacles to the establishment of political legitimacy in Communist Poland," pp. 125-
147; and Zoltan D. Barany, Soldiers and Politics in Eastern Europe, 1945-90, p. 18. 
520 Huntington, The Third Wave, p. 259. 
521 Barany, Soldiers and Politics in Eastern Europe, 1945-1990, pp. 17-23. 
522 The authors developed the ideas presented here based on the readings of Huntington, Janowitz, Lewis, 
Michta, Barany, Peabody, Ulrich, and others. 
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demands of society. As noted in the previous chapter, the procedures and processes ofthe 
democratic system allows ASD governments to remain legitimate despite fluctuations in 
the popularity of a particular president/prime minister or party in power at any given 
time. 
Today, the fledgling Hungarian and Polish democracies enjoy 
procedural legitimacy derived from a system of political pluralism and a new political-
social contract that is codified in democratic constitutional provisions.
523 However, the 
absence of a mature democratic culture and institutionalized democratic political 
behavior combined with current economic depravations and the loss of services as a 
result of the demise of the socialist welfare state undermines procedural legitimacy and 
makes it difficult to for the government to gain performance legitimacy. 52
4 According to 
Professor George Schoepflin, "the Central European countries have a reasonably good 
chance in the long run of moving towards a social structure where the traditional segment 
is gradually weakened over time and a de facto alliance between the liberal and 
communist segments will construct a social and political base sufficient for a reasonably 
secure democracy. "525 
523 Political pluralism is a condition for the government to be representative of the diversity of public 
opinion. It requires: free and fair elections at regular intervals in conditions of complete openness; citizens 
must be free to establish political parties freely; the parties must be allowed to campaign without fear of 
intimidation. (This defmition extracted from the NATO Draft General Report "Democratization in Eastern 
Europe: An Interim Assessment," May, 1994). 
524 Huntington, The Third Wave; also "Address of the Polish Prime Minister to the Sejm, 19 Jan 1995," 
BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, British Broadcasting Corporation, 21 Jan 95; Schoepflin, "The 
Problems of Democratic Construction;" Also NATO Draft General Report, "Democratization in Eastern 
Europe: An Interim Assessment," May, 1994; and remarks of Andrew Michta in "Woodrow Wilson 
Center Meeting Report: East European Studies," Jan-Feb 1996. 
525 Schoepflin, "Postcommunism: The Problems of Democratic Construction," p. 139. 
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The "contextual problems" of democratization described above 
have spread discontent among large segments of Hungarian and Polish societies. 526 The 
inability of the new democratically elected governments to address the contextual 
problems, and thus, gain performance legitimacy places great stress on the democratic 
constitutional provisions and processes that form the basis for procedural legitimacy. 
Thus, unlike mature democracies, the developing democracies in Hungary and Poland 
may find it more difficult to protect their procedural legitimacy when the popularity of a 
particular leader or party declines. Developing democratic societies face a greater 
challenge because their political representatives lack the mature parliamentary 
"democratic culture" necessary to solve problems through rational debate and 
. 527 
compromise. 
Having established their legitimate right to rule, the governments 
of Hungary and Poland are re-building the hierarchy of positional authority in 
government institutions, to include the military. This process is complicated by the fact 
that the Hungarian and Polish militaries have an overabundance of field-grade officers 
which creates an "inverted pyramid" rank structure in the officer corps. 528 Thus, there are 
526 Based on interviews with Polish and Hungarian officers, soldiers, and citizens, August, 1996; also 
"Address ofthe Polish Prime Minister to the Sejm, Jan 1995." 
527 The NATO Draft General Report: "Democratization in Eastern Europe: An Interim Assessment," notes 
the following: "For a democracy to flourish, the population, and even more so, its representatives, must 
acquire certain spontaneous attitudes. These attitudes are partly technical, where they concern 
parliamentary debating procedures, amendments to legislation, the preparation of parliamentary work, and 
partly behavior related. There is a need for a kind of parliamentary "democratic culture" which requires 
respect for others, a distinction between personal opinions and political programs, the acceptance of the 
need to relinquish, as well as assume power, a capacity for rational debate, and a spirit of compromise. 
Such qualities are not innate, they have to be acquired; the learning of certain techniques can help. The 
availability to parliaments of independent sources of information and competent staff is also an important 
factor for effective democracy." 
528 Based on interviews with Hungarian and Polish officers in August, 1996. In other words, there are far 
more field-grade officers than company grade officers. 
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more field-grade officers than positions available, forcing many officers to work in 
positions not commensurate with their rank. For example, the Hungarian army has 
lieutenant colonels filling positions meant for company-grade officers. In the process of 
downsizing and restructuring, the Polish and Hungarian armed forces are reluctant to 
"RIF" field-grade officers as they eliminate their positions. 529 
In addition to the restructuring of the officer corps, Hungary and 
Poland are attempting to widen the scope of positional authority. In the Soviet era, the 
NSWP did not widely delegate authority and, thus, did not allow officers at the lower 
echelons to exercise autonomy of command. By contrast to ASD militaries, the NSWP 
did not use mission-type orders, instead, commanders used a system of centralized 
control and centralized execution which discouraged initiative. 530 Polish Army Colonel 
Adam Kolodziejczyk uses the phrase "the division decided what a squad would do" to 
describe the remarkable degree of centralization in NSWP armed forces.531 
Today, the legacy of centralized command and centralized 
execution makes it difficult for Hungarian and Polish armed forces to adjust to the 
widened scope of positional authority required by the ASD system of centralized control 
and decentralized execution. Many Hungarian and Polish officers, used to the centralized-
centralized command system still expect detailed directives from higher authorities and 
529 Based on interviews with Hungarian and Polish officers, and Col Szurgyi, USDAO in Hungary. Note: 
"RIF" means "reduction in force;' Some officers indicated that there is a sort of"welfare system" in the 
military, in the sense that the military feels a responsibility to take care of its senior officers. The armed 
forces do not want to throw their veteran field-grade officers "into the street" during a time when there are 
few opportunities for employment in the civilian sector. 
53
° Corroborated by Hungarian and Polish officers during interviews with the authors in August, 1996. 
531 Interviewed by the authors in August, 1996. 
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are reluctant to take action without them. 532 In addition, the legacy of distrust created by 
the MPA and secret police apparatuses make it difficult for post-communist militaries to 
adjust to the ASD command system which requires trust to function. 
Hungarian and Polish militaries will be able to fully transition to a 
centralized-decentralized system as society develops a mature democratic culture that 
inspirits citizens to display initiative, creativity, and originality; and as the military 
creates a command climate based on trust that encourages the same traits in its soldiers. 
In addition, a centralized-decentralized system is well suited for an army of democratic 
citizen-soldiers who thrive in an environment that promotes flexibility. 
A command system based on centralized control and decentralized 
execution requires the integration of a hierarchy of professional NCOs into the chain of 
command to interpret and execute mission-type orders. The NCO corps extends the lines 
of positional authority to the lowest levels of command. In addition, NCOs enhance unit 
effectiveness by spending most of their time among the troops, supervising details 
involved in accomplishing the mission and caring for the needs of soldiers. By contrast, 
the NSWP did not have an effective professional NCO corps to augment the chain of 
command. Instead, the NSWP relied on second-year conscripts to fulfill squad and 
platoon leader duties, maintain discipline and ensure soldiers carried out their orders. 533 
Today, Hungarian and Polish armed forces are attempting to 
transform their Soviet-style, "specialist NCO corps" into an ASD-style "professional 
532 Based on authors' interviews with Hungarian and Polish officers in August, 1996. 
533 Ibid. 
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NCO corps" that is fully integrated into the chain of command.534 However, the Soviet 
legacy and the current lack of defense funding makes it difficult for Hungary and Poland 
to fully institute a professional NCO corps.535 For example, as noted earlier, the Russians 
decimated the Hungarian officer and NCO corps after the Second World War. But, prior 
to the war, many considered the Hungarian NCO corps "a model for European armies" to 
emulate. Today, through PFP and the JCTP, Hungary is tapping Western expertise to 
reestablish its once-proud NCO tradition.536 In fact, the Hungarian military has 
distributed "study papers" on the pre-war NCO corps to familiarize today's soldiers with 
Hungary's NCO heritage.537 Similarly, Poland has adopted a non-commissioned officer 
training program to build a corps of professional NCOs.538 In addition, both countries use 
professional "contract NCOs" as an interim measure to achieve NATO compatibility and 
professionalize their NCO corps.539 
In sum, Hungary and Poland are widening the scope of positional 
authority in the armed forces by adopting a centralized-decentralized command system, 
and extending the lines of positional authority by building a professional NCO corps. In 
addition, Hungarian and Polish armed forces recognize the need to shed the authoritarian 
legacy of reliance on formal authority and emphasize functional types of authority based 
on Western notions of leadership. 
534 Ibid. 
535 Ibid.; also Andrew Michta remarks in "Woodrow Wilson Report, Jan-Feb 96." 
536 Partnership for Peace Guide, US Department ofDefense (DOD) Publication, March, 1996, p. 2. 
537 Based on authors' interviews with Hungarian officers in August, 1996. 
538 Partnership for Peace Guide, p. 22. 
539 After completing his obligation as a conscript, soldiers may sign-on as "contract NCOs" (minimum 
contract terms are 2 years in Hungary and 5 years in Poland), at which time they receive professional NCO 
training and serve their terms as professional NCOs. 
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(2) Functional Authority - Authority of Competence and Authority 
of Person. ASD militaries emphasize competence at each level of the military hierarchy 
and consider it a leadership principle because a competent leader inspires the trust and 
confidence of his subordinates.540 Today, Hungarian and Polish armed forces continue to 
stress competence as a means to motivate troops and accomplish the mission. As the 
militaries institutionalize democratic military professionalism, officers will increasingly 
appreciate the need to display leadership in order to gain personal authority. Obtaining 
personal authority will help obviate the need for them to rely on formal authority to 
motivate and discipline their troops. The successful development of personal authority is 
especially important for post-communist armed forces that no longer maintain the 
authoritarian dual command structures and strict disciplinary regulations of the Soviet 
era.
541 The legacy of officers' reliance on formal authority and their unfamiliarity with the 
Western conception of leadership challenges them to develop the qualities necessary to 
. 1 h . 542 attam persona aut onty. 
b. Leadership 
In a democracy, military leadership is based on respect for individual 
rights, human dignity, trust, and accountability to societal values--principles that form the 
essence of democratic ideology.543 ASD militaries aim to inspire their soldiers to want to 
do their job by requiring that officers and NCOs use positive motivational techniques of 
540 The Armed Forces Officer, p. 28. 
541 Based on authors' interviews with instructors from the Polish Defense Academy and Miklos Zrinyi Staff 
College, August, 1996. 
542 Ibid. 
543 Ulrich, p. 116. 
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leadership that do not violate the individual rights and human dignity of soldiers. By 
exercising "positive leadership" and attending to individual needs, superiors earn the 
confidence, respect, and cooperation of their soldiers. By contrast, NSWP militaries often 
sacrificed individual rights beyond the constraints necessary for military competence. 
544 
The NSWP used a highly impersonal system, based on formal authority to "force" 
obedience. As a result, the authoritarian system fostered a command climate in which 
human rights abuses were common and quality of life issues were of secondary concern. 
Today, Hungarian and Polish officers strive to comprehend and implement 
the ASD style ofleadership. However, neither country's military professional education 
programs have incorporated an extensive training regimen required to prepare officers to 
meet the challenge ofleading democratic citizen-soldiers.545 However, according to 
Hungarian Colonel Janos Szabo, Hungary plans to open a National Defense Academy in 
1997 that will offer courses in human resource management and lectures aimed at 
developing "westernized" approaches to problem solving.546 The process ofbuilding 
armies of democratic citizen-soldiers frustrates officers' efforts to motivate soldiers. The 
elimination of authoritarian practices and the increase in soldiers' rights, when combined 
with officers' lack of familiarity with the ASD leadership style creates discipline 
problems. One Polish officer reveals his frustration: "Today, company commanders have 
difficulty enforcing discipline because they only have the carrot, but not the stick. 
544 Ibid., p. 110. 
545 Based on authors' interviews with instructors at the Polish Defense Academy and Hungary's Miklos 
Zrinyi Staff College. Also expressed by Hungarian Brigadier General Andras Havril in interview for 
article in Magyar Nemzet, Budapest, "The New Structure Must Be Built From Below," as translated in 
FBIS-EEU-96-192 (30 Sep 1996), p. 5. 
546 Szabo, "Fostering Democratic Civil-Military Relations," 1996. 
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Soldiers have many more rights than before, and commanders have less authority."547 In a 
recent interview, an HDF division commander, Brigadier General Andras Havril, stated: 
"New relations have emerged between troops and the commanders ... ; we must learn the 
right way to institute disciplinary measures, the right way to deal with absenteeism, and a 
whole series of other tasks .... For this, we need retraining and the development of a 
new .. .leadership system."548 Clearly, the officers of both armed forces recognize the 
need for western-style leadership to maintain disciplined units in armies governed by the 
laws and principles of a democracy. 
In order for Hungarian and Polish service members' to fully internalize the 
principles of leadership, they must come to understand the relationship between a 
democratic society and the military. As noted earlier, democratic societies expect military 
commanders to exercise the kind of leadership that complies with national values and 
emphasizes the "human element."549 As Hungarian and Polish society develops a mature 
democratic culture, they will most likely demand that the military use leadership 
techniques consistent with democratic norms and values. The HDF's and PAF's use of 
the Bundeswehr' s leadership style, Innere Fuehrung, as a model for re-professionalizing 
their armed forces should help them develop leadership techniques in keeping with the 
ideal of the democratic citizen-soldier. The complete institutionalization of ASD-style 
leadership will enable the HDF and P AF to build disciplined units comprised of soldiers 
who possess high morale and willingly obey their superiors. 
547 Based on authors' interviews with Polish officers in August, 1996. 
548 Magyar Nemzet, Budapest, "The New Structure Must Be Built From Below," as translated in FBIS-
EEU-96-192 (30 Sep 1996), p. 5. 
549 US Army FM 100-5, Chapter 14. 
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c. Discipline, Obedience, and Morale 
In the ASD, discipline is primarily the product of morale and leadership 
and is supported by the formal authority vested in the officer corps, NCO corps, and the 
military justice system. The goal of military discipline in the armed forces of a 
democracy is to predispose soldiers to willingly obey the legitimate authority of the 
military and the state. By using positive means to meet the expectations and individual 
needs of the soldier, the officer bolsters morale, inspires trust and confidence in his ability 
as a leader, encourages self-discipline, and thus, creates an atmosphere in which the 
soldier willingly obeys. 
By contrast, NSWP militaries used the Soviet-style of discipline, known as 
"exactingness," to compel their soldiers to conform to harsh disciplinary standards. 550 
Many NSWP officers gained obedience, albeit the reluctant obedience of their soldiers by 
relying on their "absolute authority" and using negative reinforcement, domination, and 
fear. 551 As discussed earlier, the failure ofthe Soviets to gain the attitudinal integration of 
Eastern European units frustrated officer's efforts to secure the willing obedience of 
Hungarian and Polish soldiers. The strictness of the regulations and the preponderance of 
restrictions on conscript behavior led to frequent disciplinary infractions in most units. 552 
Common discipline problems included: Absent without leave (AWOL), drunkenness, 
slovenly appearance, unauthorized reading and smoking, imitating Western lifestyles, and 
lack of ideological trustworthiness, to name a few. 553 In addition, commanders allowed 
550 Goldharner, p.142. 
551 Rakowska-Harmstone, Phase II- Voll, pp. 298-305. 
552 Jones, p. 131. 
553 Rakowska-Harmstone, Phase II- Vol II, p. 111. 
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unauthorized caste systems because it simplified the problems of maintaining control of 
large groups of postadolescent males.554 Moreover, the NSWP did not afford their 
soldiers the right to demand trial by court-martial, the right to remain silent, and the right 
to counsel. 555 
In the post-communist era, the Hungarian and Polish armies have 
eliminated the old authoritarian system and replaced it with less stringent mechanisms of 
control that protect soldiers' individual rights in accordance with democratic principles. 
For example, The new Hungarian Service Law "provides conscripts with an expanded 
protection of interests and human rights. The conscript has the right to leave the base in 
the event that he has no service obligations and the right to wear civilian clothes off-
duty."556 In addition, soldiers now have the ability to legally file complaints and redress 
grievances. 557 Soldiers in Poland can even lodge direct complaints via telephone to a 
newly established Complaints and Intervention Bureau in the MOD.558 
The introduction of relaxed disciplinary codes and practices, and more 
rights for soldiers resulted in improved morale and a decline in the number of violations 
among conscripts.559 For example, military sociologists in Poland indicate that absence 
without leave (AWOL) and barracks violence have declined since 1989.560 Today, the 
554 Jones, p. 130. 
555 Goldhamer, p. 134. 
556 National Defense '96, Hungarian Ministry of Defense Publication, Budapest, p. 31. 
557 Based on interviews with Polish officers in the MOD. 
558 Ibid. Result of "Karkoszka Committee" reform regulations passed in 1996; Polska Zbrojna, Warsaw, 
"Reforming the Ministry," translated in FBIS-EEU-96-137 (15 Jul1996). 
559 Based on authors' interviews with Hungarian and Polish officers in August, 1996. By contrast, morale 
for professional officers and NCOs suffers due to low pay, inadequate housing, and limited career 
opportunities as a result of force reductions. 
560 Based on authors' interview with Col dr. Adam Kolodziejczyk and Col dr. Henryk Dziewulski of the 
Military Institute for Sociological Research, Poland, in August 1996. 
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major discipline problem lies in the off-post behavior of conscripts. Like young soldiers 
in ASD militaries, the conscripts often "get into trouble" as a result of expanded off-duty 
. "1 561 pnv1 eges. 
In addition, an illegal system of hazing among conscripts continues to 
exist despite its decline in recent years. A study on social issues in the Polish army 
describes how the system works in Poland (Hungary's system is similar): 
A kind of informal, hierarchical structure of status within the group exists, 
which gives to older conscripts the unofficial control over the younger 
ones. Time becomes the only measure and criterion of ones position 
within the small group. So, everybody has some prescribed obligations 
and privileges as well as specific, ritual patterns of behavior - due to actual 
position of his cohort in the sequence of changing "waves" of newcomers. 
The highest position belongs to "grandfathers" - the oldest within the 
group, the middle position is given to the "vices" and the lowest position 
to the nubies, known as "cats." "Cats" have no rights except for clearing 
barracks and giving every service to their "grandfathers" (when there are 
no officers present). The "grandfathers" are untouchable, have the 
unrestricted right to have "whims,"and have total control over the "cats." 
Special rituals support this structure as well as painful patterns of coercion 
and punishment for disobedience to the informal rules of the "wave."562 
The integration of professional NCOs into the chain of command will help 
curb hazing and eliminate unauthorized caste systems. NCOs provide the proximate 
leadership necessary to enforce standards of conduct consistent with the foundations of 
democratic military professionalism. In addition, professional NCOs instill discipline and 
build morale by providing the continuity of leadership that bridges the gap between the 
commander and the soldier. 
561 Based on authors' interviews with Hungarian and Polish officers, August, 1996. 
562 Colonel dr. Henryk Dziewulski, "Selected Issues of Civil-Military Relations in Poland," Military 
Institute for Sociological Research, Warsaw, June, 1996; This agrees with Rakowska-Harrnstone's 
discussion on hazing, Phase II, Vol II, p.lll. 
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2. Secondary Foundations of Military Professionalism in Hungary and 
Poland 
a. Recruitment and Retention 
Like ASD militaries, the HDF and PAF must satisfy the needs and 
expectations of prospective professional soldiers to successfully recruit. The HDF and 
P AF also recognize the need to offset the limitations placed on soldiers' rights and 
privileges by offering incentives for military service. These incentives, which include 
opportunities for financial stability, quality of life, education, and advancement serve to 
complement traditional reasons for joining and staying in the military: prestige, 
patriotism, and affinity for the military profession. 
The stagnant economies and meager defense budgets of the post-
communist era prevents the HDF and PAF from offering financial and quality of life 
incentives to aid in the recruitment and retention of personnel. 563 Low wages, long 
working hours, and deteriorating living conditions undermine efforts to attract and retain 
people.564 For example, in Hungary, 20 percent of the officer's families, and 45 percent of 
NCOs live below the official subsistence level.565 Recent public opinion surveys indicate 
that the HDF could increase the number of volunteer soldiers by 23 percent if salaries 
were higher.566 In addition, the Polish MOD performed a comparative study of yearly 
outlays per soldier that revealed the extent to which the Visegrad countries lagged behind 
563 Polska Zbrojna, Warsaw, "I Will Respect and Protect the Polish Armed Forces," 22-26 Dec 95, 
interview with Polish President Aleksander Kwasniewski, as translated in FBIS-EEU-95-250 (29 Dec 
1995), pp. 1-2; and Magyar Hir/ap, Budapest, "Who Threatens Hungary," Interview with Defense Minister 
Gyorgi Keleti, 7 May 96, as translated in FBIS-EEU-96-090 (7 May, 1996), p. 10. 
564 Szabo, "Fostering Democratic Civil-Military Relations," pp. 1-4 
565 Ibid. 
566 Ibid. According to Col Szurgyi, USDAO in Budapest, conscripts receive only one-third the income of 
an unemployed civilian. 
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NATO countries. In 1992, Poland spent $6,745 per soldier and Hungary $10,587 per 
soldier, whereas France spent $54,176 per soldier and Germany $53,703 per soldier.
567 
These statistics indicate the degree to which Hungary and Poland lack the necessary 
resources to modernize their forces and to provide financial and quality of life incentives 
to recruit and retain professional soldiers. 568 
In addition, the overabundance of middle and senior grade officers and the 
downsizing of the armed forces diminishes the possibility for advancement. Some 
prospective officers shy away from military service because they see limited career 
potential in the military as long the "log jam" continues to exist at the higher levels of the 
officer corps.569 Moreover, the lack of clearly defined, well publicized career paths 
discourage young people by making them feel insecure about a career in the military. 
570 
Dr. Jeffrey Simon recently stressed the importance of career opportunity to the 
recruitment of officers: "To make the military a legitimate career, young officers need a 
career path where the horizons are broadened."571 
Educational opportunities provide one of the only effective incentives for 
military service. Officers who attend state-funded military colleges receive an education 
on par with civilian colleges. 572 Students at the pre-commissioning colleges in Poland and 
Hungary take courses in foreign languages, the humanities, and military science, and 
mid-grade officers can earn post-graduate technical degrees.573 The opportunity for 
567 Polish Armed Forces Guide '95, p. 52. 
568 Ibid., p. 51. 
569 Based on interviews with Hungarian and Polish officers, August, 1996. 
570 Ibid. 
571 Interviewed by authors in May, 1996. 
572 Szabo, pp. 2-3. 
573 Ibid., also Polish Armed Forces '95. 
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advanced education attracts prospective young officers who view military service as a 
means to prepare them for future employment in the market economy. 574 
Despite their common inability to provide many of the incentives for 
recruitment and retention, the PAF and HDF differ in their ability to attract people on the 
basis of the military's prestige. According to Dr. Andrew Michta, the Polish military 
today is a respected occupation that enjoys broad social support. By contrast, the 
Hungarian armed forces is held in very low esteem by society.575 According to a 1996 
report published by Poland's Military Institute for Sociological Research, 64 percent of 
the adult population and 32 percent of the youth surveyed in a recent study view the 
military in a favorable light. In the same survey, people showed more confidence in the 
military institution than any other major institution or organization in the country.576 
Remarkably, the military ranked above the Office of the President, the Legislature, 
civilian government institutions and even the Catholic Church.577 In addition, the HDF 
and PAF efforts to institutionalize the concept of the democratic citizen-soldier, and 
favorable public opinion about the military's participation in NATO peacekeeping 
missions and PFP exercises, bolsters support for the armed forces. Moreover, the advent 
of a free press and the requirement for the military to be transparent to society forces the 
military to carefully cultivate its public image. 578 As a result, the Hungarian and Polish 
MODs have opened public relations offices to "educate the media in defense matters" and 
574 Based on authors' interviews with Hungarian and Polish officers, August, 1996. 575 Michta remarks in "Woodrow Wilson Center Report, Jan-Feb 1996." 576 Dziewulski, "Selected Issues of Civil-Military Relations in Poland," p. I 0. 577 Ibid. 
578 Based on interviews with Hungarian and Polish officers, August, I 996. 
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"popularize military knowledge."579 Failure to do so will erode social support and 
damage recruiting efforts. 
Significant improvements in the Hungarian and Polish economies and the 
maturation of democratic culture will raise the expectations of prospective recruits who 
will have become accustomed to a higher standard of living and the rights and privileges 
in a democracy. To successfully recruit, the military must then satisfy the higher 
expectations of prospective soldiers by providing an improved quality of life for soldiers. 
The ability of the HDF and P AF to attract and retain people who live in a free, prosperous 
society will be especially critical if Hungary and Poland shift to an all-volunteer force. 580 
To further enhance their recruitment and retention efforts, Hungary and Poland must 
revamp their career development and personnel management systems to provide 
attractive career opportunities for service members. 
b. Career Development - Promotion/ Advancement; Education/Training 
During the Soviet era, loyalty to the communist party, ideological 
reliability, and cronyism formed the basis for promotion and advancement in the 
NS WP. 581 The existence of a decentralized promotion system meant that an officer's 
immediate chain of command could act in self-interest to either approve or reject an 
officer's promotion. In addition, automatic promotions through the rank of lieutenant 
579 Szabo, p. 12; Also Polish Armed Forces Guide '95, p. 131. 
580 Interviews revealed that Poland and Hungary are currently debating whether or not to create an AVF. 
Currently, the HDF and PAF are raising the percentage of professionals in their ranks which will increase 
the need to offer viable incentives to attract officers and NCOs. 
581 Based on interviews with Hungarian and Polish officers, August, 1996. 
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colonel and the lack of an "up-or-out" policy created a disproportionate number of higher 
ranking officers, many of whom held positions not commensurate with their rank. 582 
The legacy of the WP system of promotions and advancement poses a 
significant challenge for HDF and P AF reformers striving to re-structure patterns of 
career development. Today, the HDF and PAF have attempted to institute a centralized, 
merit-based promotion system that will reduce cronyism, standardize selection criterion, 
and facilitate equal opportunity initiatives. 583 However, the HDF and P AF lack automated 
systems to effectively manage centralized selections.584 Despite the removal of political 
criteria for advancement, the promotion system remains vulnerable to cronyism and 
selfish commanders. For example, the HDF continues the practice of automatically 
promoting most officers through the rank of lieutenant colonel, which exacerbates force 
structure problems in the officer corps. 585 In addition, rampant favoritism continues to 
undermine efforts to institute a system based on merit. 586 In the P AF promotion system, 
unit commanders determine who is eligible for promotion, then submit that list to higher 
headquarters. 587 At the service level, administrators rank -order the list of officers 
according to time in service and military education level. Officers are then promoted from 
this list based on available slots for each grade. 588 
Authors' note: In both the HDF and PAF, eligibility for automatic 
promotion is determined in the following manner: To be eligible for promotion, an officer 
582 Ibid. 
583 Ulrich, p. 113. 
584 Based on interviews and observations of the authors. 
585 Based on interviews with Hungarian MOD officials. 
586 Ibid. 
587 Based on interviews with Polish MOD officials. 
588 Ibid. 
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must occupy a billet coded to allow promotion to a higher rank. For example, in most 
cases, a lieutenant will be automatically promoted to captain if he occupies a captain's 
billet and he has enough time in service. Once that lieutenant is promoted to captain, he 
has the potential to remain in that job or an equivalent captain-level position until he is 
either moved to a major's billet, in which case he will be eligible for promotion in the 
manner described above, or he reaches the age limit for a captain, at which time he must 
retire. 
One of the main obstacles preventing the implementation of an 
appropriately sized force structure that retains only the best qualified individuals lies in 
the continued use of an "up-and-stay" structure and the lack of clearly defined career 
paths in the HDF and P AF officer corps. Based on age limits, the "up-and-stay" structure 
allows those officers passed-over for promotion to remain in the service until they reach 
the maximum age for a given rank. For example, the PAF permits captains to remain in 
service until the age of 45, and majors until age 48.589 However, both Hungary and 
Poland introduced the mandatory retirement age of 55 to help reduce the number of 
colonels and generals and improve opportunities for upward mobility.590 
Moreover, the HDF and P AF incorporate professional education in career 
paths to prepare each military professional for the new responsibilities that come with 
each consecutive career phase. As part of military downsizing, the HDF and P AF have 
restructured their professional military education systems to reflect their role in the new 
589 Ibid. 
590 Szabo, p. 3, Interviews with Polish officers. 
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democratic republics of Hungary and Poland.591 Today, the HDF and PAF strive to 
produce officers with well-rounded education's, similar to those of ASD officers. 
However, the Soviet legacy of specialized education and today's small defense budgets 
make it difficult for the HDF and P AF to radically alter the basic structure of the 
education and training system. 
The Hungarian officer training system is characterized by the following 
structures. First, pre-commissioning institutions, which include military high schools, 
civilian universities, and three four-year military colleges, which offer instruction in 
specialized areas. 592 The Lajos Kossuth academy conducts commanders training, the 
Janos Bolyai Academy conducts engineer training, and the Aviation Academy conducts 
aviation training. 593 In addition, officers receive advanced professional military 
education training and post-graduate degrees at the Miklos Zrinyi Staff College. In 1997, 
the HDF will open the National Defense University which will conduct General Staff 
courses, offer doctoral programs, and educate civilians in defense matters.594 
The P AF has restructured its professional education system in a similar 
fashion. It reduced the number of schools and consolidated many of the programs. 
Currently, four High Officers' Schools provide precommissioning education, seven 
specialized training centers provide branch-specific training, and four military 
universities provide advanced command and staff training and postgraduate education. 595 
591 Based on interviews and official publications of the HDF and PAF. 
592 Eighty percent of officers attend the military colleges, 10-15 percent attend the high schools, and the 
rest join the military from civilian universities. 
593 Based on interviews with Hungarian MOD officials, and the MOD publication Reform of the Armed 
Forces, 1995. 
594 Ibid. 
595 Polish Armed Forces Guide, '95, pp. 116-124. 
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In addition, Deputy Defense Minister Andrzej Karkoszka instituted a program to educate 
civilians in defense matters. The program, which commences in 1997, will be taught by 
the faculty ofNational Security at Warsaw University with the help ofNATO, the US, 
and a German foundation. 596 This program is the first step toward preparing civilian 
defense experts to be integrated into the faculties of military schools and universities, as 
well as into the MOD and other government institutions. 597 The presence of civilian 
instructors in military schools and the training of military instructors in civilian 
universities will enhance the cross-flow of ideas and methods from society.
598 Moreover, 
the P AF and HDF widened the scope of language training to include more courses in 
English and other European languages. 599 
In addition, the HDF and P AF recognize the need to include courses in 
democratic civil-military relations, leadership and ethics in their professional military 
education curricula. Instruction in democratic civil-military relations will reinforce the 
point that democratic citizen-soldiers must be committed to the constitution, civilian 
control of the military, and morals, ethics, norms, and values consistent with democratic 
ideology and society. Ethics training is especially important for the HDF and PAF as they 
develop a system of centralized control and decentralized execution which demands 
officers to exercise considerable autonomy of command. 600 Given latitude to make their 
own decisions, ethics training prepares officers for situations that may require them to 
596 Based on authors' interviews with MOD officials in Poland, August, 1996. 
597 Based on authors' interviews with MOD officials in Poland, August, 1996. 
598 Ulrich, p.121. 
599 Polish Armed Forces Guide '95, p. 118; also interviews with Hungarian and Polish officers. 
600 Inculcating Western-style ethics principles should not pose a problem for the Poles and Hungarians, 
who never "attitudinally" integrated into the Soviet mindset. 
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deconflict the force of law, the force of public opinion, the force of conscience, and the 
use of military force in order to carry out their mission.601 
601 Glover, p. 149. 
152 
V. CONCLUSION 
As Hungary and Poland convert from a communist to a democratic political 
system, they must also change from a communist to democratic form of civil-military 
relations. Thus, Hungary and Poland must create mechanisms of democratic political 
(civilian) control; introduce society and the military to the concept of the democratic 
citizen-soldier; and institutionalize democratic military professionalism within the armed 
forces. 
Today, Hungary and Poland have reordered their formal civil-military relations to 
ensure democratic (civilian) control by creating legal and institutional mechanisms that 
define the relationship between the armed forces and the civilian branches of government. 
Constitutional provisions, service acts and defense laws subordinate the military to the 
President of the Republic, the parliament, and civilian MODs. Parliament strives to 
ensure civil supremacy by exercising oversight and control of the budget and the 
deployment of the armed forces in emergency and war. In addition, civilian defense 
ministries are gaining control of the military budgets, access to intelligence, strategic 
planning, force sizing and structure, procurement and acquisitions, and deployments and 
promotions. However, both countries need to improve the working relationship between 
the General Staff and the MOD, especially in Poland, where some members ofthe 
General Staff still refuse to cooperate with civilian leaders in the MOD. 
Additionally, Hungary and Poland are trying to rebuild the image and prestige of 
their militaries by developing a legal-political culture that accepts the idea of the "citizen-
in uniform." The HDF and PAF are inculcating their officers and soldiers with the 
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concept ofthe democratic citizen-soldier. Today, many Hungarians and Poles are striving 
to comprehend their newly-acquired rights and responsibilities. However, the lack of a 
democratic tradition in these countries makes it difficult for the people to fully grasp the 
new democratic ideology. In their endeavor to instill the ideal of the democratic citizen-
soldier in the military and society, Hungary and Poland promulgated service laws and 
developed Western-inspired military justice systems that protect soldiers' rights and 
promote the concept of the "citizen-in-uniform." 
Moreover, building armies of democratic citizen-soldiers that possess the qualities 
necessary to perform effectively in combat requires the HDF and P AF to institutionalize a 
new form of military professionalism. Hungary and Poland are struggling to transform 
from the NSWP to the ASD model of (I) authority; (2) leadership; (3) discipline, 
obedience, and morale; (4) recruitment and retention; and (5) career development. 
Today, the legacy of centralized command and centralized execution makes it 
difficult for Hungarian and Polish armed forces to adjust to the widened scope of 
positional authority required by the ASD system of centralized control and decentralized 
execution. Many Hungarian and Polish officers, used to the centralized-centralized 
command system still expect detailed directives from higher authorities and are reluctant 
to take action without them. In addition, the HDF and P AF are attempting to transform 
their Soviet-style "specialist NCO corps" into an ASD-style "professional NCO corps" 
that is fully integrated into the chain of command. However, the Soviet legacy and the 
current lack of defense funding makes it difficult for Hungary and Poland to fully 
institute a professional NCO corps. 
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In addition, Hungarian and Polish officers strive to comprehend and implement 
the ASD-style ofleadership. However, neither country's military professional education 
programs have incorporated an extensive training regimen required to prepare officers to 
meet the challenge of leading democratic citizen-soldiers. The complete 
institutionalization of ASD-style leadership will enable the HDF and PAF to build 
disciplined units comprised of soldiers who possess high morale and obey their superiors. 
In the post-communist era, the Hungarian and Polish armies have also eliminated 
the old authoritarian system and replaced it with less stringent institutions of discipline 
and obedience that attempt to protect soldiers individual rights in accordance with 
democratic principles. The introduction of relaxed disciplinary codes and practices, and 
more rights for soldiers resulted in improved morale and a decline in the number of 
violations. Today, the major discipline problem lies in the off-post behavior of conscripts. 
What's more, an illegal system of hazing continues to exist despite its decline in recent 
years. The integration of professional NCOs into the chain of command will help curb 
hazing and eliminate unauthorized caste systems. Professional NCOs instill discipline and 
build morale by providing the continuity of leadership that bridges the gap between the 
commander and the soldier. 
In terms of the secondary foundations of military professionalism, the stagnant 
economies and meager defense budgets of the post-communist era prevents the HDF and 
P AF from offering financial and quality of life incentives to aid in the recruitment and 
retention of personnel. Further, the legacy of the WP system of promotions and 
advancement poses a significant challenge for HDF and PAF reformers striving tore-
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structure patterns of career development. Despite the removal of political criteria for 
advancement, the promotion system remains vulnerable to cronyism and selfish 
commanders. Moreover, one of the main obstacles preventing the implementation of an 
appropriately sized force structure that retains only the best qualified individuals lies in 
the continued use of an "up-and-stay" structure and the lack of clearly defined career 
paths in the HDF and P AF officer corps. Based on age limits, the "up-and-stay" structure 
allows those officers passed-over for promotion to remain in the service until they reach 
the maximum age for a given rank. 
Finally, the HDF and PAF recognize the need to include courses in democratic 
civil-military relations, leadership and ethics in their professional military education 
curricula. Instruction in democratic civil-military relations will reinforce the point that 
democratic citizen-soldiers must be committed to the constitution, civilian control of the 
military, and morals, ethics, norms, and values consistent with democratic ideology and 
society. 
Today, Hungary and Poland appear to be committed to building armies of 
democratic citizen-soldiers who respect democratic political control and embody the 
foundations of democratic military professionalism. Infusing democratic military 
professionalism and the ideal of the democratic citizen-soldier throughout the ranks of the 
HDF and P AF will help to ensure that Hungary and Poland make a complete transition to 
democracy and achieve "human interoperablity" with NATO. However, overcoming the 
legacy of communist military professionalism poses a formidable challenge for service 
members used to operating under the Soviet system. Thus, this thesis recommends that 
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U.S. and NATO programs help the HDF and PAF to institutionalize the ideal of the 
democratic citizen-soldier and democratic military professionalism to ensure the 
military's proper role in society. Without democratic military professionalism, the new 
armies of democratic citizen-soldiers in East Central Europe will not have the leadership, 
discipline, and morale necessary to be effective and reliable partners in the integrated 
military structures that form the basis of NATO's "New Strategic Concept."602 
602 The "New Strategic Concept" was outlined at the November, 1991 meeting of the North Atlantic 




APPENDIX. U.S. AND NATO PROGRAMS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
From the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, The United States has been firmly 
committed to supporting the efforts of ECE states to democratize, shift to a market 
economy, and move closer to the Western security arena. The 1996 U.S. National 
Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement outlines how American goals in the 
region are tied to its overall strategy of promoting democratic enlargement throughout the 
world: 
The new Democracies in Central and Eastern Europe are [of great strategic 
importance] to the great democratic powers of Western Europe, their 
importance to our security and their potential markets. Eventual 
integration into European security and economic organizations, such as 
NATO and the EU, will help lock in and preserve the impressive progress 
in instituting democratic and market-economic reforms that these nations 
have made. 603 
In addition, as NATO expansion nears, Poland and Hungary will most likely be 
among the first new member states. To gain membership, Poland and Hungary must 
demonstrate their commitment to the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the 
rule oflaw.604 Moreover they must reform their institutions, to include the military, in 
accordance with Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which states: 
The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and 
friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by 
bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these 
institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and 
11 b . 605 we - emg ..... 
603 A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, February 1996, p. 32. 
604 The North Atlantic Treaty, Washington, D.C., 4th Aprill949. 
605 Ibid. 
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As a part of their efforts to comply with this requirement, prospective NATO members 
must develop civil-military institutions in accordance with the principles of democracy. 
To advance democratization in ECE, the United States and NATO conduct 
programs to help the former Warsaw Pact (FWP) states build armed forces that will be 
effective and interoperable with NATO, and will fulfill a proper role in a democracy.606 
Ambassador Robert E. Hunter, US Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic 
Council (NAC) recently stressed the importance of ECE military reform: "The creation of 
armed forces fully embedded in the democratic process is an indispensable element in the 
transition of partner countries-- and it is indispensable for NATO membership."607 To 
meet the objectives of reform, the Western programs must help the ECE armed forces to 
develop democratic military professionalism with respect to the foundations examined in 
this thesis. Democratic military professionalism is an indispensable part of any armed 
forces "fully embedded in the democratic process." 
The NATO and U.S. programs offer the best hope for the US and NATO to 
directly influence the professionalization of the ECE armed forces. As discussed in this 
thesis, the NSWP form of military professionalism is incompatible with the armed forces 
of a democracy. To build highly professional armies in a democracy, the ECE armed 
forces must institutionalize the kind of military professionalism practiced in the armed 
forces of ASD states. Thus, US and NATO reformers must ensure that a top priority 
606 Fonner Warsaw Pact (FWP) states include the states of Central and Eastern Europe that were non-
Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP) members and the independent republics of the fonner Soviet Union. 
607 Ambassador Robert E. Hunter, Address at Jagiellonian University, Krakow, Poland, May 6, 1996, US 
Dept. of State Dispatch, May 27, 1996. 
160 
of their programs is to help the ECE armed forces institute democratic military 
professionalism. 
B. OVERVIEW OF MAJOR PROGRAMS 
1. Partnership for Peace (PFP) 
Partnership for Peace is a NATO program to promote military cooperation among 
NATO countries, former members of the Warsaw Pact, and other countries in Europe and 
Central Asia.608 US Secretary of Defense William J. Perry states: 
PFP is one of the most significant institutions of the post-Cold War era. 
Like the Marshall Plan in the 1940s, PFP today is creating a network of 
people and institutions across all of Europe working together to preserve 
freedom, promote democracy and free markets, and cooperate 
internationally -- all of which are critical to expanding the zone of stability 
in Europe in our day. 609 
PFP activities include meetings between Defense Ministers, officer exchanges at 
schools and planning headquarters, and joint peacekeeping exercises.610 As the primary 
conduit for membership in NATO, PFP member states agree to pursue the following 
objectives in cooperation with NAT0:611 
• facilitation of transparency in defense planning and budgeting processes. 
• ensuring democratic control of defense forces. 
608 PFP started in January 1994 under the framework oftheNorth Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), 
which includes the NATO allies, the newly free independent states of Central and Eastern Europe, the 
Baltics, and the former Soviet Union. PFP is open to states participating in NACC and other members of 
the Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). (Information provided in the US Department 
of State Fact Sheet on the NACC, August 28, 1996) 
609 William J. Perry, Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to the President and the Congress, March 1996, 
p. xiii. 
610 lb"d .. 1 ., p. xu. 
611 Partnership for Peace, March 1996, US Department of Defense Pamphlet, p. 3. As of March, 1996, the 
following 27 countries were PFP members: Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Austria, Belarus, Bulgaria, the 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, the 
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Malta, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, 
Sweden, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. 
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• maintenance of the capability and readiness to contribute, subject to 
constitutional considerations, to operations under the authority of the UN 
and/or the responsibility of the OSCE. 
• the development of cooperative military relations with NATO, for the ability 
to undertake missions in the field of peacekeeping, search and rescue, 
humanitarian operations, and others as may subsequently be agreed. 
• the development, over the longer term, of forces that are better able to operate 
with those of the members of the North Atlantic Alliance. 
To help advance the PFP objectives, the US introduced the "Warsaw Initiative"-- one-
hundred million dollars in financial assistance to help partner states participate in PFP 
exercises and achieve NATO interoperability.612 
2. Joint Contact Team Program (JCTP) 
The JCTP is a US program operated and administered by the United States 
European Command (USEUCOM) to help the emerging ECE democracies to:613 
• Develop non-political military forces owing loyalty to a lawful constitution, 
and accountable to civilian leadership 
• Restructure military forces for legitimate defense needs 
• Enhance public respect for the military within society 
• Develop an enhanced understanding of US values and way of life 
The program is operationalized through the use of a Military Liaison Team 
(ML T), composed of four US members in the host-nation, to coordinate the contact 
events. 
614 Four major types of contact events are coordinated by the ML T: Traveling 
Contact Team (TCT) events, Familiarization Tours (FAMTOURs), Conferences, and 
612 Infonnation paper from Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy; FY 96 (first year) fund allocated 
in two parts: I) $60 million in Foreign Military Funds (FMF); and 2) $40 million in Department of 
Defense (DOD) Funds. The FMF portion supports equipment transfers and training for partner nations. 
The DOD portion supports partner participation in joint {PFP or "in the spirit of PFP") exercises and other 
DOD programs that support interoperability. Congress re-approved The Warsaw Initiative for FY 97. 613 lnfonnation Paper on JCTP prepared by Greg Hoffman, CDR, US Navy, Joint Staff, J-5, European 
Division, Pentagon, Washington D.C., dated 21 February, 1996. 
614 The ML T, headed by a Colonel or Navy Captain, consists of a multi-service mix of active duty and 
reserve personnel. The team is assigned on a long-tenn (usually 6 months) temporary duty basis, and is 
usually supplemented by English-speaking members of the host nation military. 
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Exchanges.615 TCTs consist of US military or civilian personnel with expertise in a 
particular functional area, such as civil-military relations, judicial development, logistics, 
public affairs, and personnel management. TCTs deploy for short duration to share their 
expertise with host nation counterparts. By contrast, F AMTOURs are short visits by host 
nation personnel to US facilities in Europe or the United States to observe a specific type 
oftraining.616 Conferences provide a useful forum for the exchange of ideas in subjects 
that involve several ECE countries, such as military law. And exchanges, which include 
individual officer/NCO exchanges and unit exchanges, expose members of the host-
nation military to US military professionalism, doctrine, and training.
617 
In addition, US National Guard and Reserve units contribute to the JCTP through 
the State Partnership Program (SPP) -- a program which associates US states with PFP 
countries. It promotes the development of long-term institutional and personal 
relationships and allows the ECE armed forces to interface with more Americans.
618 
The JCTP is fully integrated into each ambassador's country plan, and supports 
each country's plan to meet Partnership for Peace (PFP) objectives.619 The JCTP's legal 
mandate prohibits providing training, equipment, or a service to foreign nationals and 
limits its areas of focus to "nonlethal assistance," which includes areas such as personnel 
management, education and training, resource management, chaplaincy, military in a 
615 Information Paper on JCTP prepared by Greg Hoffman, CDR, US Navy, Joint Staff, J-5, European 
Division, Pentagon, Washington D.C., dated 21 February, 1996. 
616 LTC John A.Gagnon, USEUCOM ECJ5-J, remarks at JCTP Conference, Patch Kaseme, Germany, 
attended by authors 20 August, 1996. 
617 HQ, USEUCOM, ECJ5-J, LTC John A. Gagnon, "Background Paper on the Joint Contact Team 
Program," 29 Nov 95. 
618 Ibid. 
619 Each PFP member country has its own Individual Partner Plan (IPP) for meeting PFP objectives. 
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democracy, communications, public affairs, military police, quality of life issues, military 
legal system, civil affairs, humanitarian assistance, and military medicine. 620 In addition, 
each host nation develops their own specific focus areas.621 
Despite the legal restrictions on its scope of activities, the JCTP has helped states 
to reform their armed forces . 622 The former program director stated that from his 
personal observations, "the ideas [delivered by the TCTs] are taking root and flourishing 
[in the countries ]."623 He added that the JCTPs ability to show the vitality of ethics and 
the relationships between officers and soldiers in the armed forces of a democracy is one 
of the most important benefits of the program. 624 
3. International Military Education and Training (IMET)625 
IMET is an instrument of national security and foreign policy -- a key component 
of US security assistance that provides US training on a grant basis to students from 
allied and friendly nations. IMET enjoys a legal mandate that permits it to perform a vital 
role in the professional education of civilian and military leaders of the ECE states.626 
620 DOD funded programs are restricted under Title 10, US Code of Law. This restriction was emphasized 
to the authors by individuals on the Interagency Working Group (IWG) for US-East European Defense and 
Military Relations interviewed by the authors in Washington D.C., May, 1996; List of nonlethal subject 
areas based on USEUCOM ECJ5-J Joint Contact Team Program Briefmg Slides, FY 95. 621 As of August, 1996, Poland's focus areas include: Interoperability with US and NATO forces; 
Logistics; Airspace Management; Military Health Care; Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System 
(PPBS); and Military Education. Hungary's were: Defense Planning and Budgeting; Defense 
Policy/Strategy; Defense Structures; Democratic Control ofForces; Education and Training; Defense 
Procurement Programs; and C31 interoperability with NATO, and others. These topic lists were received 
by the authors from the ML T in Hungary and Poland in August, 1996. 
622 Based on authors' interview with COL Lee Alloway, USAF, USEUCOM, ECJ5-J, at Patch Kaseme, 
Germany on 21 August, 1996. 
623 Remarks by COL Lee Alloway, USAF, at the JCTP Quarterly Conference, Patch Kaseme, Germany, 20 
August, 1996. 
624 Ibid. 
625 Information on IMET extracted from: Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA), Washington, D.C., 
International Military Education and Training Program (/MET) Fiscal Year 1996 Program Summary 626 Based on authors' interview with Keith Webster, Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA), in 
Washington D.C., May, 1996. 
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IMET exposes students to the US professional military establishment and the American 
way of life, including US regard for democratic values and respect for individual and 
human rights. Students are also exposed to the manner in which the US military 
functions under civilian control and how the military interacts with society. 
In addition, IMET has expanded its role to meet the following objectives with 
respect to the emerging post-Cold War democracies:627 
• Foster greater respect for and understanding of the principle of civilian control 
of the military; 
• Develop military justice systems and procedures in accordance with 
internationally recognized human rights; 
• Introduce military and civilian participants to the elements of American 
democracy and how they reflect the US commitment to the basic principles of 
internationally recognized human rights; 
• Modify existing civil-military mechanisms used by democracies to meet a 
country's own unique circumstances and help resolve civil-military conflicts. 
4. George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies 
Established as an element of the US European Command (USEUCOM) in 
November 1992, the Marshall Center educates mid- to senior-grade military and civilian 
officials of ECE and former Soviet countries on defense planning, organization, and 
management in democratic societies. 628 In addition, the center hosts conferences and 
seminars on democratization topics and provides specialized training for US Foreign 
Area Officers (F AOs) and linguists.629 Moreover, through its Partnership Support 
Program (PSP), the Center organizes in-country conferences, seminars, and workshops to 
627 Referred to as Expanded IMET (E-IMET) 
628 lnfonnation Paper on Marshall Center prepared by Greg Hoffman, CDR, US Navy, Joint Staff, J-5, 
European Division, Pentagon, Washington D.C., dated 21 February, 1996. 
629 Ibid. 
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help meet the individual needs of PFP states with respect to the development of 
democratic civil-military relations.630 
630 Partnership for Peace, US DOD publication, March 1996, p. 25. 
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